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ABSTRACT 
EXPLAINING ACHIEVEMENT: 
AN ASSESSMENT OF G. BATESON'S ECOLOGY OF MIND 
MAY 1994 
RICK FERRAN HENDRA, B.A. STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK at BUFFALO 
M. PHIL, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Arthur Eve 
t 
Gregory Bateson's research spanned many fields. The critical 
literature on him is mostly limited to assessments of his work within 
anthropology, psychology, and ethology. This study assesses Bateson's 
contribution to the methodology of the behavioral sciences generally. 
It proceeds by applying his methods to the ancient question, "Why does 
man pursue virtue?" and to its modern rephrasing in terms of excellence 
or achievement. Bateson himself only touched on this question without 
answering it. 
vi 
To evaluate Bateson's methodological approach against other approaches 
in the behavioral sciences, this study examines how other thinkers have 
explained achievement, using Bateson's tools and methods to critique or 
restate their conclusions. Major positions examined include those of 
Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Freud, Skinner, and 
McClelland. 
The principle conclusion drawn from this study is that Bateson's 
approach accounts for earlier explanations of achieving behavior within 
a broader framework suggesting new insights with more practical 
applications. Its success in explaining achievement argues for its 
general significance within the behavioral sciences. The approach 
involves a fundamental rethinking of what Aristotle called "formal 
causation." Cybernetics, information theory, organization theory and 
the other new mathematical theories comprising the cognitive sciences 
all purport to explain as well as describe our world. Bateson's work 
helps explain how this is possible. 
Bateson's essential contribution is his contextual theory of learning, 
which directly challenges the associational theory of learning that 
underlies most modern empirical research in the behavioral sciences. 
Bateson explains phenomena as diverse as character development and 
creativity, mammalian play and certain forms of schizophrenia in terms 
of hierarchies of context and the conflicts between them. And he does 
so within the generally accepted parameters of evolutionary theory that 
informs our modern understanding of biology and behavioral science. 
It is a major achievement and, as a first attempt to comprehend the 
foundations of a cognitive science still in its fledgling stages, will 
likely be appreciated more as time goes on. 
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CHAPTER 1 
DOUBLE DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM 
Some men seem able to go on working steadily with little success 
and no reassurance from outside. I am not one of these. I have 
needed to know that somebody else believed that my work had promise 
and direction, and I have often been surprised that others had 
faith in me when I had very little in myself. I have, at times, 
even tried to shrug off the responsibility which their continued 
faith imposed on me by thinking, "But they don't really know what I 
am doing. How can they know when I myself do not?" 
Gregory Bateson 1972, ix 
Gregory Bateson (1904-1981) is not a household name. He was a 
generalist in an age of specialists, and though he made important 
contributions in fields as diverse as anthropology, psychiatry, 
evolutionary theory, and ethology he was a relatively minor figure in 
each (Lipset 1980, 232). He held no vaunted academic positions and 
wrote no great, seminal works. His one book that did gain notoriety 
(and a series of paperback reissues) was compiled of previously 
published articles towards the end of his career and was embraced 
mainly by the academically disenfranchised counter-culture of the 
60's. The quote above is from the Foreword to that book, Steps to an 
Ecology of Mind. While prefaces and forewords are typically humble as 
they set about thanking those who helped midwife the book that follows, 
it is rare to find one as self-effacing as this: 
My first anthropological field work among the Baining of New 
Britain was a failure, and I had a period of partial failure in 
research with dolphins. Neither of these failures has ever been 
held against me. I therefore have to thank many people and 
institutions for backing me, at times when I did not consider 
myself a good bet. (Bateson 1972, ix) 
He goes on to speak of other failures and of the desparate pleas 
for grants that marked his career. And he seems fully to accept his 
lesser rank among the luminaries of his time: "It is no mean comfort, 
at times when the next idea cannot be found and the whole enterprise 
seems futile, to remember that greater men have wrestled with the same 
problems" (Bateson 1972, x). Bateson's unswerving commitment to his 
theoretical research despite all these setbacks, hardships, and 
insecurities seems remarkable. 
On the other hand, owing to of the fame of his father William 
Bateson, a noted biologist who helped introduce Mendel's genetic 
theory, and his own marriage to the hugely famous Margaret Mead, it 
must be said that doors were open to him that others might have found 
closed. He was fortunate to have so "many people and institutions" to 
thank for backing him. And in the end, his career surely justified 
their faith, scoring many more achievements than failures, as witness 
his pioneering use of the camera in anthropological fieldwork; his 
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introduction of the notion of cultural "schismogenesis" - a form of 
positive feedback before that term was even coined; his subsequent 
involvement with the founders of cybernetics; and his framing of the 
double-bind theory of schizophrenia. 
Gregory Bateson's career, in short, had its ups and downs, while 
eventually establishing him as a scientist and thinker of note. As 
his biographer, David Lipset, notes: 
Although there has been no paradigm change at the level of those 
initiated by his namesake, Gregor Mendel, or led by his father, 
William Bateson; still, the immediate consequences of his thought 
are not insignificant: books and articles known as classic in their 
field and influence upon leading members of every discipline to 
which he associated. In late 1979, he may appear to have fallen 
short of the highest realms of scientific achievement . . . But if 
his questions and ideals sometimes exceed him, they do so from a 
tantalizing distance rather than from an impossible one. It 
remains to be seen what the future will make of them and of him 
(Lipset 1980, 302) 
I recount this rather qualified estimation from Bateson's 
biographer along with Bateson's own confessions of self-doubt, and list 
the peculiarly scattered highlights in his life and work by way of 
contrast with some very different assessments of his achievement that 
Bateson himself made over the last few years of his life. Towards the 
end of his career, Bateson began to feel that the seemingly disparate 
threads of his varied theoretical pursuits could be woven together to 
powerful effect. In various articles and addresses from this period, 
he reviews his intellectual development and argues for its underlying 
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coherence. In the Introduction to Steps to an Ecology of Mind, after 
all the confessions of early failures in his Forward, he claims 
It was only in late 1969 that I became fully conscious of what I 
had been doing. With the writing of the Korzybski Lecture, "Form, 
Substance, and Difference," I found that in my work with primitive 
peoples, schizophrenia, biological symmetry, and in my discontent 
with the conventional theories of evolution and learning, I had 
identified a widely scattered set of bench marks or points of 
reference from which a new scientific territory could be defined. 
These bench marks I have called "steps" in the title of the book. 
(Bateson 1972, xvi) 
Indeed, Bateson envisioned not just a new scientific territory, but 
a whole new science taking shape around the ideas he was working with. 
In a later address, he envisions that 
The new science will form around profoundly nonphysical ideas: the 
nature of the relation between name and that which is named, the 
nature of recursive systems, and the nature of difference. (Bateson 
1991, 157) 
In the title of his 1972 book, he offered a tentative name for that 
new science: the "ecology of mind", which he describes as 
a new way of thinking about ideas and those aggregates of ideas 
which I call 'minds.' ... It is a science which does not yet 
exist as an organized body of theory or knowledge. (Bateson 1972, 
xv) 
Bateson envisioned more than just a new science. In an address at 
the Langley Porter Clinic where his team had framed the double bind 
theory of schizophrenia twenty years before, he argued that the ideas 
they developed then had opened a new era in psychiatry and in the 
behavioral sciences as a whole: 
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These questions . . .were the beginnings of a profound change in 
the paradigms of psychiatric theory. Indeed, the whole of our 
thinking -- our ideas of how to think -- about problems of 
behavioral science has changed. 
From now on the focus of theory in these sciences will inevitably 
be upon form rather than content ... 
We were not alone in this change of focus from content and 
narrative to form. Warren McCulloch was with us, and a few 
others. But we at Langley Porter had the thrill of being in the 
front line. (Bateson 1991, 156) 
Bateson speaks of a "change in the paradigms", recalling that badly 
overused phrase, "paradigm shift." Here it still conforms to Thomas 
Kuhn's original notion of a shift in the conceptual and methodological 
foundations of a field - a revolution in how we approach and understand 
a subject. And Bateson is proposing his new paradigm not only for 
psychiatry but for the behavioral sciences as a whole. His literary 
executor, Rodney Donaldson, writes in his introduction to Bateson's 
last collection of essays, 
Bateson sought continually to elucidate the basis of form and 
pattern in the living world. As a result, he is a primary 
harbinger of what may be a major shift in Western thought, a 
paradigmatic shift from a mindless bio-sphere to one arising in and 
through mental process. (Bateson 1991, xi) 
That is a formidable claim and a considerable achievement should it 
prove true. A paradigm shift of that magnitude recalls the comedic rant 
from the 60's: "Everything you know is wrong." While behavioral 
science isn't everything, it covers quite a bit of curriculum. All the 
applied behavioral sciences, from education to management to 
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psychiatry, would likely need reworking as well. How should we assess 
a claim like that? How might we measure Bateson's achievement with 
respect to new foundations for the behavioral sciences? That is the 
question that drives this study and provides the first description of 
our problem. 
The first step to assessing his achievement might be to ask how 
Bateson's colleagues in the scientific community have assessed it. His 
own biographer, we saw, could credit Bateson with "no paradigm change 
at the level of those initiated by his namesake, Gregor Mendel" 
although genetic theory is a field where Bateson thought the shift in 
paradigms was already most in evidence. Genetic theory is replete with 
the language of messages, codes, and information that informs Bateson's 
own discourse. This wasn't Bateson's doing, however -- it was Mendel 
himself who posited patterns and rules as the basis of the field, and 
this in turn influenced Bateson. In the years since that biography was 
written, I've read nothing aside from Donaldson's panegyric to dispute 
Lipset's assessment. The old paradigms seem to be holding their own 
and Bateson's influence, frankly, seems negligible, his work in general 
neglected while this or that part of it is subject to occasional 
attack: the double bind theory, for instance, is hotly contested by 
neurophysiologists who trace schizophrenia to chemical irregularities 
in the brain (though Bateson anticipated this development, seeing his 
approach and theirs as complementary). 
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The fact is that there has been little critical review of Bateson's 
thought. There have been no book length studies, just one not very 
critical biography and a smattering of articles over the years that 
tend to focus on specific aspects of his work in some specific field or 
other. 
The most extensive use of Bateson's ideas I've found is in linguist 
Deborah Tannen's recently popular works on conversational dynamics. 
She draws on his notions of schismogenesis and contextual framing to 
explain how understanding goes awry in our everyday exchanges (Tannen, 
1986). Perhaps she represents the leading edge of a wave of younger 
researchers who will finally press Bateson's claims. Perhaps she is 
sailing solo on an ebbing tide. At this point, we can say only that 
Bateson's role as harbinger of "a major shift in Western thought" has 
yet to be addressed by the literature. 
Did Bateson misestimate his accomplishment? Or have the implica¬ 
tions of his work simply not been realized? 
Bateson could certainly have misestimated, although he was not the 
sort of man given to vainglorious claims. He was, as we've seen, 
rather humble about his own accomplishments and readily credited the 
most fundamental principles of the new "ecology of ideas" to others - 
to Bertrand Russell and A.N. Whitehead, Warren McCullough, Norbert 
Weiner, Adelbert Ames, and such. He was, in fact, a very careful, 
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very skeptical theoretician. If he misestimated, it would be 
instructive to find out where he went wrong. Claims to new paradigms 
seem epidemic on the social scientific map these days and if Bateson 
was a progenitor of certain strains of these, as I think likely, a 
diagnosis might be useful in developing antidotal arguments and 
restoring our cognitive health. 
On the other hand, it would be entirely in keeping with Kuhn's 
model of scientific revolutions were a challenge to fundamental 
paradigms to be stubbornly ignored or resisted till a younger 
generation was in position to take up the cause and make the case. 
I find it more probable that the power of his ideas has not been 
fully appreciated for the simple reason that, being a man of many 
fields, he was finally claimed by none. In an age of specialists, who 
could assess such a broad-based synthesis? Who are the generic 
behavioral scientists? What method would they use to judge a position 
that rejects their entire methodology? It might seem the proper task 
of some branch of philosophy, but that was one field Bateson never 
formally enrolled in. Though he came to consider himself essentially 
an epistemologist, he drew a distinction between philosophical 
epistemology and that study of learning which is more properly a part 
of natural science and which he made his own. He never wrote for the 
journals of philosophers, or engaged in their debates. And they have 
replied in kind. 
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It must be said, too, that Bateson's ideas are not easily gotten 
hold of. A scientist by training, his oeuvre consists almost entirely 
of short journal articles that studiously avoid speculation. He 
offered no system and little synthesis of his key ideas. My guess is 
that a more coherent framework for the science he envisioned will be 
needed before the full weight of his achievement can be determined. 
And that won't happen until his methodology has been applied fruitfully 
to problems in a variety of behavioral disciplines. My intention here 
is to take one step in that direction, to attempt such an application 
and see what light it sheds on the significance of Bateson's "ecology 
of mind." 
The problem I propose to consider is why people pursue achievement - 
not all people, perhaps, and none all the time, but enough to make a 
difference wherever civilization has taken root throughout recorded 
history. I am distinguishing civilization from those pre-literate 
cultures that have sustained their way of life with little change over 
long stretches of time, where "achievement," if at all translatable, 
may signify something rather different. Here it is taken to mean 
something accomplished by superior ability or special effort, and often 
in spite of obstacles and discouragements (Random House Dictionary 
1987, 15) It signifies a noteworthy accomplishment, implying some 
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degree of public recognition as opposed to more private accomplishments 
like my five year old's learning to ride a bike. Discovering a new 
paradigm for the behavioral sciences would certainly be an achievement. 
The question is virtually the same as that first posed by the 
ancient Greek philosophers: why does man seek virtue (arete - or as we 
would say today, "excellence")? Why does he (for the Greeks it was 
always "he") seek to be first among peers? What makes the question 
interesting are the "obstacles and discouragements" that so typically 
obstruct the path to achievement: the pursuit of excellence and the 
pursuit of happiness often seem headed in different directions. The 
biographies of the illustrious seem just as prone to unhappy endings as 
the untold stories of common folk, and those who pursue great deeds 
without success may indeed be unhappier than most. 
The problemmatical nature of the pursuit of achievement is well 
illustrated by Bateson himself: What caused him to spurn the secure and 
easy path his talents and contacts so easily availed him? What 
sustained him through repeated false starts, failures, and self-doubts 
in the lifelong pursuit of intellectual attainment? While the faith of 
others must have been a comfort when the way grew dark, as Bateson 
himself suggested, what started him on that path to begin with? How 
does such commitment form? Of what is it made? More importantly, what 
kind of an answer -- what sort of explanation -- would we be looking 
for? How, indeed, would Bateson himself go about answering that 
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question? How would he use his ecology of ideas to address it? Taken 
together, these questions provide the second description of our problem 
here. 
I have offered two "descriptions of the problem," although they 
appear to be simply two separate problems, in keeping with one of 
Bateson's fundamental methodological principles: the "method of double 
or multiple comparison" (Bateson 1979, 87). This refers to "the bonus 
of understanding which the combination of information affords" (Bateson 
1979, 68). The combinations that Bateson extolled could be as simple 
as binocular vision, which affords the bonus of depth; or as complex as 
the comparison between learning and evolution, and both with 
epigenesis, that lay at the heart of his ecology of mind. 
Double description provided Bateson with a "manner of search" - not 
a specific methodology so much as a general investigative approach: 
". . . the combination of diverse pieces of information define(s) an 
approach of very great power to what I call 'the pattern which 
connects'" (Bateson 1979, 68). Bateson's concern for pattern is 
critical to the effectiveness of this approach, as it is to the 
formalist paradigm for behavioral science in general. Seemingly 
disparate phenomena, like learning and evolution can be fruitfully 
compared to the extent that both are stochastic processes (generating 
random elements within a selective framework). Understanding the 
general pattern of stochastic processes gives us a useful way of 
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comparing these phenomena - in terms of divergence (increasing 
unpredictability), the alteration of digital and analogic elements, and 
so on. 
These patterns, however, are more than mere artifacts of our 
methodology to which the phenomena must be fitted as to some 
Procrustean bed. The formal patterns our analysis uncovers and 
elaborates should properly inform the phenomena themselves. Bateson 
admits to a certain Platonic realism in this regard (Bateson 1979, 4), 
although his forms hold sway primarily in the world of living things, 
defined by learning and by the information contained in DNA. Patterns 
for Bateson are always patterns of relationship, and these patterns 
inhere in the living things themselves. Bateson's double descriptions 
or multiple comparisons, in other words, are intended to prove most 
fruitful in comparing apples and oranges rather than apples and 
orangutans, inasmuch as fruits as a class are structured by their 
relationships to insects, soils, sunlight, the branches on which grow, 
etc. There are numerous real and parallel relationships there, more 
than in the other case. At its most rigorous, dual description forms 
the basis for "abduction", which is 
. . .[philosopher C.S.] Pierce's word for that part of the 
process of inquiry which proposes that a given set of 
phenomena is a case under some previously proposed rule. 
(Bateson 1991, 186) 
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A rule is a simply a pattern in the imperative mood. Finding that 
two or more seemingly disparate pieces of information fall under the 
same rule or pattern can be a source of deep insight: 
Every abduction may be seen as a double or multiple description of 
some object or event or sequence. If I examine the social 
organization of an Australian tribe and the sketch of natural 
relations upon which the totemism is based, I can see these two 
bodies of knowledge as related abductively, as both falling under 
the same rules. 
. . .Their ideas about nature, however fantastic, are supported by 
their social system; conversely, the social system is supported by 
their ideas of nature. (Bateson 1979, 143) 
The doubly described problem that I have proposed here involves a 
comparison between the way in which Bateson's principles and methods 
might explain the pursuit of achievement and the way in which they 
might provide new foundations for the behavioral sciences as a whole. 
That is to say, I am less concerned with unearthing or reconstructing 
Bateson's explanation of the phenomenon of achievement (since he 
nowhere addresses that question directly) than with discovering what 
the "pattern" of his explanation - or his approach to one - might look 
like. 
It is useful, I think, in assessing the value of Bateson's new 
paradigm to apply it to some problem he didn't take on himself. 
Defending territory already annexed -- enjoining the controversy over 
double bind theory, for instance -- would do little to advance the 
argument over paradigms. If Bateson's vision is to stand, it must be 
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extended. If it fails that test, then the defense of all his various 
ideas and their applications will grow tired. 
Other questions might have been chosen. The question of 
achievement and why we pursue it has several advantages, however. 
First of all, it is worth asking. It is not a trivial question, but one 
that reaches down to the foundations of what it means to be human. No 
other animal on earth -- or machine intelligence -- shares this 
pursuit. That makes it an interesting test case for an approach that 
has its roots (as we'll see) in biology and cybernetics. A fortiori, 
as a pursuit that underlies our entire sense of ethics and human 
spirituality -- the no-man's land of scientific inquiry -- any light 
shed here would go a long way. 
For these reasons, too, it is a question that has attracted 
speculation for millenia. Philosophers of every description grappled 
with it long before its devolution into the hands of modern 
psychology. That makes it a useful dredging device for unearthing 
rival paradigms. 
It is also a question of fundamental importance for educators: if 
we are not able to inspire our students to the pursuit of achievement, 
then schooling will inevitably become more a matter of training than of 
education, a learning not for its own sake and for what is best in us, 
but simply for its use to other ends. Flow shall we inspire them to 
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that pursuit? How shall we persuade them that excellence is not just a 
corporate but a personal responsibility? Amid the growing evidence 
that mediocrity is become the standard by which academic effort is 
measured and that it erects no undue obstacles to wealth and power in 
our society, can we afford not to revisit the question of whence 
excellence comes? 
Finally, I must admit to an aesthetic criterion in the choice of 
question, and perhaps a personal one as well. Bateson seems to me in 
many ways a misfit and melancholy figure. Never finding an academic 
home or security in his career; laboring in the shadow of, first, a 
famous father and then an even more famous wife; not knowing for a long 
time what the underlying coherence or significance of his work really 
was; then, at the point where he felt he finally understood its import 
and had garnered acclaim, realizing that most of his audience didn't 
understand at all: 
"One of the repetitive yearnings," his wife said, "in the early 
mornings has been, 'Has anybody heard me?' . . . And that's a 
terrible feeling to have when you are nearing the end of your 
life." (Lipset 1980, 255) 
As the memory of him fades, so has his reputation. Bateson's 
achievements are a matter of question now, and it seems fitting in that 
case to consider his achievement together with the question of what 
motivated him -- and indeed, what motivates any of us -- along such a 
difficult and uncertain road. The two questions thus become one in his 
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person, so that either answer vouchsafes the other. In short, I hope 
to understand the man and assure that he is heard. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MAPPING THE APPROACH 
What leads human beings to pursue achievement is a surprisingly 
tough question, mostly because it is far from obvious what kind of 
answer would suffice or even what approach to take. What makes a 
falling body pursue contact with the earth is obviously a matter of 
physics. What makes a tree's roots pursue water is a matter of 
physiology and, ultimately, biochemistry. Like so many things human, 
however, the pursuit of excellence can conceivably be explained in many 
ways. 
Consider the analogy of criminality: Why do some pursue the life of 
crime? Many would say it is a matter of choice: believing he can get 
away with it, the criminal opts for a shortcut on the road to success. 
Others would say it is less a matter of choice than of upbringing, the 
crime-prone personality being established in the formative years of 
life within a dysfunctional family. Others blame criminality on a 
society rife with injustice and inequity, while still others will argue 
17 
that the criminal mind can be traced to its genetic inheritance. Many 
different kinds of answers, each with a claim to truth. 
The pursuit of achievement has likewise been explained variously in 
terms of personal choice, personality, sociology, and socio-biology. I 
believe we can narrow the range of possible answers just a bit, 
however. 
Unlike criminality, the pursuit of achievement can't plausibly be 
explained by the standard calculations of self-interest which 
economists expect of their ever-maximizing "rational man." The rewards 
are neither clear nor calculable. Bateson himself, we've noted, left 
the clear path to social and material reward when he forsook his 
initial preparation and patrimony in biology for graduate work in what 
was then the new and not so reputable field of anthropology. Then, 
having secured his reputation (and matrimony) there, he abandoned 
anthropology for the life of an itinerant researcher with no 
discernible disciplinary base. An intellectual free lancer, he was 
from that time on never financially secure, never tenured, always in 
anxious pursuit of some grant just to keep his researches going. He 
had no reason to believe he would ever achieve anything to materially 
redeem his situation, and yet he never deviated from his thought-path. 
He was clearly less motivated by the extrinsic rewards of 
intellectual life (whatever riches or recognition, power or position it 
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occasionally bestows) than by the intrinsic lure of theoretical 
discovery - "the pleasure of finding things out", as physicist Richard 
Feynman put it. Anyone reading this study has no doubt known that 
pleasure and hopes, perhaps, to rekindle it here. Such pleasures, of 
course, can be derived from non-intellectual accomplishment as well. 
There is surely some similar allure and pleasure in victory for 
athletes and generals, and some suitable analog for the artist or 
entrepreneur. And my son's pleasure at learning to ride his bike was 
certainly no less palpable. We can extend such examples indefinitely, 
eviscerating the explanatory power of the pleasure principle in the 
process. It's not enough, in other words, to say that people pursue 
achievement because it gives them pleasure. That only begs the 
question, which now shifts to the source and nature of the pleasure we 
take in achievement. If it was simply the pleasure of having completed 
a difficult task that gains approval from others, we might expect more 
commitment to homework or housework than we typically see. 
If looking to the extrinsic or intrinsic rewards of achievement 
doesn't seem to get us very far, that is because the commitment to 
achievement -- or any other lifelong pursuit -- simply can not be 
explained in terms of reasons and choices consciously made. Reasons 
and choices are tied to circumstance, arising in response to the 
situations one confronts and the options available. A lifelong 
commitment, by definition, transcends the circumstances of any 
particular choice. If Bateson consciously made the choice at the 
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beginning of his career to pursue achievement, he certainly had ample 
opportunities and reasons later on to reverse that choice -- as have 
innumerable others who labor with less success but no less dedication. 
It is the constancy and consistency of choices over an individual's 
lifetime in favor of some particular value that needs explaining here. 
This is true of criminality, too: though circumstances can drive 
anyone to an act of crime, it is the repeat offender -- the three or 
more time loser, in particular -- that demands explanation. If 
criminality were simply a matter of risk/benefit ratios and rational 
choice, our penal codes would provide more effective deterrence than 
they do. The situation of achievers is even less likely a matter of 
choice, since it is less likely that just anyone can be driven by 
circumstances into acts of achievement. In the cases of both the 
criminal and the achiever the reasons may change while the object of 
choice remains largely the same. How does such constancy come about? 
Constancy is a mark of character. It is not a character trait, 
like loyalty, but a defining criterion such that someone who seems 
incapable of enduring commitments seems to us lacking in character. 
Though "character" carries ethical connotations, this linkage should 
not be taken ethically: the constancy of Don Juan's faithlessness, his 
devotion to a life of sexual conquest, is as much a mark of his 
character as the fidelity of Odysseus' beleaguered Penelope. Character 
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constrains our choices, and our character lies ultimately beyond our 
choosing. 
To put it another way: explaining some particular choice of action 
in the context of its unfolding situation is the task of the historian; 
explaining a longterm, consistent pattern of choices is typically the 
task of the psycho-logist. As behavioral scientists, psychologists are 
less concerned with reasons than with causes. They seek explanations 
that can be generalized over many instances and individuals. 
Psychologists want to know why some choose the pleasures of 
intellectual discovery or sexual conquest while others are oblivious of 
or unwilling to commit to them. They wonder why some continue to 
pursue achievements that seem impossible to attain while others readily 
lower their expectations. They want to know how character traits are 
formed and how they are maintained. 
I should note here that psychologists seem to talk more about 
personality than character. The terms are in some usages nearly 
synonomous, as when we refer to "character" as "the aggregate of 
features and traits that form the individual nature of some person" 
(Random House Dictionary 1987, 346), and to "personality" as "the sum 
total of the physical, mental, emotional, and social characteristics of 
an individual" (Random House Dictionary 1987, 1445). 
21 
But "personality" carries connotations of a public self, a self-for- 
others (as in a "pleasing personality"), while "character" retains the 
ethical overtones of a more inward determination. This makes 
personality the more easily observed and researched subject from the 
psychologists' point of view, but makes "character" the more 
appropriate heading, to my mind, for the dedication to achievement. 
More importantly, Bateson himself drew this distinction, using the 
phrase "personality and character" as though they were two sides of a 
coin (Bateson 1991, 9-25), and noting that "the person, after all, is 
the mask. It is what is perceivable of a human organism." (Bateson 
1991, 75n). After his early collaborations with Margaret Mead on the 
problem of personality, questions of character became his abiding 
concern. 
By eliminating reasons and choices from our possible explanations 
for achievement and by focusing on character, we seem committed to some 
sort of psychological explanation. We might expect to address the 
problem in terms of temperament or dispositions or some other 
psychological mechanism; but for all their concern with what goes on 
inside the mind, psychologists still oftimes arrive at sociological 
answers, as when the criminal mind is itself explained in terms of 
early family upbringing or some matrix of social pressures and 
inequities. Psychologists also seem comfortable with biogenetic 
explanation, as evidenced by the increasing acceptance of drug 
therapies for sex offenders and violent schizophrenics. Though crime, 
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like achievement, is a social construct which presumably lies beyond 
the determinations of biochemistry, the tendencies to aggression or 
social distance which feed criminal activity might very conceivably 
have a genetic basis. Achieving behavior might be genetically rooted 
in similar ways. 
Diverse as these approaches seem, they needn't be mutually 
exclusive: certain instinctive tendencies may be channeled by social 
customs and institutions into behavioral patterns that individuals then 
develop dispositions for through reinforcements of various kinds. This 
pattern of explanation, which relies on a combination of psychological, 
sociological, and socio-biological factors can be applied to a wide 
range of character traits, from criminality to competitiveness to cross¬ 
dressing. It seems a reasonable model: it is inclusive rather than 
reductive, making room for competing viewpoints by showing how each 
complements the other. Is the model adequate? To answer that we need 
to know what the criteria might be for an adequate explanation. And to 
answer that, we need to ask first what it means to explain anything. 
Bateson wrestled with this question throughout his career, and we will 
need to grapple with it too. 
Framed in this way, the question of how to explain a lifelong 
pursuit of achievement passes beyond the concerns of biographers or 
psychologists into questions of concern to the philosopher of science. 
That is where it is meant to go. Historians and behavioral scientists 
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may test the bounds of accepted methodologies when the data demand it, 
and still stay rooted in their chosen soil. But opposing the reigning 
methodologies with alternatives and seeking to reconceptualize 
foundations takes an act of philosophy, a discussion of what it means 
to explain something, hence a step into meta-language and an uprooting 
from familiar ground. That is what a fundamental paradigm shift 
entails. That is what Bateson intended, and that is where we're 
headed. 
We have determined that our search for an explanation of 
achievement will bring us within the precincts of theories on character 
formation. We know, too, that the way of approach will find us 
exploring the fields (and avoiding the bogs) of philosophy. It remains 
to locate a starting point and initial direction for our quest. 
Perhaps we should just follow Bateson's steps. 
While Bateson never, in his published work, posed the specific 
question of how to explain a commitment to achievement, the question of 
character formation intrigued him from his first book, Naven, to his 
last, Mind and Nature, published forty three years later. And it was 
this question as much as any that propelled his career-long quest to 
unravel the puzzles of biological and behavioral explanation. "Naven, 
"Bateson declared in an epilog for the 1958 edition of that book, "was 
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a study of the nature of explanation" (Bateson 1991, 49). Instead of 
answering his questions, the passing years seemed only to elaborate and 
deepen them: "The immediate task of this book," he writes in the 
introduction to his last published work, Mind and Nature 
. . .is to construct a picture of how the world is joined together 
in its mental aspects. How do ideas, information, steps of logical 
or pragmatic consistency, and the like fit together? How is logic, 
the classical procedure for making chains of ideas, related to an 
outside world of things and creatures, parts and wholes? (Bateson 
1979, 19-20) 
Considering the scope of Bateson's wide-ranging interests, it is 
amazing how faithful he remained to a few central questions. These 
questions first emerged from his attempts, as a budding anthropologist, 
to understand an odd set of sexually suggestive behaviors among an 
obscure people on the other side of the world. 
Bateson's approach to anthropology was strongly influenced by A. R. 
Radcliffe-Brown, the founder of the British school of social 
anthropology, who viewed societies as organic wholes analogous to 
living organisms: 
The analogy suggested that the social structure of a society, by 
which he meant the system of subgroups, clans, moieties, age- 
grades, factions, was comparable in organization to the structure 
of an organism. Both remained constant over time -- internal 
relations persisted even though constituents were changing. (Lipset 
1980, 124) 
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With his background in biology, Bateson understandably found this 
analogy attractive. The social anthropologists relied on functional 
analysis to explain the social activities they observed, much as 
physiologists explain bodily organs in terms of their functions: 
Radcliffe-Brown believed that the "function of any recurrent 
activity, such as the punishment of a crime or a funeral ceremony, 
is the part it plays in the social life as a whole, and therefore 
the contribution it makes to the maintenance of structural 
continuity. Following Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown deduced individual 
behavior from social structure ... As such, the psychology of 
individuals was irrelevant to the study of society. (Upset 1980, 
125) 
But Bateson's work on Naven was also influenced by his fateful 
meeting with Margaret Mead (and her then husband, Reo Fortune) in 1932, 
while doing fieldwork among the Iatmul tribe along the Sepik River in 
New Guinea. According to Bateson's biographer, 
Mead had been trying to assess the contribution of culture to 
development of sex roles. Apart from innate biology, how did 
cultural patterning differentiate masculine and feminine 
personalities? . . . Among Bateson's Iatmul, there was a ceremony 
called naven, which dramatized the everyday [sex] roles -- by 
reversing them. Father's sisters and mother's brothers would 
exchange clothes; the men dressing in filthy skirts while the women 
adorned themselves in male finery, and strutted as they grated 
their husband's serrated lime sticks in and out of lime gourds. By 
contrasting these data, they worked out some ideas about the 
relations between sex roles and individual temperament -- which 
they understood to be the raw material of personality that culture 
shaped and selected. (Upset 1980, 136) 
Their discussions on the effects of culture on personality were 
greatly stimulated by the "arrival of a manuscript draft of Ruth 
Benedict's Patterns of Culture ..." (Lipset 1980, 137). Benedict was 
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a former student of pioneering anthropologist Franz Boas at Columbia 
U., as was Mead: 
. . .Boasians were immured not with analogies borrowed from the 
natural sciences which suggested unitary notions of "system," but 
rather with the "psychological, aesthetic and humanistic" premise 
of "pattern," in which the idea of cultural integration was a 
problem and not a given. 
. . .Ruth Benedict had taken to psychological characterizations of 
cultural configurations. To Benedict, society was analogous, not 
to an organism, but to a person. Both were organized in consistent 
patterns of thought and feeling. (Lipset 1980, 138) 
While not denying the importance of social structure, Benedict was 
arguing for another level of analysis, one recognizing that the ideas 
and values of the culture and the psychology of individuals shared 
patterns which were also worthy and capable of study. 
Bateson took up the problem of explaining the naven ceremony by 
examining those "consistent patterns of thought and feeling," which he 
labelled "eidos" and "ethos" respectively. "Ethos" (the Greek word for 
character) he defined as "the expression of a culturally standardized 
system of organization of the instincts and emotions of the individual" 
(Bateson 1958, 118). Iatmul manhood, for instance, was standardized 
around expressions of "pride, self-assertion, harshness, and 
spectacular display" (Bateson 1958, 198). His definition recalls our 
inclusive model for character formation, whereby genetically based 
instincts and emotions are channelled through customs and institutions, 
gradually forming those habitual expressions that constitute 
character. The phrasing suggests, given roughly similar instinctive 
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and emotive capacities, that character is a function of the cultural 
setting; but Bateson was unwilling to assign to cultural configurations 
the status of an independent variable: 
Unlike Radcliffe-Brown, Bateson's causal scheme did not deduce 
individual behavior from social structure. Neither did it induce 
social structure from individual behavior. Rather, both these 
processes were invoked. The pervading themes of individual 
behavior not only resulted from processes of standardization but 
also effected them. He posited a circular, interdependent, 
bidirectional system of causation. (Lipset 1980, 142) 
His refusal to take cultural configurations and social cohesion as 
a given and his emphasis on the psychology and behavior of individuals 
showed the influence of the Boas school. And his embrace of a 
"circular, interdependent, bidirectional system of causation" marked 
the beginnings of his movement away from the one-way functionalism of 
Radcliffe-Brown toward a "more relativized sense of function." (Lipset 
1980, 147) This turn would eventually prove decisive for Bateson's 
thinking. Lipset (1980, 142) notes the influence of philosopher Alfred 
North Whitehead in Bateson's suggestion that 
A further and more compelling argument in favour of the circular 
. . . view of functional systems is to be found in the fact that 
any other view would drive us to belief either in a 'first cause' 
or in some sort of teleology --in fact we should have to accept 
some fundamental dualism in nature which is philosophically 
inadmissable. (Bateson 1958, 117) 
Whitehead's influence on Bateson was subtle but longstanding, as he 
was a close friend of his father's. The metaphysics laid out in 
Whitehead's Process and Reality was a realist attempt at overcoming the 
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dualism of mind and matter, subject and object, inherent in so much of 
the philosophical tradition; and Bateson committed himself with 
increasing urgency to that same cause as the scientifically 
debilitating affects of Cartesian dualism became clearer to him in 
later years. The connection that Whitehead drew between circular 
causality and the problem of teleology (granting causal efficacy to as 
yet unrealized purposes -- a traditional scientific taboo) helped draw 
Bateson to cybernetics in his middle years. At this early stage in his 
thinking, however, the most striking effect of Whitehead's influence 
came as he struggled with the last chapter of Naven: 
The final climax of the book is the discovery, described in the 
epilogue --and achieved only a few days before the book went to 
press -- of what looks like a truism today: that ethos, eidos, 
sociology, economics, cultural structure, social structure, and all 
the rest of these words refer only to scientists' ways of putting 
the jigsaw puzzle together. 
These theoretical concepts have an order of objective reality. 
They are really descriptions of processes of knowing, adopted by 
scientists, but to suggest that "ethos" or "social structure" has 
more reality than this is to commit Whitehead's fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness. The trap or illusion -- like so many 
others -- disappears when correct logical typing is achieved. . . 
. People can be influenced, of course, by economic theories or 
economic fallacies -- or by hunger -- but they cannot possibly be 
influenced by "economics." "Economics" is a class of explanations, 
not itself an explanation of anything. (Bateson 1991, 50) 
Years later, Bateson was still exploring the depths of this insight 
via the broader formulation of it in Alfred Korzybski's famous aphorism 
"the map is not the territory," describing the general relationship 
between language and the world it describes. As Bateson came to 
realize that there could be no bidirectional causality between social 
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structure and ethos because these were mere abstractions, his attention 
refocused on the concrete mutual causality inherent in the human 
interactions and, particularly, on that form of mutually reinforcing, 
potentially destructive interaction which he labelled 
"schismogenesis." 
Bateson's identification and description of schismogenetic 
interactions would prove to be Naven's most lasting contribution. 
Schismogenesis has its basis in the mutual causality at work in any 
interaction between two persons: A's acts provide stimuli for B's acts 
which in turn become stimuli for further action on the part of A, which 
in turn become stimuli for B, and so on. Schismogenetic interactions 
occur when B's responses to A "become stimuli for more intense action 
[italics added] on the part of A and so on, A and B acting either as 
individuals or group members" (Bateson 1972, 109). Bateson classified 
such mutually reinforcing sequences into two types: 
(a) symmetrical schismogenesis, where the mutually promoting 
actions of A and B are essentially similar, e.g., in cases of 
competition, rivalry, and the like; and (b) complementary 
schismogenesis, where the mutually promoting actions are 
essentially dissimilar but mutually appropriate, e.g., in cases of 
dominance-submission, succoring-dependence, exhibitionism- 
spectatorship, and the like. (Bateson 1972, 109) 
We may be most familiar with schismogeneses in the international 
arena, where symmetrical competition has given us arms races (checked 
only by finances or force) while complementary dominance/submission has 
led to the apotheosis of numerous petty tyrants from Lenin to Saddam 
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and the enslavement of their subjects. These latter schismogeneses 
also prove subject to certain checks. 
In Iatmul society, Bateson found two pervasive forms of 
schismogenic interaction which could threaten the social equilibrium if 
left unchecked: there was a powerful current of symmetrical rivalry 
among the men and their clans, marked by boasts, insults, and sometimes 
blows over this one's or that's respective achievements in fishing, 
headhunting, or whatever; and there was an equally powerful tendency 
towards complementary interactions, towards dominance and submission in 
particular, between men and women (as we might expect), but also 
between novice boys and the older men who intitiate them into clan 
membership and manhood. Bateson's discovery was that the sexual role 
reversals of the naven ceremony provided the necessary checks on these 
schismogenic interactions. 
The relationship of a boy [laua) and his mother's brother (wau), 
for example, is important among the Iatmul, as it is among many 
societies organized around exogamous clans. The mother's brother is 
typically from a clan other than the one the boy will belong to, which 
typically invites symmetrical rivalries. Sooner or later, the boy's 
behavior provokes the naven ceremony: "When laua boasts in the presence 
of waUy the latter has recourse to naven behavior" which is "an 
exaggerated caricature of a complementary sexual relationship" between 
them (Bateson 1991, 57). Because of the boys' age and relationship to 
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him, the wau in this way refuses the invitation to symmetrical rivalry: 
The laua makes the symmetrical gesture and the wau responds not by 
overbearing complementary dominance but by the reverse of this -- 
exaggerated submission. (Bateson 1991, 58) 
The boy's uncle, in other words, gently mocks him by pretending to 
defer to his dominance as a wife might: "Wau's behavior is a 
caricature of submission" (Bateson 1991, 58). And that helps defuse 
the tensions that the suggestion of symmetrical rivalry had 
threatened. The naven ceremony also involves women: 
. . .while the wau's transvesticism is a caricature of the female 
role, the transvesticism of father's sister and elder brother's 
wife is a proud exhibition of masculinity. It looks as though 
these women are stating a symmetrical rivalry vis-a-vis the men, 
compensating for their normally complementary role. (Bateson 1991, 
58) 
And so the runaway tendencies of both the symmetrical and the 
complementary interactions which threaten to destroy Iatmul culture are 
both addressed through the naven ceremony. This is an intriguing and 
elegant explanation -- too elegant, somehow, for as Bateson reflected 
later: 
. . .1 made an effort to account for the presumed dynamic 
equilibrium of the system by pointing out that the symmetrical and 
complementary processes are in some sense opposites of each other 
so that the culture containing both of these processes might 
conceivably balance them one against the other. This, however, was 
at best an unsatisfactory explanation, since it assumed that two 
variables will, by coincidence, have equal and opposite values; but 
it is obviously improbable that the two processes will balance each 
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other unless some functional relationship obtains between them. In 
the so-called dynamic equilibrium of chemical reactions, the rate 
of change in one direction is a function of the concentration of 
the products of the inverse change, and reciprocally. But I was 
not able to see any such functional dependence between the two 
schismogenic processes and had to leave the matter there when the 
book was written. (Bateson 1991, 55) 
This problem aside, Bateson's schismogeneses, with their circular 
causality, mutual reinforcement, and necessary governing factors, found 
an appreciative audience among a small group of mathematicians and 
engineers who were drawing together the basis for what would become 
known as cybernetics. This led to Bateson's invitation to attend the 
so-called Macy Foundation Conferences, held annually or biannually from 
1942 to 1953. Bateson recalled later that "membership in those 
conferences, with Norbert Wiener, John Von Neumann, [Warren] McCulloch 
and the rest, was one of the great events of my life" (Lipset 1980, 
180). 
The Macy Conferences were organized in response to the growing 
interest among researchers from a number of different fields in self- 
regulatory mechanisms. Some of the interest had developed through 
mathematician Norbert Wiener's work on guided missile systems in World 
War II; some, like the neurophysiologistWarren McCulloch and 
physiologists Arturo Rosenbluth and Lorente de No, shared "an interest 
in the physiological mechanism underlying the phenomena of conditioned 
reflex" (Lipset 1980, 179); others, like Julian Bigelow and Johnny Von 
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Neumann -- "a child prodigy of mathematics, 'Johnny' to the end of his 
life," in the words of Jacob Bronowski (Bronowski 1973, 432) -- came to 
the conferences out of their growing fascination with computers. They 
were galvanized by a short paper written by Rosenblueth, Wiener, and 
Bigelow called "Behavior, Purpose, and Teleology," announcing 
. . .their consensus that mutual communication of error between 
the ideal and the actual, called "feedback," was pivotal to the 
theoretical understanding of all voluntary or purposeful behavior. 
(Lipset 1980, 178) 
Over the course of 12 years, these conferences induced some of the 
finest minds of the time to return again and again to the issues 
introduced in that paper: 
Except for the second conference, called Teleological Mechanisms 
and Circular Causal Systems, all the rest retained the name of the 
original meeting, Feedback Mechanisms and Circular Causal Systems 
in Biological and Social Systems. (Lipset 1980, 180) 
The application of cybernetic concepts to the life sciences drew 
the intense interest of Bateson, as well as Margaret Mead and 
psychologists Lawrence Frank and Lawrence Kubie. The relevance of 
these new conceptual tools to the social sciences may not have been 
immediately obvious to all, but it was fundamental. A little 
background may be helpful here; fortunately, Bateson has some stock 
presentations we can borrow: 
The ideas themselves are extremely simple. All that is required is 
that we ask not about the characteristics of lineal chains of cause 
and effect but about the characteristics of systems in which the 
chains of cause and effect are circular or more complex than 
circular .... 
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Such circular causal systems must in the nature of the case either 
seek a steady state or undergo progressive exponential change; and 
this change will be limited either by the energy resources of the 
system, or by some external restraint, or by a breakdown of the 
system as such. 
The steam engine with the governor illustrates the type of circuit 
which may seek a steady state. Here the circuit is so constructed 
that the faster the piston moves the faster the governor spins; and 
the faster the governor spins the wider the divergence of its 
weighted arms; and the wider the divergences of these arms the less 
the power supply. But this in turn affects the activity of the 
piston. The self-corrective characteristic of the circuit as a 
whole depends upon there being within the circuit at least one link 
such that the more there is of something, the less there will be of 
something else .... 
In contrast, a steam engine with a governor so constructed that a 
wider divergence of the arms of the governor will increase the 
supply of steam to the cylinder affords an instance of what the 
engineers would call "runaway." The feedback is "positive" and the 
system will operate faster and faster. (Bateson 1991, 56) 
The presence of a negative feedback loop gives the system as a 
whole the appearance of purpose. Keeping the supply of steam within 
certain parameters keeps the arms from spinning too fast or too slow, 
which is the purpose of the governor -- or rather, our purpose in 
designing it that way. It could be argued that every element in a 
machine is there for a purpose, but what we have here is an element 
which serves to keep the entire mechanism working toward its purposed 
end. It is like a built-in intelligence, adjusting the system as 
needed to achieve its goal. 
The discovery that mechanical systems can be designed to emulate 
goal directed behavior provided a potentially powerful insight into the 
debate over whether living systems can ever be described in wholly 
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biochemical terms. With the discovery of cybernetics, it seemed 
thatperhaps they could. And if the teleology of organisms might be 
described in wholly physico-chemical terms, might human intelligence 
and even social sytems be similarly subject to cybernetic redescription 
and hard scientific analysis? These are the sorts of questions the 
Macy Conferences keyed in on. 
The cybernetic circuit assumes a social form in the basic 
interaction we described before, where A's acts are stimuli for B's 
acts which in turn become stimuli for more action on the part of A, and 
so on. What Bateson called "schismogenesis" is essentially a form of 
positive feedback. By mapping his own key notions onto the 
fundamentals of cybernetics, Bateson was suddenly given access to a 
body of theory that enabled him to extend his ideas in whole new ways. 
In Naven, Bateson had struggled to understand how the powerful 
schismogeneses pervading Iatmul society had been held in check. While 
he was convinced the naven ceremony was part of the answer, it seemed 
improbable that it could just pop up whenever and to whatever extent 
was necessary to maintain equilibrium. The notion of feedback now gave 
him a new way of looking at the problem: 
It was not good enough to say that symmetrical schismogenesis 
happened by coincidence to balance the complementary. It was now 
necessary to ask, is there a communicational pathway such that an 
increase in symmetrical schismogenesis will bring about an increase 
in the corrective complementary phenomena? Could the system be 
circular and self-corrective? (Bateson 1991, 57) 
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He decided, of course, that it was. As we saw before, "the 
complementary sexual relationship between wau and laua, is in fact set 
off by overweening symmetrical behavior" (Bateson 1991, 57). Bateson 
thought it significant that the women make their transvestite statement 
of symmetrical rivalry with men "at a time when a man, the wau, is 
stating his complementarity vis-a-vis laua" (Bateson 1991, 57). Armed 
with this insight, he was able to identify a number of other examples 
where the governing behavior arises not by coincidence but in more or 
less direct response to schismogenic excess. 
Not surprisingly, according to his biographer, David Lipset: 
" . . .[T]he new theoretical framework was intoxicating to Bateson 
and came to dominate his scientific imagination . . . Now at the 
age of 42, he had a new set of conceptual tools and a new task, 
which was to glean what he could from them . . .(Lipset 1980, 182- 
3) 
Bateson claimed it was the beginning "of a general theory of 
process and change, of adaptation and pathology": 
[I]n terms of the general theory, we have to re-examine all that we 
thought we knew about organisms, societies, families, personal 
relation-ships, ecological systems, servomechanisms, and the like 
(Bateson 1958, Preface). 
The "new set of conceptual tools" were clearly laid out at the Macy 
conference Bateson organized to introduce social scientists to Von 
Neumann and Wiener in 1946. The two mathematicians provided a rich 
summary, 
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. . .differentiating between "analogical" and "digital" coding, 
discussing circuits, servomechanisms, positive and negative 
feedback, the measurement of information and its relation to the 
idea of entropy, binary systems, Von Neumann's theory of games, 
Bertrand Russell's theory of logical types, "pathological" 
oscillations (yes-no-yes-no-yes, etc.) in a computer confronted by 
a Russellian paradox, and the notion that communication systems 
depend upon "information" and not "energy." (Lipset 1980, 180) 
For our purposes (as well as Bateson's), the most critical new tool 
in Wiener's and Von Neumann's cybernetic catalog was Russell's (and 
Whitehead's) theory of logical types. This was, in effect, an 
extension of Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness, applying 
the logical distinction between concrete and abstract to different 
categories or levels of abstraction. Bateson described the theory this 
way: 
Russell's central notion is the truism that a class cannot be a 
member of itself. The class of elephants has not got a trunk and 
is not an elephant. This truism must evidently apply with equal 
force when the members of the class are not things but names or 
signals. The class of commands is not itself a command and cannot 
tell you what to do. 
Corresponding to this hierarchy of names, classes, and classes of 
classes, there is also a hierarchy of propositions and messages, 
and within this latter hierarchy the Russellian discontinuity must 
also obtain. We speak of messages, metamessages, and meta¬ 
metamessages, and what I have called deutero-learning I might 
appropriately have called metalearning. (Bateson, 1991, 60) 
There were two critical insights for Bateson here. The first had 
to do with the way this theory was applied to cybernetic circuits. 
Consider that other standard example of a homeostatic system, the 
thermostat: 
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A house with a thermostatically controlled heating system is a 
simple self-corrective circuit of the sort discussed above. A 
thermometer appropria-tely placed in the house is linked into the 
system to control a switch in such a way that when the temperature 
goes above a certain critical level the furnace is switched off. 
Similarly, when the temperature falls below a certain level the 
furnace is switched on. But the system is also governed by another 
circumstance, namely, the setting of the critical temperatures. By 
changing the position of a dial, the owner of the house can alter 
the characteristics of the system as a whole by changing the 
critical tempera-tures at which the furnace will be turned on and 
shut off. Following Ashby, I will reserve the word "variables" for 
those measurable circumstances which change from moment to moment 
as the house oscillates around some steady temperature, and shall 
reserve the word "parameters" for those characteristics of the 
system which are changed for example when the householder 
intervenes and changes the setting of the thermostat. I shall 
speak of the latter change as of a higher order than changes in the 
variables. (Bateson 1991, 60) 
For "higher order" we can read "higher logical type." What 
Russell's and Whitehead's theory provided was an essential logical and 
mathematical tool for the cybernetic explanation of hierarchical 
systems. Bateson was almost certainly correct in suggesting that "the 
discoverers only half knew the monstrous power, the wide significance, 
of their discovery" (Bateson 1991, 154). And he could have been 
describing his own role as he went on to observe that: 
It sometimes seems as if every great breakthrough in science is 
only the discovery of the wider relevance of something said many 
years before. Whitehead and Russell seem to have seen their work 
concerning the foundations of mathematics as an abstruse and 
abstract matter, not as something fundamental to all human 
interaction and all evolutionary process. (Bateson 1991, 154) 
This insight into the nature of hierarchy in complex systems helped 
Bateson unravel the puzzling improbability confronting his explanation 
of the naven ceremony. He now realized that the symmetrical rivalries 
39 
he had witnessed among the Iatmul operated only within the parameters 
set by the complementary schismogenesis of dominance/submission -- and 
vice versa. They were both part of a larger circuit, a system of 
behavior in which these schismogeneses served only as subsystems. It 
was this larger circuit that was self-correcting. 
The theory of logical types not only helped tie up the loose ends 
from his prior research, it spun new threads in all directions. A 
second fundamental insight provided by the theory concerned the nature 
of learning. What Bateson now realized was that the "meta" 
relationship held there, too. As "meta-messages" refer to messages 
about messages, metalearning refers to learning about learning - not to 
propositions about learning but, rather, to the process of learning how 
to learn. Bateson's term "deutero-learning" defines this notion more 
precisely in terms of the commonplace lab phenomenon "that the 
experimental subject -- whether animal or man, becomes a better subject 
after repeated experiments" (Bateson 1972, 166): 
Let us say that there are two sorts of gradient discernible in all 
continued learning. The gradient at any point on a simple learning 
curve (e.g., a curve of rote learning) we will say chiefly 
represents rate of proto-learning. If, however, we inflict a 
series of similar learning experiments on the same subject, we 
shall find that in each successive experiment the subject has a 
somewhat steeper proto-learning gradient. This progressive change 
in the rate of proto-learning we will call "deutero-learning." 
(Bateson 1972, 167) 
Through being subjected to a "series of similar learning 
experiments," the lab rat learns to anticipate the experimenter's 
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game. He begins to understand at some level "what's going on," to 
guess, for instance, that this is a game he can win -- that exploration 
on his part may lead to reward. Deutero-learning is of a higher 
logical type than proto-learning because it represents learning about 
the contexts of action, about the sets of alternatives to be chosen 
from in any given situation. It is like learning to set a thermostat. 
And it shapes the way the rat sees the world: 
I assume that in any learning experiment -- e.g., of the Pavlovian 
or the Instrumental Reward Type -- there occurs not only that 
learning in which the experimenter is usually interested, namely, 
the increased frequency of the conditioned response in the 
experimental context, but also a more abstract or higher order of 
learning, in which the experimental subject improves his ability to 
deal with contexts of a given type. The subject comes to act more 
and more as if contexts of this type were expectable in the 
universe. (Bateson 1991, 54) 
A rat whose development was shaped by a series of Pavlovian 
contexts (where rewards come after a buzzer or other unconditioned 
stimulus, regardless of what he does) would come to expect a world in 
which his actions had little effect. Rather than developing his skills 
as a maze explorer, he would likely become a more passive creature. 
And this phenomenon is limited neither to labs nor lab animals. This 
same sort of metalearning provides the basis for various forms of 
psychotherapy: 
Now all those psychiatric theories which invoke the past experience 
of the individual as an explanatory device depend necessarily upon 
some such theory of high-order learning, or learning to learn. 
When the patient tells the therapist that, in her childhood, she 
learned to operate a typewriter, this is of no particular interest 
to him unless he happens to be a vocational counselor as well as a 
therapist. But when she starts to tell him about the context in 
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which she learned this skill, how her aunt taught her and rewarded 
her or punished her or withheld reward and punishment, then the 
psychiatrist begins to be interested; because what the patient 
learns from formal characteristics or patterns of the contexts of 
learning is the clue to her present habits, her "character," her 
manner of interpreting and participating in the interaction between 
herself and others. (Bateson 1991, 54) 
Indeed, the development of character is for Bateson a form of 
deutero or meta-learning. Our retracing of Bateson's steps has finally 
brought us to the point where we can begin to describe his general 
understanding of character and its development. 
In Mind and Nature, Bateson distills his theory of character 
formation to a nearly mathematical precision. He tells us that 
" . . .the unit of interaction and the unit of characterological 
learning (not just acquiring the so-called "response" when the 
buzzer sounds, but the becoming ready for such automatisms) are the 
same." (Bateson 1979, 132) 
The density of Bateson's expression here almost entirely obscures 
the thought behind it, so we need to take some time with his 
definitions. Bateson defines character as "the system of 
interpretations which we place on the contexts we encounter" (Bateson 
1979, 115), and "characterological learning" he defines as "learning 
the contexts of life" (Bateson 1979, 132). At the heart of both 
definitions is the notion of "context" which, through its connection to 
the theory of logical types, is basic to Bateson's thinking. By 
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"contexts of life" he means the ways we classify the various life 
situations we find ourselves in: Is this play - or for real? Is this 
love - or conquest? Does this situation call for moral choice - or 
pragmatic calculation? Is this even a situation I can influence at 
all? These questions all concern the context of our actions. Our 
choice of action depends on our identifying which sets of alternatives 
we can choose from. We have to frame the situation, identify the 
context, understand our parameters. Bateson is suggesting that the 
contexts we are able to recognize, and the markers by which we 
recognize them, define our character. 
For example, Bateson contrasts the fatalist, who sees "all events 
as preordained" and himself as "not able to influence the course of 
events," with the "instrumentalist," the pragmatist, who typically 
views situations in terms of causes and effects with outcomes subject 
to his manipulation (Bateson 1972, 173). The two live in quite 
different worlds: their attention, even within the same setting, is 
directed towards different things, and their responses within that 
setting differ even more. An interpretation may hang on a very quick 
reading, in which a single element, a context marker, may prove 
decisive. An example of a context marker is the act of bolting by 
which the zebra "may identify (for the lion) the nature of the context 
in which they meet . . . [so that] even the well-fed lion may give 
chase" (Bateson 1979, 115). 
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This is a profound reworking of the notion of character, but a 
plausible one I think. The implications of it become clearer when we 
examine the other side of his formulation. Bateson's "unit of 
interaction" is simply an "external relationship between two creatures" 
(Bateson 1979, 132). This is the social form of the cybernetic circuit 
we examined earlier -- what sociologists call a "double interact." Of 
course, there are many different sorts of relationships creatures can 
engage in over time, depending on the situations they find themselves 
in. Bateson defines relationships as "patterns of interchange" 
(Bateson 1979, 133), emphasizing recurring sequences of behavior 
between individuals rather than something internal to either one of 
them (Bateson 1979, 132-3). That relationships are of this nature 
seems evident, but in fact we often describe relationships like 
fatherhood as if they were roles describable entirely in terms of the 
rights and expectations of one party. Bateson would have us redescribe 
fatherhood in bipolar terms as a father-child relationship, and insist 
that we define it in terms of the patterns of interchange between the 
two parties. "Relationship," Bateson insists, "is always a product of 
double description" (Bateson 1979, 133). 
Though we don't usually think of character traits in relational 
terms, Bateson urges that we redescribe these in bipolar terms as 
well. He suggests, for instance, that pride is best understood as 
"conditional admiration provided by spectator, plus response by 
performer, plus more admiration, plus acceptance of admiration .. 
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(Cut the sequence where you will!)" (Bateson 1979, 134). In a similar 
manner, dominance is redescribed as "dominance-submission", nurturing 
as "nurturing-dependence", and so on. It is easy to see how 
schismogenic interactions can be powerful formative influences on 
character. 
In arguing that the unit of interaction is the unit of charactero- 
logical learning,. Bateson is arguing that our relationships with others 
constitute our learnings about the contexts of life which, in turn, 
constitute our character -our longterm dispositions and traits. An 
exerpt from one of Bateson's more expansive lectures on the subject may 
make the point clearer: 
Now I want you to notice these words like "dependency," 
"dominance," "spectatorship," "suffering," "passive-aggressive" -- 
and a number of other descriptive terms that [psychiatrists] 
habitually use about individuals. If you really want to say what 
you mean by them -- which I think most psychiatrists don't really 
want to do -- you will find that you have to spell out the contexts 
of interchange between persons in order to define their meaning. . 
. . There is a regularity in their external behavior vis-a-vis 
other persons, involving the behavior of other persons -- because 
if other persons don't play, it doesn't work out right. This is 
actually what we mean by these "psychological words." For example, 
we say "What do you mean by 'fatalism'?" Now the easy way to 
answer that question is to say, "I mean the sort of thing that an 
organism would learn, would acquire, if he were subjected to 
learning contexts of a certain kind." That is, if he were 
subjected, let us say, to Pavlovian contexts, where we have a 
conditioned stimulus, a response, and an unconditioned stimulus -- 
i.e., a buzzer, salivation, and meat powder . . . 
Now if you learn that your universe is made up of strings of that 
kind, so to speak, you would then become a Pavlovian dog, and you 
would expect the universe to be made up of strings of that kind; 
and that universe is one in which you can't do anything to make 
things happen ... In a certain sense, you would be a fatalist. 
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(There are other sorts of fatalism, of course.) This gives you a 
way of making a fairly precise form of words for what you mean by 
something like "fatalism"; equally, "dependency," "dominance," 
"suffering," etc. (Bateson 1991, 168) 
This interactional "form of words" or pattern of definition for 
character traits stands in clear contrast to our usual manner of 
defining character in terms of dispositions or predispositions 
developed within each person's mind. As an anthropological 
epistemologist, one who studied how people actually learn, Bateson was 
convinced that learning began with social relationships and developed 
thereafter wholly within the contexts of life, the experiential frames, 
learned through those relationships: 
Learning the contexts of life is a matter that has to be discussed, 
not internally, but as a matter of the external relationship 
between two creatures. And relationship is always a product of 
double description . . . 
Relationship is not internal to the single person. It is nonsense, 
for example, to talk about dependency or aggressiveness or pride as 
if these were internal to single persons. All these words have 
their roots in what happens between persons, not in something or 
other inside a person . . . (Bateson 1979, 132-3) 
Bateson rejected explanation in terms of dispositions because such 
explanations grant causal agency to what is, in fact, a theoretical 
construction -- meaning they suffer from the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness. He called this type of explanation a "dormitive 
hypothesis," borrowing the notion from Moliere. In Le Malade 
Imaginaire, Moliere depicts an oral doctoral examination: 
[T]he learned doctors ask the candidate to state the "cause and 
reason" why opium puts people to sleep. The candidate triumphantly 
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answers in dog Latin, "Because there is in it a dormitive principle 
(virtus dormitiva). 
Characteristically, the scientist confronts a complex interactive 
system -- in this case, an interaction between man and opium. He 
observes a change in the system -- the man falls asleep. The 
scientist then explains the change by giving a name to a fictitious 
"cause," located either in one or the other component of the 
interacting system. Either the opium contains a reified dormitive 
principle or the man contains a reified need for sleep . . . 
And, characteristically, all such hypotheses are "dormitive" in the 
sense that they put to sleep the "critical faculty" (another 
reified fictitious cause) within the scientist himself. (Bateson 
1972, xx) 
Reified principles, causes, and needs all involve the fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness. Dormitive hypotheses are, in fact, 
distressingly common: Bateson suggests that "about three-quarters of 
all the hypotheses in the behavioral sciences are fundamentally 
dormitive principles" (Bateson 1979, 170). The nature of these 
internal agencies, be they instincts, dispositions, motivations, or 
whatever, is typically not explained: 
For the sake of politeness, I call these 'heuristic' concepts; but, 
in truth, most of them are so loosely derived and so mutually 
irrelevant that they mix together to make a sort of conceptual fog 
which does much to delay the progress of science. (Bateson 1972, 
XVI11) 
The interactional form of words was Bateson's remedy for this 
affliction: 
Only if you hold on tight to the primacy and priority of 
relationship can you avoid dormitive explanations. The opium does 
not contain a dormitive principle, and the man does not contain an 
aggressive instinct. 
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. . .[You] will get nowhere by explaining prideful behavior, for 
example, by referring to an individual's "pride". Nor can you 
explain aggressive behavior by referring to instinctive (or even 
learned) "aggressiveness". Such an explanation which shifts 
attention from the interpersonal field to a factitious inner 
tendency, principle, instinct, or whatnot, is, I suggest, very 
great nonsense which only hides the real questions . . ..The same 
is true of "dependency," "courage," "passive-aggressive behavior," 
"fatalism," and the like. All characterological adjectives are to 
be reduced or expanded to derive their definitions from patterns of 
interchange. (Bateson 1979, 133) 
These are very broad and sweeping claims, with implications for 
philosophy as well as psychology. While "dependency" and "passive- 
aggressive behavior" are closely associated with the field of 
psychology, "courage" has long been a subject of philosophical 
speculation and "fatalism", if not a philosophy, denotes at least a 
basic philosophical attitude. Bateson is stepping on many toes here. 
As if these weren't enough, in a footnote to the discussion of 
"aggressiveness" quoted above Bateson rather curiously adds the 
sociobiologists to his list of potentially footsore readers. He bids 
us: 
"Note, in passing, how easy is the descent from sociobiology to 
paranoia and, perhaps, how easy is the descent from violent 
repudiation of sociobiology to paranoia - alas." (Bateson 1979, 
133) 
Typically elliptical, Bateson here lapses into the cryptic; but he 
may well be making an oblique criticism of ethologist/sociobiologist 
Konrad Lorenz' famous work On Aggression. Where Lorenz ascribed much 
of man's ill-fated history to an inability to channel his aggressive 
instincts in civilized ways, Bateson declares: " . . .the man does not 
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contain an aggressive instinct" (Bateson 1979, 133). That's a strong 
statement from someone with Bateson's background in evolutionary 
biology. 
Consider, however, how little the notion of instinct adds to the 
explanation of aggressive behavior. It suggests that humans are born 
with a capacity for aggression regardless of their enculturation, which 
is doubtless true; but ascribing that capacity to instinct tells us 
nothing more than that -- nothing about the genetic mechanisms 
presumably underlying it, nothing about how aggressive behavior is 
triggered or possibly modified by chemical treatments. Instinct no 
more explains aggressive behavior than gravity explains falling 
objects. It merely puts a name onto an otherwise unexplained process. 
Worse, by reifying the cause of aggressive behavior onto an internal 
agency, it obscures the fact that aggression is situational, arising in 
response to cues from the environment. Humans don't pursue aggression 
for its own sake, but as a response within contexts of competition, 
dominance/submission, and the like. In this case, certainly, Bateson 
was right in suggesting that such "factitious inner tendencies . . . 
only hide the real questions." 
While Bateson's approach is clearly original and interesting, is 
there any reason to consider it beyond his claims about the 
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inadequacies of competing models? The idea that character represents 
learning of a higher contextual level than factual knowledge or "know¬ 
how" does have some interesting, supporting implications. 
An important one is that higher-level contextual learning tends to 
be self-validating, even in the face of new and apparently conflicting 
experiences. We act according to our perception of the situation, 
whatever happens. An undesirable outcome indicates only that another 
course of action might have fared better, not that we misperceived the 
situation to begin with. A series of undesirable outcomes might lead 
us to reconsider our interpretation, but it often does not. In fact, 
as our experience confirms: 
. . .there is a very profound difference between a serious attempt 
to change the characterological state of an organism and trying to 
change that organism's particular actions. The latter is 
relatively easy; the former, profoundly difficult. (Bateson 1979, 
124) 
This helps explain another phenomenon of the psych-lab, one that 
the standard dispositional models find difficult to explain: 
It seems to puzzle psychologists that the exploring tendencies of a 
rat cannot be simply extinguished by having the rat encounter boxes 
containing small electric shocks. From such experiences, the rat 
will not learn not to put his nose into boxes; he will only learn 
not to put his nose into the particular boxes that contained 
electric shocks when he investigated them. In other words, we are 
here up against a contrast between learning about the particular 
and learning about the general. (Bateson 1979, 124) 
This is not a phenomenon confined to labs and lower mammals, of 
course. Human society's rats -- its criminals -- are just as unlikely 
50 
to be reformed by legal punishments (just as penologists are unlikely 
to reform their approach because of the failure of punishment to 
reform): 
We act as if crime could be extinguished by punishing parts of what 
we regard as criminal actions, as if "crime" were the name of a 
sort of action or of part of a sort of action. More correctly 
"crime," like "explora-tion," is the name of a way of organizing 
actions. It is therefore unlikely that punishing the act will 
extinguish the crime. In several thousand years, the so-called 
science of criminology has not escaped from a simple blunder in 
logical typing. (Bateson 1979, 124) 
We may safely conclude that, for Bateson, the persistence with 
which some people pursue achievement, despite setbacks and hardships, 
is likewise a matter of the self-validating nature of contextual, 
characterological learning. Each failure becomes a lesson only in what 
not to do; each hardship simply something to test one's mettle. While 
we don't yet know why people pursue achievement, we now have an idea, 
at least, of why they stick with it. 
The theory of logical types thus provides the framework on which 
Bateson's concept of characterological learning is based, and our 
experience of the constancy of characterological traits supports the 
validity of that approach. His more general thesis concerning the 
hierarchical nature of learning (the idea of meta levels in learning) 
also seems to square with laboratory data. However, the claim that all 
characterological adjectives must be redefined in terms of 
relationships, while it has the virtue of avoiding dormitive 
hypotheses, seems harder to corroborate. 
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Bateson himself tended to rail against the "inner tendency" model 
rather than support his own approach. His conviction that 
relationships define character seems to rest on two sorts of evidence. 
The first is inductive: the several schismogeneses that Bateson first 
identified along the Sepik and returned to repeatedly in later years -- 
dominance/submission, exhibition/spectatorship, nurturance/dependence, 
and competition -- all comprise characterological adjectives, and all 
need to be understood in relational terms. We speak of domineering or 
submissive sorts of people, for instance, as though they were opposing 
character types; but logically the two go hand in hand. If one is to 
dominate, another must submit. Moreover, there is every reason to 
suppose the two sides to inhere in the character of each person in the 
relationship: it is often said that the best leader knows how to obey, 
and in any dominance hierarchy those in the middle must be adept at 
both roles. In symmetrical schismogeneses like competition, similarly, 
it takes two to compete. 
What is evidently learned in each case is a context for a certain 
sort of relationship, and the anticipation that future relationships 
will be of this same sort would certainly seem to define one's 
character to some degree. While the schismogeneses thus support the 
notion that relationships define character, it seems a leap to conclude 
that all character traits must be defined this way. We may recognize 
some people as achievement oriented, to take a relevant example, 
without finding it immediately evident that some relationship is 
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involved. If, through this study, it turns out that achieving behavior 
is rooted in a context of relationships, that might lend some further 
credence to Bateson's claim. 
Bateson would certainly agree that his inductive evidence was 
incomplete as well as inconclusive. Inductive evidence, of course, is 
never conclusive. But Bateson was unusually content, for one of his 
scientific background, with fragmentary inductive evidence. Margaret 
Mead is purported to have said that Bateson's talent was for 
the extraordinary broad concepts and . . .[the] minor little . . . 
details. But the middle ground he's not so good at . . . One of 
the reasons it is hard to grasp the connections . . .[Gregory makes 
is] because he jumps the middle. He goes to the extraordinarily 
broad from very small observations. (Lipset 1980, 227) 
Bateson himself recognized that he differed from many of his fellow 
behavioral scientists in that he relied as much or more on deduction as 
on induction in arriving at his positions. At one point, he recalls 
his difficulties in communicating with his students in pyschiatry: 
. . . [I]t became clear that a difference between my habits of 
thought and those of my students sprang from the fact that they 
were trained to think and argue inductively from data to hypotheses 
but never to test hypotheses against knowledge derived by deduction 
from the fundamentals of science or philosophy. (Bateson 1972, 
XVIIi) 
This is a key point. The second sort of evidence that Bateson 
would adduce for his prescription that characterological adjectives be 
redefined in terms of relationships would be deductive. Obviously, his 
position should follow from the premises of what we might generously 
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call his "implicit" theory of mind; but just as obviously, that sort of 
support would be circular and suspect. That's not the sort of 
deductive support Bateson had in mind, however. For deductive support, 
his appeal was rather to those "fundamentals of science or philosophy" 
mentioned above. 
By "fundamentals of science or philosophy," Bateson meant 
"propositions and systems of propositions which are truistical, and 
propositions or 'laws' which are generally true" (Bateson 1972, xix). 
The first set of propositions would include the tautologies of logic 
and mathematics, the second "the conservation 'laws' for mass and 
energy, the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and so on" (Bateson 1972, 
xix). For Bateson, "Explanation" is simply "the mapping of data onto 
fundamentals" (Bateson 1972, xix). 
The problem, of course, is in trying to identify what the "funda¬ 
mentals" of behavioral science might be. Bateson, surveying the 
contemporary scene in the behavioral sciences, found little that fit 
this description: 
It is all too clear that the vast majority of the concepts of 
contemporary psychology, psychiatry, anthropology, sociology, and 
economics are totally detached from the network of scientific 
fundamentals. (Bateson 1972, xix) 
While it is generally conceded that the theoretical foundations of 
the behavioral sciences are less secure than those of the physical 
sciences, is it reasonable to expect some sociological equivalent of 
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the conservation laws of matter and energy? I'm sure it is not, but in 
fact Bateson was not looking to ground the behavioral sciences on 
general laws like those of physics. What attracted him to fields like 
cybernetics, game theory, and information theory was their basis in 
mathematics -- the eternal verities of tautology. 
Tautology rightfully carries connotations of emptiness. "If P is 
true, then P is true" certainly doesn't convey much information. But 
Bateson argues that 
. . .the line between tautological truths and empirical 
generalizations is not sharply definable, and, among my 
"fundamentals," there are many propositions whose truth no sensible 
man can doubt but which cannot easily be classified as either 
empirical or tautological. The "laws" of probability cannot be 
stated so as to be understood and not be believed, but it is not 
easy to decide whether they are empirical or tautological; and this 
is also true of Shannon's theorems in Information Theory. (Bateson 
1972, xix) 
On the other hand, no one argues that the "laws" of probability or 
Shannon's theorems* were arrived at inductively. I think it's fair to 
say that Bateson's call for redefinition of characterological 
* Claude Shannon's famous second theorem for information theory, for 
instance, "guarantees that information can be transmitted over a noisy 
channel at the fastest rate permitted by the capacity of the channel, 
and still contain as few errors as we wish." (Campbell 1982, 80) This 
is the basis for satellite communications, the recent verification of 
big bang theory, and numerous other, more mundane applications. While 
the theory was arrived at mathematically, it is considered as true for 
real world communications as Newton's Laws of Motion are for the 
physical world. 
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adjectives in relational terms was not arrived at wholly by induction, 
either. As he says in his Introduction to Steps . . .: 
. . .this collection of essays is very much concerned with trying 
to communicate this thesis -- that in scientific research you start 
from two beginnings, each of which has its own kind of authority: 
the observations cannot be denied, and the fundamentals must be 
fitted. You much achieve a sort of pincers maneuver. (Bateson 
1972, xx-xxi) 
The relational definition of characterological adjectives could be 
seen to follow from the premisses of cybernetics, inasmuch as the 
elements of any self-regulating system are defined by their 
relationships to the other elements. Bateson would be arguing, in 
effect, that the characteristic traits of individuals are defined 
within their system of social relations. The question is whether 
mapping descriptions of character traits onto the tautologies of 
cybernetics and other mathematically based sciences can be done 
successfully enough to qualify as a satisfying explanation. My 
intention here is to make that attempt with the trait of achievement 
orientation. If successful, we will have shed light both on achievers 
and, hopefully, on the status of Bateson's own achievement. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DESIGN AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY 
Design 
Bateson's emphasis on deduction and on formal mathematical systems 
in the behavioral sciences goes to the heart of the purported paradigm 
shift we spoke of in the beginning. It is no accident that he makes so 
little reference to seminal figures or leading contemporaries in the 
behavioral sciences while so often citing his considerable debts to 
philosophers and mathematicians like Bertrand Russell, Alfred North 
Whitehead, Alfred Korzybski, Norbert Wiener, Johnny Von Neumann, and 
Claude Shannon. Bateson was convinced that the behavioral sciences, 
arising in the shadow of Newton's dazzling achievement in physics, 
had simply gotten off on the wrong foot: 
The nineteenth-century scientists (notably Freud) who tried to 
establish a bridge between behavioral data and the fundamentals of 
physical and chemical science were, surely, correct in insisting 
upon the need for such a bridge but, I believe, wrong in choosing 
'energy' as the foundation for that bridge. (Bateson, 1972, xxii) 
The choice of "energy" as the bridge to fundamental scientific laws 
was prompted, Bateson suggests, by analogy with "already existing 
metaphors such as 'strength' of emotions or character, or 'vigor'"; or 
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by thinking of "'energy' as somehow the opposite of 'fatigue' or 
'apathy'" (Bateson 1972, xxii). The metaphor of energy still echoes 
in the notions of "impulse," "libidinous energies," "sex drives," and 
"force of habit" as well as in the pervasive emphasis among behavioral 
scientists on quantitative measurements. Bateson is clearly digging 
for the roots of the problem in this critique, and he is convinced that 
the problem goes deeper than metaphors, that it lies in the very soil 
in which the metaphor of energy takes root: 
. . .my critical comments above about the metaphoric use of 
'energy' in the behavioral sciences add up to a rather simple 
accusation of many of my colleagues, that they have tried to build 
the bridge to the wrong half of the ancient dichotomy between form 
and substance. The conservative laws for energy and matter concern 
substance rather than form. But mental process, ideas, 
communication, organization, differentiation, pattern, and so on, 
are matters of form rather than substance. (Bateson 1972, xxv) 
A more fundamental shift in the grounding of behavioral science 
would be hard to imagine. Though we've already laid out in rough form 
the new foundation that Bateson was proposing, the relationship between 
his new paradigm and the standing one needs to be worked out in 
considerably greater detail if we are to assess what difference he 
hoped it would make. 
Because the shift is so fundamental, I think there is no choice for 
us but to return to its source, what Bateson calls "the ancient 
dichotomy between form and substance": 
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It all starts, I suppose, with the Pythagoreans versus their 
precedessors, and the argument took the shape of "Do you ask what 
it's made of -- earth, fire, water, etc.?" Or do you ask, "What is 
its pattern?" Pythagoras stood for inquiry into pattern rather 
than inquiry into substance. (Bateson 1972, 449) 
That is certainly a long reach, but in truth the roots of the 
modern scientific paradigm extend that far. The attempt to explain 
man's pursuit of achievement also goes back that far (at least), and 
the oldest theories still extant on how character is shaped come to us 
from the Hellenic world as well. So that is where this study will 
begin. 
Were this a purely scientific study of the causes of achievement 
orientation, we would proceed to the lab or the field with our 
methodology in hand to pursue "original" research. Our concern being 
with the nature of explanation in the behavioral sciences, however, our 
study is philosophical and our method analytic rather than empirical. 
The source of our data will be the history of philosophical 
speculation, beginning with the Greeks, on the formation of character, 
the pursuit of achievement, and the kind of explanation that is 
properly brought to bear on such questions. 
In other words, rather than using the standard "review of the 
literature" to provide the background for our research, it will be the 
focus of it. The tools of Bateson's formal science will then provide 
the analysis. I begin with a few presumptions, which will either be 
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borne out or not. One is that the finest minds of our Western world 
have left us insights on the pursuit of achievement which bear some 
share of truth. Who would know better? A second is that their 
explanations of that pursuit are shaped by the reigning scientific 
paradigms of their time, that the two "fit" together much as Bateson 
suggested (" . . .the observations cannot be denied, and the 
fundamentals must be fitted"). The third is that, if Bateson's new set 
of fundamentals provide a better fit, then we will have managed to 
provide both a more satisfactory explanation for achievement and 
evidence of the power of his formal paradigm. The pincers movement 
will have proven successful. 
Significance 
While it is far from certain that a life of achievement - even 
intellectual achievement - correlates closely with youthful success in 
academic studies, the fact is that much of the modern psychological 
research on what motivates people to achieve has been pursued with 
hopes of enhancing children's performance on tests in school. For the 
sake of clarity, it should be noted that the term "achievement" is 
often used euphemistically in educational contexts to refer to what a 
child should know or be able to do, given his or her potential. 
Parents want to know whether their children are "over-achievers" or 
"under-achievers" as revealed through "achievement tests" which, at 
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best, only measure how much information a child has retained in a given 
subject. These uses of the term "achievement" have little to do with 
the sorts of accomplishment pursued by so-called "super-achievers" -- 
like Gregory Bateson. What we are trying to understand by way of 
"achievement" here would be better defined (as Random House does in its 
second, unabridged Dictionary of the English Language) as "1. something 
accomplished, esp. by superior ability, special effort, great courage, 
etc.; a great or heroic deed ..." (Random House Dictionary 1987, 15) 
However, there does exist a body of research concerned with the 
tendency of some children to push themselves to meet challenges and to 
outperform their peers. What these researchers, building on David 
McClelland's original work in the 1950's, are trying to comprehend 
under the rubric of "achievement motivation," or "n-Ach," seems close 
to the problem posed here. In its original formulation, achievement 
motivation was viewed as a long-term need or disposition with roots in 
childhood socialization. 
Since any long-term disposition or motivation would qualify for 
Bateson's list of "factitious inner tendencies" with roots in the ill- 
fated metaphor of energy, we can assume that he would reject 
"achievement motivation" out of hand. Our analysis will trace that 
argument in some detail. For now, note only that a different kind of 
explanation for a lifetime of achievement, along the lines Bateson 
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suggests, would clearly have major theoretical implications for the 
entire body of research on achievement motivation. 
The practical implications, on the other hand, might even be more 
significant, inasmuch as the research on achievement motivation has 
attempted to identify those factors in a child's socialization which 
correlate with a life of achievement. If we allow that a positive 
orientation towards achievement is good for our children and society, 
then there is the possibility that identifying the contributing factors 
may help us somehow to promote that orientation. If Bateson's approach 
is truly to make a difference, then it should help us identify 
different or additional contributing factors, or at least give us a 
clearer understanding of how those factors already identified 
contribute to that cause. If that proves not to be the case, then 
Bateson's alternative model of explanation begins to look suspiciously 
like a distinction without a difference, and his prescriptions may be 
considered philosophical at best. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE LITERATURE 
Building a New Bridgehead to the Old Dichotomy 
Though it may seem overreaching to begin this review with the 
ancient Greeks, our philosophical interest in explanatory models and in 
understanding achievement would be ill-served by overlooking them. As 
Bateson warns: 
The would-be behavioral scientist who knows nothing of the basic 
structure of science and nothing of the 3000 years of careful 
philosophic and humanistic thought about man - who cannot define 
either entropy or a sacrament - had better hold his peace rather 
than add to the existing jungle of half-baked hypotheses. (Bateson 
1972, xxi) 
We certainly wouldn't want to be accused of that. Moreover, 
Bateson suggests that "in the search for a bridgehead among the 
fundamentals we should go back to the very beginnings of scientific and 
philosophic thought" (Bateson 1972, xxii). It is with the Greeks that 
the "ancient dichotomy between form and substance" has its origins. It 
is also with the Greeks that we find the first sustained investigations 
of character and how "great souls" [megalopsyche) may be fostered. 
What I propose is that we examine the Greek explanation of achievement 
both for its own contribution to the question before us and for the 
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insight it may provide on the origins of the ancient dichotomy and on 
Bateson's suggestion that we try to rebuild the bridge to the formal 
side. 
The Greek Arete 
Though we owe so much of our intellectual heritage to the Greeks, 
comparisons to modern concerns over a gap of 2500 years must be drawn 
with caution. With all due respect to Bateson, for instance, the 
"ancient dichotomy" for the Greeks was between form and matter, not 
form and substance which are nearly synonomous in Aristotle. It wasn't 
till the rise of Renaissance science that "substance" acquired its 
current, dichotomous connotations. Fortunately, the philosophical 
discussion of these terms is not only extensive but nearly continuous 
over the millenia that separate us, and definitions are essential to 
it, so these comparisons can be drawn with some confidence. We are not 
so fortunate when it comes to the consideration of character and 
achievement. 
The meaning of terms is inevitably connected to the time and place 
of their use. Much as the term "achiever" has come to mean something 
less exclusive, even generally attainable in the modern educationist's 
argot, we must allow for the possibility that the term as we (and 
Random House) know it has no exact equivalent in the Greece of 2000 to 
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3000 years ago. If it has, I've yet to find it. With democratic 
ideals still in their infancy, the Greeks invariably ascribed great 
feats to innate ability (or "divine inspiration") rather than to hard 
work and education. Despite our differences, however, we are probably 
closer to the Greeks in our appreciation of human achievement than we 
are to some remote non-Western peoples who are our contemporaries. The 
Greeks had their great artists and philosophers, scientists and 
inventors, athletes and generals just as we do. And they meditated, as 
we do, on what made those individuals and their works (and Greeks in 
general) superior. What distinguishes their meditations on these 
matters is the word that stands at the heart of all Greek thinking 
about excellence: arete - typically, though inadequately, translated as 
"virtue". 
The term "virtue" today verges on the archaic, having passed out of 
vogue along with "vice", "sin," and "seven cardinal" anything. Should 
someone occasionally still refer to the "virtue of a particular work," 
or to the "virtuosity" of a performer, then some faint echo of what 
arete meant to the ancient Greeks can still be heard. While the 
Christian transignification of the Latin virtus ("manliness") into a 
moral term presumed to translate the Greek arete greatly obscures our 
understanding of it, what makes it even harder to get a handle on arete 
is the fact that its own meaning evolved considerably from its initial 
appearances in Homer to its later renderings in the hands of Plato and 
Aristotle. 
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Like virtus, arete originally carried connotations of martial 
valor. In Werner Jaeger's classic work on Greek civilization, Paideia: 
The Ideals of Greek Culture, he describes its oldest meaning as "a 
combination of proud and courtly morality with warlike valor" (Jaeger 
1970, 5), but notes that: 
In Homer, as elsewhere, the word arete is frequently used in a wide 
sense, to describe not only human merit but the excellence of non¬ 
human things -- the power of the gods, the spirit and speed of 
noble horses. . . . The root of the word is the same as that of 
aristos, the word which shows superlative ability and superiority; 
and aristos was constantly used in the plural to denote the 
nobility [Hence, "aristocracy" (author's note)]. It was natural 
for the Greeks, who ranked every man according to his ability, to 
use the same standard for the world in general. That is why they 
could apply the word arete to things and beings which were not 
human, and that is why the content of the word grew richer in later 
times. For a man's ability can be appraised by different 
standards, varying according to the duties he has to perform. 
(Jaeger 1970, 5) 
Arete thus comprises the notion of superior ability which we assume 
of those we call "achievers." But not every duty performed in a 
superior fashion qualifies one to be called an achiever or to lay claim 
to arete. Superior housecleaners, thieves, or parents would be denied 
that recognition both by the Greeks and ourselves. In the world of the 
Iliad, the superior intelligence of Odysseus is respected but not yet 
fully recognized as arete (Jaeger 1970, 8). In the modern world, we 
honor the scientist but are understandably less inclined than our Greek 
forebears to recognize the achievements of an Alexander. Again, 
different times bring different applications. But the connection of 
both arete and achievement with public recognition persists and is 
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important: analytically it helps distinguish an achievement from an 
accomplishment which may be measured by entirely private or personal 
yardsticks, as when a child first learns to read or one's spring 
cleaning is finally finished. And it is the honorific connotations of 
the word "achieve" that similarly incline us to call an ingeniously 
successful heist the "feat" of an "accomplished" thief rather than an 
"achievement." 
The association of arete with public yardsticks and esteem gave the 
Greeks the first clear insight into what motivates achievers, namely, 
the craving for that highest of public recognitions, the honor of one's 
peers. "Honor is the prize of virtue," according to Aristotle (Eth. 
Nic. (trans. Richard McKeown) IV, 2, 1123b36) because it is "the 
greatest of external goods" (Ibid., IV, 2, 1123b20) and great virtue, 
naturally, deserves great reward. This phrasing in terms of "prizes" 
and "rewards" is not meant to suggest that virtue was but a means to an 
end. Honor and arete were originally all but indistinguishable. 
Jaeger tells us that honor was "an essential concomitant of arete" 
(Jaeger 1970, 8). Aristotle's wording simply reflects the 
rationalizing influence of later philosophy: 
The philosophy of later times . . . bade man obey an inner 
standard: it taught him to regard honour as the external image of 
his inner value, reflected in the criticism of his fellows. But 
the Homeric man estimated his own worth exclusively by the 
standards of the society to which he belonged. He was a creature 
of his class: he measured his own arete by the opinion which others 
held of him. (Jaeger 1970, 9) 
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Thus for Homer and the aristocracy of his time "denial of honor due 
was the greatest of human tragedies" (Jaeger 1970, 8-9), as one had no 
arete withoutit. For evidence of this, we need only recall the pivotal 
episode in the Iliad when Achilles feels his honor slighted by 
Agamemnon and haughtily withdraws his forces, turning the tide of war 
against the Greeks. The modern reader tends to be annoyed by Achilles' 
apparent over-reaction, as we have learned over the millenia since 
Homer how little the roar of the crowd has to do with virtue. 
Nonetheless, as Aristotle points out: 
Men seem to pursue honor in order to assure themselves of their own 
worth --their own arete. They strive to be honored for it, by men 
who know them and who are judicious. (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. (trans. 
Jaeger 1970, 9) I, 4, 1095b26) 
The modern, Western world seems less sensitive to dishonor than the 
ancient Greeks (or even contemporary Japanese). In this country, 
"honor" is a word little heard outside the ritual incantations of boy 
scouts and soldiers. We are no less concerned over recognition of our 
worth, however, as witness the extreme prejudice attached to academic 
plagiarism and the squabbles in academic journals over who was first 
with this or that idea. "Stealing someone's thunder" strikes a 
surprisingly deep chord of resentment in us, even in academic circles 
where ideas are presumed to be free flowing and not proprietary. The 
legendary feud between Newton and Liebniz over invention of the calcu¬ 
lus (as though independent invention was impossible rather than merely 
intolerable) is evidence of the non-pecuniary nature of such injury. 
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Psychologists today would tend to affirm the "need for affirmation 
of self-worth" as a subject for research, but cringe at a study of 
honor's role in motivating achievers. "Honor" may lack precision as 
well as currency; it certainly lacks scientific cachet. That's doubly 
unfortunate, because "honor" is a term with an extensive (and 
impressive) literature behind it, while the "need for ..." is a very 
recent construct of concern only to psychologists and educationists; 
also because, scientific as the phrasing sounds, "the need for 
affirmation of self-worth" is as obscure in its etiology and ground as 
honor is. How does this need arise? How do we know it's there? Do 
infants evidence it? How about other animals? Is it discernibly 
different from the needs for affection, belonging, or status? The 
questions multiply quickly, whether we talk about a need for self- 
affirmation or honor. 
We will discuss needs-theory in more detail when we come to David 
McClelland's efforts in this century to establish a need for 
achievement. Suffice to say here that Bateson would most certainly 
reject the need for self-affirmation (along with the rest of needs- 
theory) as just another "factitious inner tendency" without basis in 
scientific fundamentals. 
That is not to say that the pursuit of honor, recognition, or self- 
affirmation -- whatever we choose to call it -- is illusory. It is the 
assumption of some deep-seated need to account for such pursuits that 
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Bateson thought illusory. Bateson would reject the inner tendency 
approach and define the pursuit of honor in interactional terms which, 
in fact, seems appropriate. Recall here Bateson's redefinition of 
pride in relational terms: "conditional admiration provided by 
spectator, plus response by performer, plus more admiration, plus 
acceptance of admiration . . . (Cut the sequence where you will!)" 
(Bateson 1979, 134). Substitute "honor" for "admiration" and it's 
clear we're dealing with the same basic interaction. 
This characteristically Greek explanation for achievement says that 
those with great abilities perform great deeds to gain the honor they 
are due. Their arete is realized in this recognition of their merit. 
Bateson would not object to this formulation. He would reject any 
implication that either the pride of the achiever or the acclaim of the 
crowd is somehow the key, the driving force to achievement; but he 
might well agree that both pride and honor are important to our 
understanding of great works and deeds. Pride and honor, for Bateson, 
would be elements in a complementary relationship between displays of 
virtuosity and their recognition by others. This interaction would be 
viewed as mutually reinforcing and schismogenic, acclaim tending to 
encourage pride and further displays of effort, bringing more acclaim, 
and so on. It is the positive feedback that develops among these 
elements that would drive the performer in the interaction towards 
achievement. Bateson's reformulation thus preserves rather nicely the 
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Greek sense of the necessity of both recognition and ability in gaining 
arete. 
Still, it's not clear what hoisting the Greek explanation onto a 
cybernetic framework does either to or for it. The original has a 
direct, commonsense quality that talk of feedback circuits 
conspicuously lacks. It's harder to argue with. That same 
commonsense quality, on the other hand, diminishes our sense of any 
deep insight at work in the Greek explanation of achieving behavior. 
And it's hard to see how Bateson's complication of it makes it any 
deeper. To say, in effect, that people display their abilities because 
others appreciate such displays, and it's nice to be appreciated, only 
raises other questions. Why do people appreciate such displays? Are 
we sure they really do? Showing off one's superiority can just as 
easily arouse envy from those of lesser talents, especially where it 
brings reward. Rewarding superiority, moreover, may bring social 
mobility, which can be divisive and unwelcome to those with a stake in 
the established order. Consider the Japanese saying, "the nail that 
sticks out gets hammered down." Mutual reinforcement between the 
display of ability and its public recognition cannot be assumed, but 
must itself be explained. This deeper explanation must be sought 
elsewhere. 
The explanation of achievement in terms of honor, on the other 
hand, does have potentially broad application. In any warrior culture 
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like ancient Greece, we can expect to find some equivalent of honor for 
great warriors and great feats on the battlefield. A soldier's first 
concern is survival. Conspicuous valor can rally soldiers together in 
the face of adversity and save their skins. Conspicuous cowardice can 
cause a deadly route. Courage must be encouraged and sacrifice must be 
shone appreciation. It's no surprise then that honor -- including 
honor for the dead -- is such a prominent feature of once-great warrior 
cultures like Japan, Italy, and those in the Arab world. 
While the warrior culture helps explain the positive feedback between 
deeds and honor implicit in the Greek explanation, the explanation 
needn't be limited to only those cultures where martial values 
prevail. "Honor" is perhaps too restrictive a word for the interaction 
between achievement and recognition. Were we to recast the explanation 
in broader terms like "public acclaim" or "fame," we would have to 
allow that the explanation could serve just as well in our own 
commercial culture, where "honor" is rarely spoken. In fact, the 
Greeks continued to emphasize honor long after their days as a warrior 
society had passed. They honored their athletes and poets and 
statesmen, and created forums where superior talent of all sorts could 
be recognized. Recalling what Bateson said about the persistence of 
characterological learning, it should be no surprise that the Greeks 
would continue to anticipate (and thus impose) contexts of performance 
and acclaim long after the martial environment that first invoked them 
had passed. 
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While the explanation can be extended to quite a wide variety of 
contexts, I'm not sure it covers them all. Consider, for example, the 
Christian emphasis on humility when the power of the Church was at its 
peak, and the fact that the authors of so many books of the Bible, the 
architects of so many cathedrals, and the composers of so many glorious 
hymns and chants are unknown. Anonymity in the Greek canon is by 
comparison rare and unintended -- where is the honor in anonymous 
works? If acclaim should prove not to be the only value that guides 
achievers -- or, in Bateson's terms, if some other interaction should 
lead to the same result -- then again, another, deeper explanation 
would be needed to help us understand how one comes to embrace this or 
that path to achievement. 
In assessing the adequacy of the Greek explanation, we have drawn 
on two rather general criteria so far that I've labeled "depth" and 
"breadth" (the latter is often called "scope of explanation," but that 
seems a regrettable mixing of metaphors). The Greek explanation lacks 
depth insofar as it doesn't help us understand anything more 
fundamental than the phenomenon in question. It offers little insight 
into human nature more generally, or the processes by which character 
is formed. It does show some breadth -- or scope -- by plausibly 
explaining achieving behavior in a variety of contexts beyond the one 
in which it was offered. We saw that it proves difficult, nonetheless, 
to universalize this explanation across all societies which have 
produced great works and deeds. 
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Of course, the Greeks didn't know about the Christians, and they 
weren't very interested in peoples other than themselves in any case. 
Nonetheless, they also came to feel the need for a deeper explanation 
of the motivation towards arete because, after all, not all Greeks 
concerned themselves with virtue. Aristotle laments that 
. . . [I]t is the nature of the many to be amenable to fear but not 
to a sense of honor . . . [for they] have not even a notion of what 
is noble and truly pleasant, having never tasted true pleasure. 
(Aristotle, Eth. Nic. (trans. Rackham 1968) X, 8, 1179bl2-16) 
As Greek society developed and prospered, "the many" became 
increasingly hostile towards the aristocracy and arete began to seem an 
endangered ideal. Much as in our own society, where a perceived 
breakdown in traditional values has led to close, critical scrutiny of 
the schools, the pillars of that Greek society, concerned for the value 
of arete, began to concern themselves with questions of education. 
Given that the pursuit of honor and arete does not come naturally to 
the many, was there some way they could be steered in that direction? 
Could character somehow be purposely developed? 
I have referred several times already to Werner Jaeger's classic 
work on ancient Greece, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture. Paideia 
is another of those Greek words that defies adequate translation. 
Francis Fobes' textbook, Philosophical Greek: An Introduction, defines 
it simply as "training, or instruction" (Fobes 1957, 287). 
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"Education," which suggests a less skills oriented, more intellectual 
concern with the development of the young, is a better translation. It 
is still inadequate, according to Jaeger: 
Education is such a natural and universal function of society that 
many generations accept and transmit it without question or 
discussion: thus the first mention of it in literature is 
relatively late. Its content is roughly the same in every nation -- 
it is both moral and practical. It consists partly of 
commandments like Honour the gods, Honour thy father and thy 
mother, Respect the stranger; partly of ancient rules of practical 
wisdom and prescriptions of external morality; and partly of those 
professional skills and traditions which . . . the Greeks named 
techne. . . 
The training of the young, in the above sense, must be 
distinguished from cultural education, which aims at fulfilling an 
ideal of man as he ought to be. In such an ideal pattern, utility 
is neglected. . . . The vital factor is to kalon, the Beautiful as 
a determinant ideal.. . . [W]e may, perhaps, use the word Education 
for the former and Culture for the latter. (Jaeger 1965, 3) 
"Paideia" signifies culture, not in the anthropological sense of 
the sum of the ways and expressions of life which define a people, but 
rather in the way we might refer to someone as "cultured," or 
"refined," though these terms have become overly identified in recent 
times with opera buffs and the pretentiously idle. Jaeger notes that 
this ideal of culture first appears with the Greeks: 
They were the first to recognize that education means deliberately 
moulding human character in accordance with an ideal. . . . Only 
this type of education deserves the name of culture, the type for 
which Plato uses the physical metaphor of moulding character. 
(Jaeger 1965, xxii-xxiii) 
The ideal to which the Greek character was to be moulded, of 
course, was arete. Arete had originally connoted martial valor and the 
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Homeric epics, extolling the heroes who had conquered Troy, had for 
hundreds of years provided the cultural ideals for all the Greek 
peoples. Plato notes that in his own time, perhaps 500 years or more 
after Homer's death, Homer was still considered by many the educator of 
all Hellas (Plato, Republic, X, 606E). Gradually however, the 
identification of arete with courage began to give way. As noted 
earlier, the content of the word grew richer in later times. This 
enrichment took a decisive turn during the eighth to the fifth 
centuries as the Greek city states were beset by political struggles 
challenging the hold of the aristocracy: 
Until these struggles began, the right of the nobles to administer 
justice -- in accordance with traditional usage, not by any 
written code of laws -- had been unchallenged. But as the economic 
position of the common people improved, the conflict between the 
freeman of low birth and the nobleman was naturally intensified. . 
. . The people demanded written laws . . . They made the word 
Justice, dike, the war-cry of the class conflict. (Jaeger 1965, 
102) 
The construction of written constitutions began in Sparta, at the 
hands of Lykurgos, and spread rapidly to the other city states in the 
Greek world (Forrest 1966, 143). Each city had its revered lawgiver, 
and they were esteemed as educators in much the same way as Homer, for 
their constitutions shaped the character of their people (Jaeger 1965, 
110). The most famous codifier of written laws in Greece was Solon, of 
Athens, who revised the harsh codes of Drakon and introduced democracy. 
With the establishment of written laws a new ideal emerged, that of 
justice or righteousness, dikaiosyne: 
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The new dikaiosyne . . . became arete par excellence as soon as the 
Greeks believed that they had found, in written law, a reliable 
criterion for right and wrong. After nomos -- that is, current 
legal usage -- was codified, the general idea of righteousness 
acquired a palpable content. It consisted in obedience to the laws 
of the state, just as Christian "virtue" consisted in obedience to 
the commands of God. (Jaeger 1965, 105) 
The significance of this transition from the martial arete of the 
heroic age to that of the law-abiding, righteous citizen lies, first, 
in its universality -- in the fact that the ideal of arete had become 
something binding on all (male, freeborn) citizens, not just the 
nobility. In its emphasis on nomos, moreover, it laid the foundation 
for the later transformation of arete into a more intellectual ideal at 
the hands of the philosophers: 
Law is the most important stage in the development of Greek culture 
from the social ideal of aristocracy to the fundamental conception 
of man as an individual, as expressed by the philosophers. And the 
ethical and educational systems constructed by the philosophers 
constantly recall, in both form and content, the legislation of 
earlier periods. . . . Law is the mother of philosophy. . . . 
(Jaeger, 1965, p. 109) 
Now that arete was expected of all citizens, it could no longer be 
viewed as something only those of noble blood were capable of. It was 
something that all were expected to pursue, and the success of that 
pursuit -- especially in going beyond the duties of citizenship into 
those of leadership -- was seen to depend on appropriate education: 
Arete had from the very first been closely bound up with 
education. But as society had changed, so also had the ideal of 
arete, and with it the way to achieve arete. Everywhere in Greece, 
therefore, attention was now focussed on the principal question: 
Hhat type of education leads to arete? (Jaeger 1965, 286) 
77 
In this question lay the origins of the Greek paideia: 
Its aim was to transcend the aristocratic principle of privileged 
education, which made it impossible for anyone to acquire arete 
unless he already possessed it by inheritance from his divine 
ancestors. It seemed easy to transcend it by the application of 
logical reasoning, the new instrument whose power was constantly 
growing. There was only one method --to apply a deliberate system 
of education to the mind. (Jaeger 1965, 287) 
Thus the Greeks became the first to seriously consider the question 
of how character could be developed. The debate over this question 
signals the emergence of Socrates and, through Plato's immortalization 
of him in his dialogues, the beginning of Western civilization's formal 
philosophical thinking on ethics, education, and politics. 
Greek thought about the education and shaping of character begins with 
the idea of mimesis, or imitation. While parents and educators today 
still rely on this approach with the very young, especially, it is hard 
for us to appreciate the power this idea held for the Greeks: 
From Homer onwards, aristocratic education was governed by the idea 
of following noble examples. A great man is a physical embodiment 
of the norm which the pupil must follow, and the pupil's admiration 
for his ideal qualities naturally prompts him to imitate them. 
(Jaeger 1965, 310) 
It was Homer's delineation of the Mycenean heroes that provided the 
ideal types for succeeding generations to follow and earned him the 
title of educator of all Hellas. Our notion of "role model" contains 
much the same idea, though typically watered down for modern tastes, 
substituting good examples for ideal types. The preoccupation of later 
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Greek poets and playwrites with characters of less than noble stature -- 
whether villains and madmen in tragedy, or caricatures of the high and 
mighty in comedy -- finally led Plato to argue for their ouster from 
his ideal Republic. Though Western thinkers have generally dismissed 
this censorious element in Plato's writings, there is growing concern 
in our own society over the glorification of violent, depraved, and 
brainless characters in television and film. In these ways, we share 
the Greeks' appreciation for the educative power of mimesis. However: 
This personal factor in imitation disappears when the laws provide 
the pattern. . . . But the normative element is maintained and 
even strengthened in the examples provided by the law -- the 
highest teacher of every citizen. . . . 
In the Athenian state law was not only the 'king' . . . but the 
school of citizenship. We do not think of it in that way now. Nor 
do we believe that the laws are the discoveries of great law-givers 
of the past: they are ephemeral things, as they were to become in 
Athens, and not even specialists can know them all. We can hardly 
imagine how, when Socrates was in prison facing death, and was 
offered a safe opportunity for escape to freedom, the laws could 
come to him in the shape of living persons and advise him to remain 
true to them in the hour of trial, because they had educated and 
protected him throughout his life. . . . (Jaeger 1965, 310) 
For the Greeks the laws thus became veritable role models for 
adults -- impersonal, yet providing patterns for conduct (the most 
fundamental being to to behave justly, giving each his due) much as the 
Homeric heroes did in more youthful times. Would that we had such 
faith in our own laws -- and that our laws deserved them. 
The Greeks' focus on mimesis was intimately bound up with their 
concern for pattern, for laws that could guide them both in civil life 
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and in understanding the world around them. For centuries in Greece, 
it was everywhere believed that dike, the universal law of justice, 
provided the pattern for both the political and natural realms (Jaeger 
1965, 323). The philosophers later worked to refashion dike according 
to the universal laws of reason, elaborating cosmology on the one hand 
and political theory on the other; but the under-lying search for 
pattern and for laws by which noble souls might be formed was 
unwavering. 
The notion of mimesis, of following a pattern, is clearly visible 
in Plato's forms (eidos). His thought was that each existing thing was 
modeled on an abstract form which contained its essential pattern or 
definition. As the scultor's clay takes the shape of the idea in his 
mind, so does the material world become shaped by the forms. The 
emphasis on the role of pattern in shaping our world is something 
Bateson shares, and it is in this light that he offers himself as a 
modern-day Platonist. In Plato, the ancient dichotomy of form and 
matter finds its clearest expression. 
The grand argument over the education of character in ancient 
Greece begins with Plato's and Socrates' attacks on those itinerant 
philosopher/educators known as the sophists. The sophists' teachings 
were as varied and diverse as the laws of the various city-states their 
calling led them to. They were sought out especially by those 
concerned with establishing their political positions in the wake of 
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the nobility's declining fortunes. They taught oratory and professed 
to provide a "universal insight into the nature of human life" which 
was essential for leadership in the new polis (Jaeger 1965, 290). 
Training for leadership was understood as a further cultivation of the 
new political arete that obliged everyone to embody the spirit of the 
laws in following them. Those so trained could presumably be entrusted 
to make the laws as well (Jaeger 1965, 290). But could the sophists be 
trusted with such a critical educational task? Socrates put the 
challenge. 
The sophists' cosmopolitanism tended to make them relativists, like 
Protagoras, famed for his pronouncement that "man is the measure of all 
things." And that relativism, in the context of leadership training, 
led some of them inevitably to ponder the rule of dike and to question 
whether giving each his due might mean anything very different from 
"might makes right." Their pupils, being drawn almost entirely from 
the ranks of dispossessed nobility and the newly monied class, were a 
receptive audience for this message. Socrates and Plato argued against 
this unprincipled view of arete in dialog after dialog. 
Socrates' arguments with the sophists hinged on the idea that right 
action could not follow reliably upon scattered teachings and examples, 
but needed to be grounded in a knowledge of the good itself -- a grasp 
of its essential definition or pattern. If one really knew what was 
good and right to do, Socrates argued, one would invariably do it 
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because it is in one's own best interests to do so. The examples of 
the mighty who, blinded by passion, had pursued actions to their own 
and everyone else's detriment were numerous enough to show that power 
alone could not define the good. It took reason to perceive what the 
good was. 
There is an assumption here, developed later by Plato, that reason 
properly rules the passions in the well ordered soul. In fact, Plato's 
model of the soul is tripartite and hierarchical, the lowest part being 
the desires, the two higher parts corresponding to the original, 
martial conception of arete and to the arete of justice and reason 
(obedience to law) that succeeded it: 
[Socrates:] "Then it is proper for the reasoning part to rule, 
because it is wise and has to use forethought for the whole soul; 
and proper for the high-spirited part to be its ally and subject?" 
[Glaucon:] "Certainly." 
[Socrates:] "... These two, then, thus trained and educated . . 
. will preside over the desiring part, which is the largest part of 
the soul in each man, and by its nature can never have wealth 
enough. This they will watch lest it be filled full of what are 
called the bodily pleasures. . . " (Plato, Rep. (trans. Rouse 1956) 
IV, 441D) 
Later philosophers came to label these the three "faculties" of 
reason, will, and desire. True arete, according to Plato, was possible 
only in the well-ordered soul. The short answer, then, to how good 
character and arete is developed is through the training and empowering 
of one's rational faculties via study in mathematics, geometry, 
astronomy, logic and the other intellectual disciplines -- culminating, 
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of course, in philosophy. Short answer, long path. I find this 
personally persuasive, but suspect it lacks mass appeal. 
The problem with this prescription, of course, is that if the hoi 
polloi are such slaves to desire that they have no notion of nobility, 
how can we expect them to take up the enthusiastic, lifelong pursuit of 
intellectual discipline? Is there reason, for that matter, to suppose 
this pursuit is attractive to any but a few of the aristocracy? 
Granted that right action and arete will flow more reliably from a 
clear knowledge of what is good and true, can we not find some way to 
provide the many with at least some good rules of thumb and some 
encouragement to follow them? 
Plato's prescription for intellectual discipline was intended, of 
course, for the rulers, those charged with the responsibility for 
making and administering the laws of the polis. Of the rulers, he 
argued, we must demand more than rules of thumb and generally right 
beliefs. They must know what they are doing, because the good of 
everyone is in their hands. The conclusion is inevitable: the 
statesmen in charge of his ideal republic must be philosopher kings. A 
properly trained military should support them in restraining the lusts 
of the hoi polloi and doing what is best for all. Thus reason would 
rule in the state as it should in the soul -- the pattern would be the 
same. A primary duty of these statesmen, moreover, would be to ensure 
the proper education of all the citizens of that state. 
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The Republic and several of the later dialogs of Plato are filled 
with advice to would-be philosopher-kings on the training of the young 
in everything from gymnastics and music to their future trades, 
whatever those might be. The common thread running through them is the 
emphasis on controlling the passions, whether through the physical 
discipline of athletics or the elimination of lurid works of art. The 
rulers, of course, would teach by their own example. Where role models 
and education proved insufficient to the task of controlling passions, 
the law would take over. 
Plato's account of the well ordered soul describes, in effect, the 
path of discipline which is the route to achievement. The pursuit of 
lofty and distant goals requires the would-be achiever to turn aside 
from base and immediate desires. Men may pursue arete for the sake of 
honor, but that pursuit requires discipline and the well ordered soul 
makes us capable of that. The will in such souls aligns itself with 
the dictates of reason against the demands of desire and the lures of 
pleasure. Only such souls can learn to appreciate and desire what is 
"noble and truly pleasant." 
Plato's explanation of discipline and the well ordered soul is a 
useful contribution to our understanding of the achievement oriented 
character type. It falls short, however, in terms of a general 
explanation of the development of character. We can assume that, for 
those less favored souls, the "spirited" or acquisitive faculties have 
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taken control; but Plato doesn't discuss the process by which these 
lesser character types come to be in much detail. We know that the 
sort of art that appeals to our baser nature plays a role, but it was 
left to Aristotle to put forward a more systematic account. 
Aristotle does finally pull the Socratic and Platonic thinking on 
arete and paideia together in a more organized manner, summarizing and 
superceding it in his usual profound but textbookish fashion. He 
suggests, for instance, that the definition of the Good that Socrates 
sought for so long was simply happiness, "that for the sake of which 
everything else is done" (Aristotle, Eth. Nic., (trans. Rackham 1968) 
I, 7, 1097a23). And a man's happiness, in turn, is to be found in "the 
exercise of a soul's faculties and activities in association with 
rational principle ... in conformity with excellence or virtue" 
[Ibid., I, 7, 1098al5-17). This sounds familiarly Platonic, and again 
the quesiton is how such souls are formed. This leads Aristotle into 
the discussion of character development. 
The general pattern for excellence of character is to be found in 
the Law of the Mean (Aristotle, Eth. Nic., II). Sometimes called the 
"Golden Mean" (recalling the Golden Rule, which is appropriate since 
arete has by now assumed nearly the Christian meaning), this Law 
suggests that the moral virtues, like courage and temperance, always 
lie somewhere between two vices -- rashness and cowardice in the case 
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of courage, profligacy and insensibility in the latter. Too much or 
too little is invariably the error, according to Aristotle. 
One gains these virtues as one gains their corresponding vices, 
through that form of imitation we call practice: 
The virtues ... we acquire by first having actually practiced 
them, just as we do the arts. We learn an art or craft by doing 
the things that we shall have to do when we have learnt it. . . 
Similarly we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing 
temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 
II, 1, 1103bl-5) > 
Though we tend not to think of it quite that way, practice was 
readily seen as a form of imitation by the Greeks. Eventually, that 
practice which constitutes our daily life will lead, for better or 
worse, to the formation of habits: 
It is by taking part in transactions with our fellow-men that some 
of us become just and others unjust; by acting in dangerous 
situations and forming a habit of fear or of confidence we become 
courageous or cowardly. And the same holds good of our 
dispositions with regard to the appetites, and anger; . . . [0]ur 
moral dispositions are formed as a result of the corresponding 
activities. Hence it is incumbent on us to control the character 
of our activities, since on the quality of these depends the 
quality of our dispositions. It is therefore not of small moment 
whether we are trained from childhood in one set of habits or 
another; on the contrary, it is of very great, or rather of 
supreme, importance. {Ibid., II, 1, 1103bl5-250) 
It is one's habits, in turn, that produce one's moral 
character. In support of this idea, Aristotle points out that 
the Greek word for character is itself derived from the word 
for habit {Ibid., II, 1, 1103al8). 
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Bateson would readily agree with Aristotle's definition of 
character as a set of habits. Learning those contexts of life 
which constitute our charactero-logical learning, Bateson tells 
us, is precisely a matter of habit formation: 
Habit formation has sorted out the constant from the changeful so 
that that which for a long time has seemed recurrently true has 
become deeply embedded in the circuitry of the organism while the 
changeful remains under flexible control. (Bateson 1991, 137) 
And taking that a step further: "What I have called habit formation 
. . . is synonymous with the development of self" (Bateson 1991, 108). 
Habit, unlike need, is not something lying behind our activities as the 
cause of them, but rather a description of how those activities are 
pursued -- in this case, unconsciously, as the product of repetition 
and deutero-learning. 
Aristotle's emphasis on developing those habits, and thus our 
character, through "transactions with our fellow-men" is also something 
Bateson would readily agree with; but Bateson's notion of character 
focuses more on the original framing of the situation than on the 
choices made within that frame. Simply identifying a context as one of 
danger, where personal bravery may be relevant and required, says more 
about one's character than how one actually comports oneself within 
that situation. As an anthropologist, Bateson is trying to explain how 
character is configured differently in different societies; as a Greek, 
Aristotle is trying to explain how good and bad character develops 
within the typical Greek configuration. Though it was Aristotle who 
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coined the notion of "meta" theory (as in his Metaphysics), Bateson's 
thinking here stands in a meta-relationship to Aristotle's. 
There is a similar sort of meta-relationship at work between 
Bateson's and Aristotle's approach to the education that produces 
character. And Aristotle's view is not all that different from 
Plato's, so the same meta-relationship holds there as well. In 
proposing that we develop the habit of seeking a virtuous mean between 
the extremes of vice in all our human transactions, Aristotle is 
following Plato's admonition to live by the dictates of principle and 
reason, but going him one better by specifying the principle. Though 
he is more specific about the processes of practice and habit formation 
that underlie character, he accepts without question the Platonic view 
of the transactions that encourage right habits: praise and blame from 
those worthy and able to make such judgements, backed in the end by the 
power of law: 
Lawmakers make the citizens good by training them in habits of 
right action -- that is the aim of all legislation, and if it fails 
to do this it is a failure; this is what distinguishes a good form 
of constitution from a bad one. (Aristotle, Eth. Nic., II, 1, 
1103b5-6). 
Perhaps because of his awareness of Freud, but in any case 
consistent with his own ideas on the critical role of context, Bateson 
tends to place more emphasis on how those "habits of right action" are 
inculcated than on what they are. For instance, an ethic of love and 
charity driven home with corporal punishment and threats of hell might 
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lead a child to develop a very different sort of character than the one 
intended -- namely, one preoccupied with dominance and submission, or a 
tendency to rebelliousness. To recall an earlier quote: 
When the patient tells the therapist that, in her childhood, she 
learned to operate a typewriter, this is of no particular interest 
to him unless he happens to be a vocational counselor as well as 
therapist. But when she starts to tell him about the context in 
which she learned this skill, how her aunt taught her and rewarded 
her or punished her or withheld reward and punishment, then the 
psychiatrist begins to be interested; because what the patient 
learned from formal characteristics of patterns of the contexts of 
learning is the clue to her present habits, her "character" . . . 
(Bateson 1991, 54) 
The reliance on praise and blame, of course, is a reasonable 
prescription for an ethics and a culture oriented towards honor; but 
again, the question is one of scope, and Bateson's is the sort of 
complex and empirically generalizable position we might expect of an 
anthropologist. Pointing out this limitation, however, detracts little 
from the power of Aristotle's analysis. It is the culmination of one 
of the single most influential lines of thought in the Western 
tradition. 
The Greek achievement, first in identifying the cultural ideal of 
arete and then in consciously developing a paideia, an educational 
approach capable of realizing it, can hardly be overestimated. By 
articulating the notions of practice and habit in the service of reason 
as the path to excellence of character they have given us a clear and 
credible model of the achievement process with relevance not only to 
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moral excellence but to artistic and other kinds of excellence as 
well. While in many ways culture-bound, the power of the Greek 
viewpoint as laid out in Aristotle's analysis was such that it could be 
taken over with relatively minor alterations by St. Thomas Aquinas to 
serve as the basis of Christian ethical doctrine to this day. Most of 
us still see the relationship between practice, habits, and character 
in much the same way that Aristotle lays it out. That we in the West, 
in fact, still see individual excellence as a goal we are morally 
obliged to pursue is testimony enough to the influence of their vision. 
Nor are we concluded yet with our examination of the Greeks, for in 
addition to their thought on matters of excellence and how to steer 
people towards it we must still consider that "ancient dichotomy 
between form and substance" that has its origins with them. To 
understand the significance of this dichotomy to Bateson and to our own 
examination of achievement orientation, we'll backtrack a bit to Plato 
and to his remarkable reworking of the standard Greek view that men 
pursue arete for the sake of honor. 
Plato's Explanation of Achievement 
We mentioned before that in Plato's Republic the citizenry is 
divided into three categories, corresponding to the three faculties of 
the soul: the rulers, who are trained in philosophy, representing 
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reason; the guardians, who are the military class, representing the 
will; and the commercial class, the hoi polloi, who represent desire. 
Though we tend to think of pleasure as the ultimate object of desire 
and of the common run of men, Plato points out that each of the classes 
(and the parts of the soul corresponding to them) has its own distinct 
pleasures, and each thinks its own the best: 
. . . [T]he money-maker, at any rate, will say that, compared with 
getting gain, the pleasure of honor or of learning is worth nothing 
at all, unless perhaps there is a bit of money in them ... 
Isn't the honor-lover the same? . . . Doesn't he see something 
vulgar in the pleasure that comes from money? And indeed, the 
pleasure of learning too, unless learning brings honor with it, he 
thinks only smoke and nonsense? 
. . . But the philosopher! . . . The lover of wisdom! What are we 
to suppose he thinks of the other pleasures as compared with that 
of knowing the truth as it is, and always being a learner in that 
school? . . . [H]ow great is the pleasure of contemplating things 
as they are, none but the philosopher can ever taste. (Plato, Rep. 
(trans. Rouse 1956), IX, 580E) 
If we can conclude from this that the Republic was not written for 
mere love of honor, since the philosopher Plato could have no desire 
for such base pleasure, we might ask why it was written at all? Why 
did Plato not simply lose himself in the ecstasies of contemplation? 
He certainly didn't need to earn a living by his writings. Perhaps he 
felt some duty to share what he had seen, the noblesse oblige of a born 
aristocrat to his fellow Athenians. He asserts no qualms about forcing 
his philosopher-kings to share their knowledge, as they benefitted from 
the education provided by their polis (Plato, Rep. VII, 519DE). But he 
acknowledges that: 
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. . . [T]hose who grow up philosophers in other cities have reason 
in taking no part in public labors there; for they grow up there of 
themselves, though none of the city governments wants them; a wild 
growth has its rights, it owes nurture to no one, and need not 
trouble to pay anyone for its food. (Ibid., VII, 519E) 
So what explanation might Plato give for those other master-works 
of intellect that his fellow philosophers have bequeathed to us? And 
considering what the government of Athens did to his own mentor, 
Socrates, could duty be a credible motivation even in his own case? 
Never one to shirk the implications of his thought, Plato suggests an 
especially intriguing answer in the Symposium. 
In this dialog, Socrates and his fellow revellers discuss the 
nature of love. This is a unique dialog, for as one Plato scholar 
points out, "it is the only subject not covered by Socrates' profession 
of ignorance": 
[Socrates:] ... I do not know how I could refuse to speak on the 
subject (of love), seeing that I have no claim to knowledge at all 
other than that of (te erotika) matters concerning love. (Plato, 
Symposium, 177DE; in Versenyi 1963, 128) 
His knowledge of these matters was reportedly gained through the 
instruction of a priestess, Diotima. As Socrates recounts the story, 
he was led by Diotima through a dialectic much like his own till the 
true nature of love was finally revealed to him. The starting point is 
the assertion that "all who feel desire, feel it for what is not 
provided or present; for something they have not or are not or lack", 
and that love is directed toward beautiful things (Plato, Symposium 
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(trans. Lamb 1967), 200E-201A). It is also readily agreed that good 
things are beautiful (Ibid., 201C). There are then two decisive turns 
in the dialog. The first is towards generalizing not only the object 
of love, but love itself -- for the possession of good and beautiful 
things makes us happy, and everyone desires happiness: "Generically, 
indeed, [love] is all that desire of good things and of being happy" 
[Ibid., 205D) As the Plato scholar, Francis Cornford, summarizes it: 
Eros is the desire for possession of beauty and goodness, that is 
to say, of happiness. This desire is universal: 'All have a 
passion for the same things always.' The name Eros has been 
wrongly restricted in common speech to what is really only one form 
of this universal desire. (Cornford, "The Doctrine of Eros in 
Plato's Symposium," in Vlastos 1971, p.123) 
Thus, those who devote themselves to the pursuit of happiness 
"through money-making, an inclination to sports, or philosophy" are 
lovers, even though we don't usually describe them that way (Plato, 
Symposium (trans. Lamb 1967), 205D). 
The second decisive turn is taken when Diotima reiterates that "men 
love the good" and "love the good to be theirs," and then adds the 
qualification that "they love it to be not merely theirs but theirs 
always" (Ibid., 206A). This further admission is critical, for what 
can it mean that the good be "theirs always?" Diotima says such 
possession is possible "through a breeding in the beautiful, both of 
body and soul" (Plato, Symposium (trans. Rouse 1956) 206B). In short, 
as Cornford puts it: 
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By means of the characteristic operation of love, generation. In 
all human beings there is the urge to bring to birth children, 
whether of the body or of the mind. The end is not the 
individual's immediate enjoyment of beauty . . . Procreation is 
the divine attribute in the mortal animal. Eros is, in the last 
resort, the desire for immortality. (Cornford, op. c/t., 124) 
As evidence for this position, Diotima offers the example of 
animals: 
'You perceive that all animals get into a dreadful state when they 
desire to procreate, indeed birds and beasts alike; all are sick 
and in a condition of love, about mating first, and then how to 
find food for their young, and they are ready to fight hard for 
them, the weakest against the strongest, and to die for them, and 
to suffer the agonies of starvation themselves in order to feed 
them, ready to do anything. One might think that man,' she said, 
'would do all this from reasoning, but what about beasts?' (Plato, 
Symposium (trans. Rouse 1956), 207A) 
Why do (many, not all) animals behave this way? Because "the 
mortal nature seeks always as far as it can to be immortal; and this is 
the only way it can, by birth. ..." (Ibid., 207D) 
This is an intriguing argument, of course, because the modern 
evolutionary perspective allows that the reproductive instinct (though 
not the nurturing and protective instincts) is indeed universal. 
Diotima then elaborates a fair analogy to a sociobiological argument by 
suggesting that: 
If you consider human ambition, you will marvel at its 
irrationality, unless you reflect on what I have said, and observe 
how strangely men are moved by the passion for winning a name, and 
laying up undying glory for all time . . . (Plato, Symposium 
(trans. Cornford, in Vlastos 1971, 125) 208C) 
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And she concludes: "I hold it is for immortal distinction and for 
such illustrious renown . . . that they do all they can, and so much 
the more in proportion to their excellence." (Plato, Symposium (trans. 
Lamb 1967) 208DE) 
In addition to, or instead of having children, in other words, some 
individuals seek to further their immortality by building a reputation 
that outlives them. Plato thus explains the desire for honor and the 
affirmation of self-worth that was so much a part of the earlier 
warrior-aristocracy's striving for arete: such ambition is grounded in 
our nature as mortals seeking eternity. And there is still another way 
in which this urge is manifested: 
'. . . there are some,' she said, 'who conceive in soul still more 
than in body, what is proper for the soul to conceive and bear; and 
what is proper? wisdom and virtue [arete] in general -- and to this 
class belong all creative poets and those artists and craftsmen who 
are said to be inventive. But much the greatest wisdom,' she said, 
'and the most beautiful, is that which is concerned with the 
ordering of cities and homes which we call temperance and justice. 
(Plato, Symposium (trans. Rouse 1956) 209A) 
Diotima goes on list Homer and Hesiod among the poets who have 
gained "immortal fame and memory," and then the great lawgivers, 
Lycurgus in Sparta and Solon in Athens, who could fairly be called the 
fathers of their city-states ("And everyone would be content to have 
such children born to him rather than human children ..." [Ibid., 
209C)). Having subsumed the two earlier understandings of arete and 
its pursuit under the general heading of begetting immortal children 
Diotima comes around, finally, to the philosopher and the understanding 
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of the arete of virtuous wisdom that Plato and his cohorts were so 
effectively promoting. The philosopher should direct his gaze at 
"beauty as a whole," she says, and "in contemplation of it give birth 
to many beautiful and magnificent speeches and thoughts in the 
abundance of philosophy" (Ibid., 210D). 
Thus Plato explains the achievements of poets, inventors, educators 
and lawgivers, and even of philosophers like himself. I have taken 
some time to present Plato's thoughts on achieving behavior and the 
background behind it because no better explanation was offered for over 
two millenia, and because it meets several criteria for what we might 
consider an adequate explanation. 
First of all, it is very broad in scope: it claims sufficient 
universality to cover all instances of the phenomenon in question - not 
just artistic or scientific achievement, or superior academic or 
battlefield performance, or behavior within an experimentally contrived 
situation, but every sort of achievement oriented activity. The urge 
to immortality may even serve to explain the achievements of those 
anonymous architects of Gothic cathedrals, since there is no anonymity 
before God and His reward for devotion to His works is well known. 
Second, it seeks to explain achieving behavior not as an isolated 
phenomenon but as part a general theory of human behavior with both 
political and psychological dimensions. It begins with what seems an 
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incontrovertible and fundamental principle, namely that all men pursue 
what they perceive to be happiness. It develops a theory of the psyche 
based on that principle and on an hierarchy of ends, which then 
provides a powerful metaphor for the state and the ways it might be 
ruled. 
Third, while the explanation allows for human uniqueness, it also 
recognizes man's continuity with other life forms by grounding the 
phenomenon in the reproductive imperative, which is as fundamental a 
biological principle as one can hope to find. The fact that it can 
easily be tied in to a theological perspective is certainly no argument 
against it. 
And finally, it is elegant -- and eloquent -- in its simplicity. 
The most glaring problem the theory runs into, as does the entire 
philosophical tradition running from Socrates and Plato through 
Aristotle to Aquinas, is its reliance on final causality: To say that 
noble souls achieve in order to secure immortality is to suggest that 
the effect of an action is somehow its cause. Though we all assume 
this causal model whenever we explain our actions by our intentions, it 
doesn't work as well for other life forms and, more to the point, it 
flatly contradicts the conventional scientific paradigm which tells us 
that causes precede their effects. It also suggests that events in the 
material world can be effected by intangible causes such as ideals and 
97 
goals -- another commonplace assumption not readily shared by many 
"hard" scientists who are convinced that the mind's operations will 
eventually be explained in purely physio-chemical terms. And that 
brings us, finally, to Bateson's call for a new look at the "ancient 
dichotomy between form and substance". 
The Problem of Teleological Explanation 
We can begin with our quote in the first section from Bateson: 
. . . [I]t all starts, I suppose, with the Pythagoreans versus 
their predecessors, and the argument took the shape of 'Do you ask 
what it's made of - earth, fire, water, etc.?' Or do you ask, 
'What is its pattern?' Pythagoras stood for inquiry into pattern 
rather than inquiry into substance. That controversy has gone 
through the ages, and the Pythagorean half of it has, until 
recently, been on the whole the submerged half. (Bateson 1972, 449) 
Our notion of substance, or rather "matter," as that from which all 
physical things are formed, goes back to the sixth century B.C. and to 
the very beginnings of ontological speculation in the ancient Greek 
territory of Ionia, on the coast of Asia Minor. Of those pre-Socratic 
philosopher/physicists, little remains but secondhand reports and 
fragments of their writings. While best remembered for their 
disagreements over the nature of the "ultimate stuff", whether it be 
earth, air, water, or fire - or some combination - this picture is 
rather a caricature (Kirk and Raven 1966, 88-9). 
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What merits their title as the first philosophers is their 
abstraction of the idea of a unity underlying the "buzzing, blooming 
confusion" of our world, and their identification of this unity as 
material (Copleston 1/1 1962, 36). Aristotle thus credits them with 
having isolated the first of his four types of cause, namely material 
causality. When we explain the make-up of the physical world with 
reference to atoms, sub-atomic particles, or fundamental forces, we are 
similarly seeking to understand the world in terms of its material 
basis. 
Aristotle's "four causes" (the material, efficient, formal, and 
final) go beyond what we would typically include today under the 
heading of "causation," inasmuch as atoms, for example, are not thought 
to cause the things they constitute. The four causes can be said, 
however, to comprise a reasonably inclusive list of the basic types of 
explanation available to us. Indeed, Aristotle's exposition of them 
represents the first rigorous attempt to explain what it means to 
explain anything. To explain something is to know the why of it, as 
this provides scientific knowledge rather than the merely true beliefs 
which make up so much of our factual "knowledge." As Aristotle states 
in his Posterior Analytics: 
We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of 
a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which 
the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which 
the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, 
further, that the fact could not be other than it is. (Aristotle, 
Anal. Post, (trans. Mure, in McKeon 1947) 1,2, 71b) 
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As our own interest lies in understanding what sort of explanation 
Bateson is proposing for character, and as he claims to base his 
approach on a reconsider-ation of the "ancient dichotomy between form 
and substance" (two of the four causes) Aristotle's analysis should 
provide a useful starting point. 
Aristotle's classic exposition on the subject of causality is laid 
out in what has become known as the Metaphysics, the title given by an 
early editor of his works to the treatises placed "after the physics" 
(McKeon 1947, 238). The discussion in the Metaphysics proceeds by way 
of a critical history of previous philosophical thought on the subject, 
culminating in Aristotle's own grand synthesis. His critique is aimed 
at preserving the fundamental validity of each previously proferred 
causal principle while pointing out its limitations, and at promoting 
his own articulation of the principle of final causality. 
Aristotle's criticism of the material causality of the Ionian 
philosophers (and of the Atomists who came after them) centers on the 
inability of these earlier philosophers to account in any coherent way 
for diversity and change: 
For, indeed, the underlying subject itself does not cause itself to 
change. What I mean, for example, is this: neither the wood nor the 
bronze causes itself to change; the wood does not make a bed, nor 
the bronze a statue, but some other thing is the cause of change. 
Now to seek this is to seek another principle, namely, as we might 
say, the source which begins motion. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 
(trans. Apostle 1966) A, 3, 984a23-27) 
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This next principle, the efficient cause, is the one typically 
captured by our modern notion of cause and effect, with its connota¬ 
tions of billiard balls and its classic expression in Newtonian 
mechanics. Material and efficient causes were, historically, the first 
to be identified according to Aristotle, and they have dominated the 
popular conception of the physical sciences (some would say all 
"rigorous" science) from Galileo's time till the present. Within the 
scientific community itself this limited, dual focus on the material 
half of the ancient dichotomy has never sufficed. Its inadequacies 
were certainly apparent to Aristotle, whose Metaphysics goes on to 
identify the remaining two modes of causality. 
The formal side of the dichotomy was acknowledged to some degree 
even by the Atomists. While atoms were claimed to be imperceptible, 
indivisible, and devoid of all qualities save impenetrability, they 
were not entirely devoid of form (Copleston 1/1 1962, 90). To explain 
the diversity apparent in the world around them, Leucippus and his 
followers postulated atoms of varying shapes and sizes. With these 
minimal differences, and arranged in different ways, atoms in 
sufficient quantities were presumed to form all the diverse and sundry 
entities of our world. The atomists' concern for form and structure, 
minimal as it was, persists in the modern chemist's concern for 
molecular structure. 
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Aristotle (and Bateson), however, traces the concern with form back 
beyond the Atomists to the Pythagoreans, who flourished in Italy a 
hundred years earlier and contemplated form in its less material 
aspects. Pythagoras is generally credited with two major discoveries 
of a mathematical nature: first, the theorem which bears his name in 
geometry; and second, "that the notes on the lyre may be expressed 
numerically": 
Pitch may be said to depend on number, in so far as it depends on 
the lengths [of the strings], and the intervals on the scale may be 
expressed by numerical ratios. (Copleston 1/1 1962, 49) 
The power of these mathematical insights convinced the Pythagoreans 
that the "principles of mathematical objects" were "the principles of 
all things" (Aristotle, Meta. A, 5, 985b24-6). Their identification of 
things with numbers (the female is equated with two, the male with 
three, and justice with four) leaves them open to the charge of number- 
mysticism; but the Pythagoreans were, nonetheless, the first to move 
away from a preoccupation with materialism and material causality 
towards a direct appreciation of the power of abstraction (Copleston 
l/l 1962, 52-3). The Pythagorean idea that something as abstract as 
numbers could make a material thing what it was clearly helped shape 
Plato's theory of Forms. 
Bateson allows that he himself came to adopt "what I think is 
called a Platonic view," which he presents in this way: 
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Plato's most famous discovery concerned the "reality" of ideas We 
commonly think that a dinner plate is "real" but that its 
circularity is "only an idea." But Plato noted, first, that the 
plate is not truly circular and, second, that the world can be 
perceived to contain a very large number of objects which simulate, 
approximate, or strive after "circularity." He therefore asserted 
that "circularity" is ideal ... and that such ideal components 
of the universe are the real explanatory basis for its forms and 
structure. ... In the beginning was the idea. (Bateson 1979, 4) 
Rather than numbers or Forms, Bateson comes to emphasize the 
explanatory power of pattern, which he loosely defines as "similar 
relations between parts" (Bateson 1979, 9) and, more technically, as a 
synonym for redundancy [Bateson 1972, 413-14) meaning a "predictability 
of particular events within a larger aggregate of events" (Ibid., 
406). We are getting a bit ahead of ourselves, however. To understand 
the basis for this discussion, we need to return to Aristotle's four 
causes. 
When Aristotle speaks of "formal causes," he intends a contrast 
with material causality, much as Bateson suggests, but also something 
rather less in keeping with the modern temper: 
Following these thinkers and their [material] principles, since 
such principles were not sufficient to generate the nature of 
things, later thinkers, forced once more by truth itself as we 
said, sought the next principle. For it is perhaps unlikely that 
Fire or Earth or any other such should cause things to be good or 
noble or that those thinkers should have thought so; nor again was 
it right to entrust a matter of such importance to chance or to 
luck. When someone said that Intelligence exists in nature, as in 
animals, and that He is the cause of the arrangement and of every 
kind of order in nature, he appeared like a sober man in contrast 
to his predecessors who talked erratically. (Aristotle, Meta., A, 
3, 984b9-18) 
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With these words, Aristotle begins his discussion of the "submerged 
half" of Bateson's "ancient dichotomy" and inadvertently reveals much 
of the reason for its submersion. Modern science does not speak 
comfortably about the causes of goodness or nobility, or about the 
Intelligence behind all things. But the phrasing here is extravagant: 
When Aristotle speaks of formal causes in the strict sense he means 
simply the cause of a thing's "whatness," the "inner nature of a thing 
which is expressed in its definition, the plan of its structure" (Ross 
1966, 74). This was the causal principle which Plato first identified 
and elaborated in his theory of Forms, although the actual operation of 
that causality was obscure - a point not lost on Aristotle: 
. . . [0]ther things do not come to be from the Forms in any of the 
usual senses of "from." And to say that the Forms are patterns and 
that the other things "participate" in them is to use empty words 
and poetic metaphors. (Aristotle, A/eta., A, 9, 991al9-23) 
For Aristotle, the form is immanent within the individually 
existing thing, giving actuality to the raw potential provided by 
matter. He refers to this individual combination of form and matter as 
a "substance," though sometimes "substance" is used with reference to 
the form alone -- hence my discomfort with Bateson's phrase, "the 
ancient dichotomy of form and substance." 
The union of form and matter in the biological world takes place 
through the dynamic processes of growth and development whereby each 
individual becomes fully realized in its adult form. The hackneyed 
example is the acorn that grows into the mighty oak. It is hard for 
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the modern mind to reflect on the formal cause leading the acorn to 
realize its essential "treeness" without thinking of the DNA at work in 
each and every living cell. The chromosomes do carry the "plan of the 
structure," the basic patterns that determine the species, and they do 
drive the organism's development to maturity. But the operations of 
the genes are known to proceed through highly complex chains of 
efficient causes; the modus operandi of formal causation in Aristotle 
is rather more mysterious. 
Though Aristotle's notion of the immanence of form in the 
individual entity answers questions raised by Plato's "participation," 
he seems unable to explain its agency without reference to other causal 
principles. Sometimes the realization of the form relies on outside 
agents serving as efficient causes, like the sculptor who shapes and 
thereby realizes a potential sphere in bronze (Aristotle, Meta., Z, 
8). When speaking of living organisms, however, the actualizing effect 
of the formal cause seems to depend on the agency of a fourth causal 
principle, that of finality. 
The final cause refers to something's raison d'etre, its purpose. 
In a living organism, according to Aristotle, this meant its fully 
developed, fully realized nature -- its adult form, before the onset of 
decline. To realize this form is the innate end, the te/os, of every 
living creature and this telos plays a causal role in realizing that 
form (hence the term, "teleological explanation"): 
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Thus the acorn, in the whole process of its development into a full- 
grown tree, is tending towards the full realization of its final 
cause. In Aristotle's view it is the final cause itself which 
moves, i.e., by attraction. In the case of the oak tree, its final 
cause, which is also its formal cause, causes the development of 
the acorn into the oak tree by drawing up, as it were, the acorn 
towards the term of its process of development. (Copleston 1/2 
1962, 55) 
The terms "attraction" and "drawing up" make the operation of final 
causality sound rather like the force of gravity, but Aristotle makes 
it clear that even the ultimate final cause, the Unmoved Mover of the 
celestial spheres, moves all the rest "as the object of desire . . . 
that which appears to be noble." ["27-8) Final causality, in other 
words, has more in common with Plato's Eros than with Newton's mutual 
attractions -- and everything to do with arete: For a human or any 
other being to realize the full potential of its form means it has 
achieved its ultimate end, which is its distinctive arete and its 
happiness as well. 
Aristotle claims to have been the first to articulate the principle 
of final causality. Though "desire" seems incongruous in discussions 
of acorns and stars, it certainly seems to play a role in human 
affairs. It has been observed that "of Aristotle's four causes only 
two, the efficient and the final, answer to the natural meaning of 
'cause' in English" (Ross 1966, 73). Teleological explanations are 
natural to everyday discussions of why we choose to do things -- "I did 
this because I desired that." Commonplace as they are, however, 
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teleological explanations for natural phenomena are highly 
problemmatic: 
It might of course be objected that the final cause, the perfected 
form of the oak, does not as yet exist and so cannot cause, while 
on the other hand it cannot cause as conceived in the mind (as the 
idea of the picture in the artist's mind is said to have causal 
action), since the acorn is without mind and power of reflection. 
[Aristotle] would answer, no doubt, by recalling the fact that the 
form of the acorn is the form of the oak in germ, that it has an 
innate and natural tendency towards its own evolution. But 
difficulties might arise for Aristotle if one were to continue 
asking questions. (Copleston 1/2 1962, 56) 
In fact, teleological explanations even for human actions and 
behavior have been considered problemmatic, as the entire program of 
behavioral psychology attests. That so common a part of our everyday 
experience of causality should arouse such resistance from scientists 
is due partly to the paradoxes involved in having a cause precede its 
effect. And since purposive action must be preceded by some notion of 
its purpose, scientists feel safe in subsuming it (somehow) under 
efficient causality (there are questions about how something mental can 
effect physical, bodily activity; but we'll get to those later). 
Aristotle certainty didn't help his cause by extending the teleological 
approach to beings not normally viewed as purposive, such as acorns. 
But the animus behind scientific reluctance to describe even human 
behavior in teleological terms can be traced in large part to the 
transformation of Aristotelian philosophy at the hands of St. Thomas 
Aquinas in the 13th century. 
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With Thomas' introduction of the Christian God into Aristotle's 
system, the notion of "end" assumed a rather more supernatural -- not 
to say unnatural -- explanatory role. It should be noted that, for 
Aristotle, the immanence of form in each existing entity implies that 
each entity is an end unto itself: 
. . . [T]hough he lays great stress on finality, it would be a 
mistake to suppose that finality, for Aristotle, is equivalent to 
external finality, as though we were to say, for instance, that 
grass grows in order that sheep may have food. On the contrary, he 
insists much more on internal or immanent finality (thus the apple 
tree has attained its end or purpose, not when the fruit forms a 
healthy or pleasant food for man, . . . but when the apple tree has 
reached that perfection of development of which it is capable. 
(Copleston 1/2 1962, 55) 
I think it's fair to say that what difference there is between 
Aristotle and Thomas on the matter of final causality stems from their 
fundamentally different views of the nature of God. Aristotle's 
Unmoved Mover, which he calls nous -- Intellect -- is a completely self- 
centered being, "thinking of Himself through all eternity" (Aristotle, 
Meta., L, 9, 1075all). Unlike the Christian God, nous "is not a 
Creator-God: the world existed from all eternity without having been 
created from all eternity" (Copleston 1/2 1962, 57). He does not 
intercede in this world and He does not reward man in a life after. 
Aristotle could hardly agree then with the position laid out by 
Aquinas, that 
God, who acts according to wisdom, created the world for an end, 
but that end can be none other than God Himself: He created the 
world, therefore, in order to manifest His own perfection . . . 
Creatures have, of course, their proximate ends, the perfecting of 
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their natures, but this perfecting of creatures' natures is 
subordinate to the final end of all creation, the glory of God. . . 
. . . [CJonvinced that man has a supernatural final end, and a 
supernatural final end alone . . . [Aquinas] was bound to place the 
final goal of man in the next life, not in this . . . 
. . . [T]he individual human being has a supernatural vocation and 
his vocation is not an earthly vocation; . . . [I]t remains true 
that each human person is ultimately of more value than the whole 
material universe, which exists for the sake of man, though both 
man and the material universe exist ultimately for God. (Copleston 
11/2 1962, 148-50) 
This heavy overlay of Final End over the immanent end of each 
creature's self-perfection marks a shift towards an external finality 
not found in Aristotle. Aquinas actually manages a fair synthesis of 
Aristotelian and Christian views, by arguing that "the glory of God, 
the manifestation of His divine perfection ... is manifested 
precisely by the perfection of his creatures" (Copleston 11/2 1962, 
146). But the intrusion of Godly purposes into explanations of the 
natural world marked a long step down what was to prove a very slippery 
slope. 
As the Church grew ascendant, and worldly understanding came to 
depend on the perception of God through a filter of faith, the 
naturalistic understanding championed by the Greeks and exemplified by 
Aristotle was eclipsed. The philosophical illumination of the human 
psyche that burst forth with Plato and Aristotle, of course, was 
obscured as well. Although Christian thinkers were hardly less 
concerned with matters of the soul, the shadow of theology inevitably 
fell over the enterprise. While "Thomas follows Aristotle in treating 
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the moral and intellectual virtues as habits . . . formed by good 
acts," and "the rule and measure of human acts" remains reason (Ibid., 
126), that happiness which is his ultimate end is now identified with 
beatitude, the vision of God, and is dependent upon God's grace (Ibid., 
120). The grounding of the virtues in God's Will raises the notions of 
"obligation" and "evil" to a prominence unknown among the Greeks. 
Nor was this shadow easily dispelled even by those who later sought 
to limit the domain of theology, since the soul tended to be left 
within those limits. Christian humility before the ultimate mysteries 
displaced Greek pride in the power of reason and the aristocracy of 
"great souls" (megalopsyche). It is hardly a coincidence that there is 
no coherent, naturalistic account of human achievement from antiquity 
till the 19th century. 
The 12th century European rediscovery of the Greeks, which prompted 
Aquinas' synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy with Christianity, did 
lead nonetheless to a resurgence of scientific investigation in the 
13th century (Copleston III/l 1963, 168). Though Aquinas had managed 
to reconcile philosophy and theology by delimiting their respective 
objects and methods, his synthesis proved unstable. The world was 
changing. The opening of trade that brought the Greek texts back from 
the Near East also brought growing prosperity and a more secular 
orientation. Nationalism began to flourish; universities sprang up; 
the printing press was invented; and Latin ceased to be the universal 
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language of the educated world. Authority was being challenged 
everywhere. Science was demonstrating the value of firsthand 
experience. As the natural philosophers and physicists of the 
Renaissance gained confidence in the power of science to reveal new 
knowledge, the fitness of final (and especially Final) causality to 
provide any useful explanations of the natural world came under heavy 
fire. A critical salvo was launched by Francis Bacon in his Novum 
Organon of 1620, which rejected the authority of traditional ways of 
understanding the world in favor of those new methods of investigation 
which were propelling the scientific revolution: 
Bacon counted the teleological mode of regarding Nature as one of 
the idols, and, indeed, as one of the dangerous idols of the tribe, 
-- the fundamental errors which become a source of illusion to man 
through his very nature: he taught that philosophy has to do only 
with formal or efficient causes, and expressed his restriction of 
philosophy to physics and his rejection of metaphysics precisely by 
saying that the explanation of Nature is physics if it concerns 
causae efficientes, metaphysics if it concerns causae finales. 
(Windelband 1958, 401) 
While dismissing final causality, Bacon still held to the value of 
formal causality and considered induction to be a process of careful 
abstraction leading to the discovery of Forms -- the essential natures 
of things (Ibid., 384). Bacon understood these Forms to comprise the 
"simple elements of reality" which alone can provide the foundation for 
the general axioms that make theoretical explanation of the world 
around us possible. What he didn't appreciate, despite this implied 
affirmation of the role of deduction as well as induction in scientific 
explanation, was the critical importance of mathematics to the new 
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science (Ibid., 386-7). It was left to his astronomer contemporaries 
to renew and reform that connection. 
The first great discovery here was Kepler's: 
The psychological motive of his research was the philosophical 
conviction of the mathematical order of the universe, and he 
verified his conviction by discovering the laws of planetary motion 
by means of a grand induction. 
In this procedure it became evident, on the one hand, that the true 
task of induction in natural science consists in finding out that 
mathematical relation which remains the same in the entire series 
of the phenomena determined by measurement, and, on the other hand, 
that the object, in connection with which this task can be 
performed by research, is none other than motion. (Windelband 
1958, 388) 
Kepler's emphasis on mathematical relation recalls Pythagoras' 
discoveries concerning right triangles and harmonics rather than 
Bacon's ruminations on the Forms of things, and thankfully avoids the 
Pythagoreans' more esoteric number symbologies. Thus, "modern 
investigation of Nature was born as empirical Pythagoreanism" (Ibid., 
387). I suspect this sort of formal approach is, in fact, a better 
description of what Bateson was proposing than Platonism which tends to 
focus, like Bacon, more on the forms of things: the "relation which 
remains the same in the entire series of phenomena" is a good 
definition of what Bateson calls "pattern." But just as the formal 
side of the ancient dichotomy was discovering this new strength, it was 
co-opted and put to the service of efficient causality. 
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It was Galileo who effectively put to rest the formal side of the 
"ancient dichotomy." Following through on Kepler's discovery of the 
mathematical relations between the motions of the planets, "Galileo 
created mechanics as the mathematical theory of motion:" 
It is extremely instructive to compare the thoughts which [Galileo] 
presents in the Saggiatore with Bacon's interpretation of Nature. 
Both aim to analyze into their elements the phenomena given in 
perception, in order to explain phenomena from the combination of 
these elements. But where Bacon's Induction seeks the "Forms," 
Galileo's method of resolution (analysis) searches out the simplest 
processes of motion capable of mathematical determination . . . 
With this, the victory of the principle of Democritus and Plato, 
that the sole object which true knowledge of Nature can deal with 
is what is capable of quantitative determination, was sealed in a 
completely new form; but this time the principle was applied not to 
the Being, but to the Becoming or change in Nature. . . . Hence 
knowledge of all things, in so far as it is accessible for us, 
consists in tracing back what is perceived to motion of bodies in 
space. (Ibid., 388-9) 
The power of this new, mathematico-empirical approach to natural 
philosophy was demonstrated most grandly by Newton's hypothesis of 
gravitation which provided the mathematical theory for the explanation 
of Kepler's laws (Ibid., 388). The success of this new, more efficient 
causality might not have led to the forcible submersion of the formal 
side of the causal dichotomy had it not been for the link, so evident 
in Thomism, between final causality and Divine creation: 
. . . [T]he new methodical principle of mechanics excluded all 
tracing of corporeal phenomena back to spiritual forces. Nature 
was despiritualized; science would see in it nothing but the 
movements of smallest bodies, of which one is the cause of the 
other. . . . 
But with the spirits, teleology, also, was obliged to give place. 
The explanation of natural phenomena by their purposiveness always 
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came ultimately in some way or other to the thought of spiritual 
creation or ordering of things, and so was contradictory to the 
principle of mechanics. (Ibid., 400-1) 
The new science needed to be aggressive in establishing its turf. 
It was not so much opposed to religion as it was insistent on defining 
and restricting it to the metaphysical realm, and taking the physical 
world under its own jurisdiction. Formal causality itself might have 
survived its guilt by association with teleology (even despite the 
sometimes near-identity of formal and final causality in Aristotle and 
Thomas), had not the idea of cause itself "acquired a completely new 
significance through Galileo:" 
According to the scholastic conception . . . causes were substances 
or things, while effects, on the other hand, were either their 
activities or were other substances and things which were held to 
come about only by such activities: this was the Platonic/ 
Aristotelian conception of the aitia [cause]. Galileo, on the 
contrary, went back to the idea of the older Greek thinkers, who 
applied the causal relation only to the states -- that meant now to 
the motions of substances -- not to the Being of the substances 
themselves. Causes are motions and effects are motions. (Ibid., 
410) 
Thus formal causation was not so much refuted as obviated, made 
moot, to be left behind along with so many other matters of merely 
"scholastic" interest. Formal explanation came to be identified with 
the tautologies of definition and logico-mathematical proof. Bateson 
didn't argue with that identification. What concerned him were the 
consequences that a limited model of mechanical causality and a limited 
set of mathematical tools, at that very beginnings of modern science, 
would have on the development of the biological and behavioral sciences 
over the next 300 years (Bateson 1972, xxi). 
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The Mind/Bodv Problem -- Bateson's New Bridgehead 
The success of the physicists in applying the mathematics of motion 
to the efficient explanation of natural phenomena did not extend so 
easily to the explanation of organic life or the human psyche, though 
numerous attempts were made beginning with Descartes. His approach was 
based, in keeping with the science of the time, not on the analogy to 
energy but to mechanical motion: 
For just as the investigation of Nature from Galileo to Newton 
directed its energies toward finding out the simple fundamental 
form of corporeal motion, to which all complex structures of outer 
experience could be reduced, so Descartes desired to establish the 
fundamental forms of psychical motion, out of which the multi¬ 
plicity of inner experiences would become explicable. . . . Thus 
Descartes derives the whole host of particular passions, as species 
and sub-species, from the six fundamental forms of wonder, love and 
hate, desire, pleasure, and pain . . . (Windelband 1958, 412) 
Descartes, who first brought the mathematical method to philosophy 
and who wished "to see all final causes kept at a distance from the 
explanation of nature" (Ibid., 401), borrowed the mechanistic analogy 
but balked at an outright physical explanation of consciousness. God 
remained the capstone of Descartes' philosophy and the identification 
of consciousness with souls was hard for him to shake. Though he was 
content to view animals as machines -- complex automata -- he 
maintained that minds belonged to another realm of being altogether, 
the res cogitantes rather than res extensae -- thinking substance 
rather than extended substance. 
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This was the infamous Cartesian dualism, which necessitated all 
those misguided attempts at a "bridge between behavioral data and the 
fundamentals of physical and chemical science" which Bateson bemoaned. 
It also led Descartes to introduce a new kind of cause to Aristotle's 
list, the causa occasional, by which thinking substance and extended 
substance were enabled to act on one another (Ibid., 415). This idea 
was so fraught with difficulties, however, that it was soon forgotten. 
The dualism remained. 
Bateson describes the split between mind and body as "the 
battleground of science, especially of biology" (Bateson 1993, 176). 
His later writings refer freely to his own wrestlings with the problem, 
and in the Forward to Steps... he acknowledges that his "personal 
inspiration has owed much to the men who over the last 200 years have 
kept alive the idea of unity between mind and body" (Bateson 1972, 
xii). He claimed that the solution to the problem finally came to him 
in late 1969, while preparing a lecture on Korzybski and reviewing the 
relation of map to territory. It was this insight that revealed the 
underlying coherence of all his previous work and led him to believe 
that the outlines of a "new scientific territory could be defined" 
(Bateson 1972, xvi). 
Bateson's name for the science that would map this territory is 
expressed in the title of his book, Steps to an Ecology of Mind. The 
title of his next book, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unityy states the 
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conviction underlying it. Bateson was, in effect, developing a radical 
new understanding of mind in opposition to the understanding expressed 
in the Cartesian dualism. 
Having now reached back "to the very beginnings of scientific and 
philosophic thought" as Bateson suggested, and reviewed the development 
of the "ancient dichotomy of form and substance" up to Descartes, we 
are ready at last to explore Bateson's new territory of mind and 
recross the bridge to the fundamentals by which he got there. 
Descartes is a good place to start. 
Descartes is, in many ways, the bete noir of Bateson's thought. 
His mind-body dualism is only part of the problem, as it is 
systematically connected to other Cartesian ideas and principles, all 
of which Bateson found destructive: 
It is not an accident and it is a very curious juxtaposition that 
this same man around 1700, Descartes, created three of the major 
tools of our contemporary thinking. One, the split between mind 
and matter. Two: the Cartesian coordinates, the graph -- you put 
time on the bottom and you make a variable. And, three: the cogito 
-- "I think, therefore I am." Those three things go together and 
have simply torn the concept of the universe in which we live into 
rags. (Bateson 1992, 305) 
In fact, Descartes died in 1650. Bateson is nonetheless correct in 
his estimation of the magnitude of Descartes' influence on modern 
thought. He is the seminal figure in modern philosophy, inasmuch as 
the problems posed by Cartesian philosophy provide the starting point 
for almost all that has come after. And yet Bateson's inclusion of the 
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Cartesian coordinates -- the basis of the analytic geometry which seems 
Descartes' most enduring achievement -- on his list of destructive 
influences still comes as a surprise. It is instructive to see why he 
includes it. 
Bateson appreciates the contribution that Cartesian diagrams have 
made -- he applauds them as "a model which has been extraordinarily 
profitable in thinking about things like planets and temperatures and 
even perhaps populations" (Bateson 1993, 175). His complaint is that 
their success in these applications has led to their use on problems 
for which they are entirely inappropriate: 
You cannot claim to have no epistemology. Those who so claim have 
nothing but a bad epistemology. And every description is based 
upon, and contains implicitly, a theory of how to describe. The 
Cartesian coordinates contain a theory of how to describe, and for 
many purposes, I believe, it is an inappropriate and dangerous 
theory -- one which in the end leads to various sorts of 
quantification of "things" which probably should be regarded as 
patterns, not quantities. (Ibid., 178) 
He gives the interesting example of our fingers and toes: 
You see, you can be wrong in describing the anatomy of a human 
being when you say he has five bananalike objects on the end of 
each limb, because, you see, he might not have "five fingers" on 
the end of each limb, but "four angles between fingers." The 
question is, what is there in the genetic injunctions, the 
prescriptive descriptions, for how to make a hand? Is there a 
number at all? "Five, or "four," or whatever? Is there 
conceivably a rule of symmetry there? (Ibid., 178) 
The "rule of symmetry" might, for instance, enjoin first the 
angling off of an opposing bone (the thumb); then another angling off 
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within the main bone between what would be, in effect, the ring and 
middle fingers; then a further angling off of each of those. By 
automatically focusing on quantities, as the tradition that comes down 
to us from Galileo and Descartes would have us do, we overlook the 
patterns of bilateral symmetry and "topological logic" that actually 
govern morphogenesis (Ibid., 180). By focusing so much on discrete 
quantities, Bateson believed we had lost our feel for the patterns that 
govern -- and connect us to -- the living world. 
More to the point, for Bateson, the Cartesian coordinates reduce 
time to a simple, linear quantity -- plot time on the x-axis, distance 
on the y-axis, and the linear relation between them is velocity. This 
fits perfectly with the assumption of unidirectional efficient 
causality and the principles of motion in mechanics. It does not fit 
so well, however, with the circular causal systems and recursive 
systems that constitute biological process: 
The . . . mechanistic point of view is a point of view derived from 
the science which grew out of Newton and Locke and became the 
Industrial Revolution and became the science. Essentially, how to 
get across those arcs and how to ignore the circuit structure. In 
a sense, in introducing the circuit structure in the bottom 
[material] half of that iceberg, I am blowing all hell out of the 
Newtonian and Lockean materialistic point of view. The Newton- 
Locke mechanism is related, in fact, to the separation of mind and 
body, mind and matter. (Ibid., 304) 
For Bateson, mind is immanent in certain organizations of matter, 
arising out of the interactions -- the passing of information, of 
differences responded to and transformed as they are passed on -- 
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through part to part of a system of circuitous pathways. What is 
critical about circular as opposed to linear causality is that what 
triggers the response isn't an impact but a difference. This was the 
insight that Bateson experienced while preparing for his Korzybski 
lecture: 
. . . I suddenly realized that of course the bridge between map and 
territory is difference. It is only news of difference that can 
get from the terri-tory to the map, and this fact is the basic 
epistemological statement about the relationship between all 
reality out there and all perception in here: that the bridge must 
always be in the form of difference. (Ibid., 218) 
Bateson attributes the initial discovery of this bridge to two 
psychologists working in Leipzig in the 1830's, Ernst Weber and Gustav 
Fechner: 
. . . Weber discovered that perception was related to ratios of 
intensity in the "stimulus." ... He discovered, for example, 
that the ability to perceive the difference between two weights is 
based on the ratio between them and not upon the subtractive 
difference. So if you can discriminate between two ounces and 
three ounces, you will also discriminate six ounces from four, and 
indeed three pounds from two pounds. Now that discovery, that the 
first and most fundamental step of mental life -- the receipt of 
news from the outside -- depends upon difference, and that the 
differences are in fact ratios, is basic for epistemology ... We 
deal in what mathematicians call derivatives, and not in quantities 
-- in ratios between quantities but not in quantities. This, you 
see, is a bridge between mind and body, or between mind and matter, 
but, at the same time it differentiates mind from matter. (Ibid., 
309) 
Pitch, of course, is also a matter of ratios. So is our perception 
of colors. The notion of ratios is important because it subtly argues 
against the Freudian metaphor of psychic energy: energies are 
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quantities and, as such, additive; ratios are not sums but products -- 
hence, multiplicative. 
Drawing on a distinction borrowed from the ancient Gnostics and 
developed by the psychologist Carl Jung, Bateson develops this 
distinction into two separate "worlds" of explanation, the pleroma and 
the creatura: 
[The pleroma] is a world in which things are not alive. They're 
billiard balls, they're stones, they're astronomical objects, and 
so forth, and they respond to forces and energy exercised upon 
them. One billiard ball hits another, and the second one responds 
with energy derived from the first... 
But the world of living things [creatura] is different. Living 
things respond to the fact of being hit. There are facts as 
distinct from forces. There are ideas. And these facts are 
essentially non-physical. What you respond to, what you can see, 
is difference. You can see that this is different from that. 
(Ibid., 273) 
If you ask where the difference lies between this and that, the 
answer can only be that it lies neither in this nor in that, but in 
their relation to each other and to a third thing, a receiver. That 
relationship has neither mass nor velocity, yet it has an effect. 
Paraphrasing Kant, Bateson notes: 
. . . [T]here are a million facts (Jatsache) in a piece of chalk, 
but a very few of these become effective. Most of them do not make 
a difference. In the more modern language of information theory, 
we may say that information is difference which makes a difference 
and that of the infinite number of differences immanent in this 
chalk very few become information. (Ibid., 309) 
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The grounding of Bateson's solution to the mind-body problem in the 
conceptual framework of information theory is intriguing because 
Shannon's equation for the measure of information has itself been 
proposed as the bridge between two closely related worlds of thought: 
Shannon had set out to solve a specific problem in radio and 
telephone communication, and the solution he arrived at, by strict, 
deductive methods, was essentially identical to the formula for 
entropy that had been established in the physics of Victorian 
times. That equation was a mathe-matical expression of the 
tendency for all things to become less orderly when left to 
themselves; for energy to undergo certain transformations in the 
natural course of events, making it more disorganized . . . 
Shannon's entropy equation suggested, at the very least, a powerful 
analogy between energy and information. Entropy was the 
connectiving link. In this way it unified two worlds of thought . 
. . (Campbell 1982, 18-9) 
That entropy, as a measure of disorganization, should be inversely 
related to information, which is a measure of organization, makes 
intuitive sense. It is reported that Norbert Wiener, the founder of 
cybernetics, was known to walk into a room "puffing at a cigar, and say 
'Information is entropy.' Then . . . turn around and walk out again 
without another word" (Ibid., 21). As Bateson knew Wiener rather well, 
he was certainly aware of these possibilities. On the other hand: 
The idea of a relationship between information and entropy, 
implicit in the early days of the theory, is still questioned by 
scientists today. Some are doubtful that the connection is any 
more than formal, or that it will lead to any deeper insights . . . 
It is interesting to note, however, that Claude Shannon, the chief 
originator of information theory, thinks differently. (Ibid., 52) 
It seems certain that Bateson did too. He says explicitly that 
"difference, of course, carries no energy. It is of the realm of 
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entropy and negentropy [negative entropy or ordering]" (Bateson 1992, 
201). I believe he hoped that difference would play the key role that 
Von Neumann proposed as critical for the scientific development of the 
behavioral sciences, namely, a correlate of the Newtonian particle, 
"that elegant fiction upon which physics was built" (Ibid., 152). 
Working out the details of the relationship between information and 
entropy, however, was not Bateson's task. It was enough for him that 
the concept of difference was essential to the definition of 
information, the theory of which was expressible in the form of 
scientific laws. That satisfied his own requirement that explanation 
provide a "mapping of data onto fundamentals," meaning propositions 
which are either tautological or scientifically lawlike and true 
(Bateson 1972, xix). The connection between information and entropy 
probably accounts for Bateson's inclusion of the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics on his select list of exemplary scientific fundamentals 
as well (Ibid., xix). 
Beginning with the idea of difference, Bateson goes on to develop 
his concept of mind. He provides numerous examples of systems 
responding to difference, and particularly to the difference provided 
by something that is not there, such as the letter from the IRS in 
response to the taxes you didn't pay, or the absence of food which 
activates an amoeba. This is important to Bateson because it 
underscores the immaterial nature of difference and because it 
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indicates that difference operates digitally rather than analogically. 
This is basic to information theory as it is to the artificial 
intelligence of computers. The smallest "difference which makes a 
difference," that which information theorists call a "bit" is defined 
this way: 
... [A] choice between two equally possible messages. It is a 
"yes" or "no" answer to the hypothetical question: "Is it this 
one?" The answer "yes" resolves all uncertainty. . . . The answer 
"no" also resolves this uncertainty. (Campbell 1982, 75) 
Bateson points out that, unlike efficient causes, these digital 
determinants do not -- can not -- impart energy to the responding 
system which, instead, draws on its own energy resources in responding: 
. . . [Information travels, usually, where energy already is. 
That is, the recipient, the organism receiving information -- or 
the end organ or the neuron -- is already energized from its 
metabolism" (Bateson 1992, 219). 
Difference, in other words, "does not provide the energy, it only 
triggers the expenditure of energy" (Ibid., 164). And as it triggers 
energy, it moves through the system: 
We talk then about differences and transforms of difference. 
Obviously a neural impulse is a very different sort of thing from a 
difference in light or a difference in temperature, which is what 
triggers the end organ. When such differences are transformed in 
successive ways through the system, mind becomes a very complex 
network of pathways, some of them neural, some of them hormonal, 
some of them of other kinds, along which difference can be 
propagated and transformed. (Ibid., 164-5) 
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Each transform along the circuit represents, in effect, a mapping 
of the territory presented to it, in Korzybski's phrasing: the light 
bouncing of the object (the ultimate territory, the thing-in-itself) 
presents a transform (a mapping) in terms of wave lengths to the 
retina, which in turn maps that presentation in neural discharges, 
passing it on to the brain, where it is mapped again, and so on and on: 
. . . [A]s a difference is transformed and propagated along its 
pathway, the embodiment of the difference before the step is a 
"territory" of which the embodiment after the step is a "map." The 
map-territory relation obtains at every step. (Bateson 1972, 455) 
We've considered this process of mapping from the perceptual side, but 
Bateson argues that it carries over to the motor side, as well: 
. . . [W]e can follow the chain forward. I receive various sorts 
of mappings which I call data or information. Upon receipt of 
these I act. But my actions, my muscular contractions, are 
transforms of differences in the input material. And I receive 
again data which are transforms of my actions. We get thus a 
picture of the mental world which has somehow jumped loose from our 
conventional picture of the physical world. (Ibid., 455) 
Indeed, says Bateson, "the mental world is only maps of maps of 
maps, ad infinitum" (Ibid., 454). The mind, in other words, can be 
viewed as a dynamic set of interconnected systems for internal and 
external mapping. 
It would be fair to ask whether, in delineating these two worlds of 
explanation Bateson hasn't effectively replicated the Cartesian 
dualism. He admits that, "in fact, this is the same old dichotomy 
between mind and substance" (Bateson 1972, 456). But in this case 
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there is no need for a causa occasional, for there are not two 
separate substances, mind and matter, but only matter organized in such 
a way as to respond to difference. The thermostat which is made up of 
metal and plastic and energized by electricity is not a mysterious 
mental substance, but "the whole system is a sense organ which is 
triggered by temperature difference" (Ibid., 456). Mind is immanent in 
matter. 
What distinguishes the thermostat or the governor on a steam engine 
from what we usually think of as mind is basically its level of 
complexity. But the difference in complexity here is not so much 
quantitative as qualitative: a mind is complex enough to evidence 
various sorts of recursiveness, that is, response to itself. 
Obviously, the thermostat is capable of a rudimentary sort of 
recursiveness in the form of feedback, by which its previous operation 
of warming the room affects its subsequent operation of shutting off. 
Another type of recursiveness, however, involves "the case in which 
some property of a whole is fed back into the system" (Bateson 1992, 
220). If the thermostat could determine not only that its thresholds 
for turning on or off were reached but that its thresholds might 
comfortably be adjusted upward or downward as it adjusted the seasons, 
then we would be seeing further signs of what might be called mind, in 
the form of a rudimentary self-awareness. Bateson suggests "that a 
special sort of holism is generated by feedback and recursiveness" of 
this second kind (Ibid., 221): 
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Autonomy -- literally control of the self, from the Greek autos 
(self) and nomos (a law) -- is provided by the recursive structure 
of the system. Whether or not a simple machine with a governor can 
control or be controlled by itself may be disputed, but imagine 
more loops of information and effect added on top of the simple 
circuit. What will be the content of the signal material carried 
by these loops? The answer, of course, is that these loops will 
carry messages about the behavior of the whole system. . . That is, 
the messages become messages about the previous lower level. From 
this to autonomy is a very short step. (Bateson 1979, 126-7) 
The recursiveness generated by messages about messages leads to 
consideration of another criterion for mentality, namely that "mind 
operates with hierarchies and networks of difference" (Bateson 1992, 
221): 
It seems to me very clear and even expectable that end organs can 
receive only news of difference. Each receives difference and 
creates news of difference; and, of course, this proposes the 
possibility of differences between differences, and differences 
that are differently effective or differently meaningful according 
to the network within which they exist. This is the path toward an 
epistemology of gestalt psychology, and this clumping of news of 
difference becomes especially true of the mind when it . . . 
evolves language and faces the circumstance that the name is not 
the thing named, and the name of the name is not the name. This is 
the area in which I've worked very considerably in constructing a 
hypothetical hierarchy of species of learning. (Ibid., 221) 
And thus Bateson's discussion of mind leads right back to the 
discussion of character, which is a form of second level meta-learning, 
and to the inadequacies of the standard psychological theories -- which 
built a bridge "to the wrong half of the ancient dichotomy -- to 
explain it. 
There is, to be sure, no way that the Cartesian coordinates could 
analytically describe systems of circular and recursive interaction. 
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And on the mechanical assumptions governing Descartes' res extensae, 
there is no way that mind could be immanent within its organization. 
Bateson is no doubt correct in blaming the assumptions embodied in 
Cartesian philosophy for skewing all scientific research towards the 
model of physics for centuries after. And, as Bateson suggests, this 
may not have been in the best interest of the life sciences generally. 
Though the model has proved effective in biology at the biochemical 
level, it has certainly not succeeded in the behavioral sciences and 
has undermined their credibility in the process. 
And what about that phrase for which Descartes will always be 
remembered -- his "cogito, ergo sum?" On Bateson's interactive 
assumptions, there is simply no way that a mind could establish its 
being apart from relationship -- any more than there could be a map 
without a territory. Moreover, and this has been pointed out by 
others, it is only by virtue of inflection that the cogito implies an 
ego. Should the act of thinking require a subject (and this is not so 
clearly the case), it certainly needn't be that ghost inside the 
machine bounded by our skin. 
This might seem no more than a philosophical concern but, in fact, 
Bateson's concept of mind entails a radical non-individuation principle 
with important implications for his thinking, including his view of 
characterological learning. It may help to summarize the 
distinguishing characteristics of Bateson's solution to the mind-body 
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problem because, taken together, he suggests that they provide also the 
general criteria for mental process: 
The criteria of mind that seem to me to work together to supply 
this solution [to the mind-body problem] are here listed . . . 
1. A mind is an aggregate of interacting parts or components. 
2. The interaction between parts of mind is triggered by 
difference... 3. Mental process requires collateral energy. 
4. Mental process requires circular (or more complex) chains 
of determination. 
5. In mental process, the effects of difference are to be 
regarded as transforms (i.e., coded versions) of events which 
preceded them. 
6. The description and classification of these processes of 
transformation disclose a hierarchy of logical types immanent 
in the phenomena. (Bateson 1979, 92) 
This is a clear and, I think, very plausible solution to the mind- 
body problem. Bateson emphasizes that these are not only necessary but 
also sufficient criteria for attributing mentality: 
. . . [I]f any aggregate of phenomena, any system, satisfies all 
the criteria listed, I shall unhesitatingly say that the aggregate 
is a mind and shall expect that, if I am to understand that 
aggregate, I shall need sorts of explanation different from those 
which would suffice to explain the characteristics of its smaller 
parts. (Ibid., 91) 
The peculiar consequence of making these the sufficient criteria 
for mind can be appreciated when we ask whether a computer is then a 
mind -- can it think? Bateson's reply is "no," but not for the usual 
reasons: 
We used to argue about whether a computer can think. The answer 
is, "No." What thinks is a total circuit, including perhaps a 
computer, a man, and an environment. Similarly, we may ask whether 
a brain can think, and again the answer is "No." What thinks is a 
brain inside a man who is part of a system which includes an 
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environment. To draw a boundary line between a part which does 
most of the computation for a larger system and the larger system 
of which it is a part is to create a mythological component, 
commonly called a "self." In my epistemology, the concept of self, 
along with all arbitrary boundaries which delimit systems or parts 
of systems, is to be regarded as a trait of the local culture . . . 
(Bateson 1992, 202) 
This is a radical concept and a difficult one to grasp. It may 
help to consider Bateson's stock example of a more fully described 
thinking system -- "a man felling a tree with an ax:" 
Each stroke of the ax must be corrected for the state of the cut 
face of the tree after each chip flies. In other words, the system 
which shows mental characteristics is the whole circuit from the 
tree to the man's sense organs, through his brain to his muscles 
and the ax, and back to the tree. This is not the unit which 
psychologists are accustomed to considering but it is the unit 
which systems theory will force them to consider. 
The example itself is not very persuasive, perhaps. But if we 
focus less on the computational contributions of the brain and think 
more about the adaptive process at work -- the learning going on -- we 
would have to admit that the muscles, at least, are very much 
involved. Over time, intellectual direction gives way to what seems 
like a direct line from eyes to hands. "Muscle memory" begins to 
assert itself. Like riding a bike, it takes time to learn but, once 
learned, it takes little or no thought. That is not to say it is 
mindless. 
Granted that learning is something that involves not just the brain 
but the larger nervous and muscular systems, consider the case of a 
horse and rider. There is a process of learning and mutual adjustment 
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that goes on between these two that is arguably better described as one 
learning system involving two brains -- or rather two nervous and 
muscular systems, for again there is little thought involved. And why 
would we want to leave the tendons and ligaments out of this adaptive 
system -- or even the bones of the two creatures -- since these two 
will adapt over time to riding (bow legs being just one example). 
Consider ants or other social insects: is there any good reason to 
consider the individual ant as the unit of thought and learning rather 
than the hive? The biologist Lewis Thomas argues the opposite: 
A solitary ant, afield, cannot be considered to have much of 
anything on his mind; indeed, with only a few neurons strung 
together by fibers, he can't be imagined to have a mind at all, 
much less a thought. He is more like a ganglion on legs. Four 
ants together, or ten, encircling a dead moth on a path, begin to 
look more like an idea. They fumble and shove, gradually moving 
the food toward the Hill, but as though by blind chance. It is 
only when you watch the dense mass of thousands of ants, crowded 
together around the Hill, blackening the ground, that you begin to 
see the whole beast, and now you observe it thinking, planning, 
calculating. It is an intelligence, a kind of live computer, with 
crawling bits for wits. (Thomas 1974, 12-3) 
Thomas is willing to take the next step as well, and consider the 
analogy to human societies: 
Nobody wants to think that the rapidly expanding mass of mankind, 
spreading out over the face of the earth, blackening the ground, 
bears any meaningful resemblance to the life of an anthill or a 
hive. Who would consider for a moment that the more than 3 billion 
of us are a sort of stupendous animal when we become linked 
together? . . . 
But there is just that one thing. About human speech. (Ibid., 103- 
105) 
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[W]e spend our time sending messages to each other, talking and 
trying to listen at the same time, exchanging information. This 
seems to be our most urgent biological function; it is what we do 
with our lives. . . . Information is our source of energy; we are 
driven by it. . . . 
Joined together, the great mass of human minds around the earth 
seems to behave like a coherent, living system. (Ibid., 131-3) 
While Thomas and Bateson did meet at least once (in 1975), it is 
unlikely that either had any influence on the other's work (Upset 
1980, 284). Their ideas on this matter, though arrived at by very 
different routes, nonetheless seem wholly congruent. Bateson took that 
line of thinking a step farther, by arguing that the entire process of 
evolution evidenced signs of immanent mentality. It would take us too 
far afield to reconstruct that argument here; suffice to say that the 
argument bears more resemblance to the Gaia hypothesis, that the earth 
itself functions effectively as a super-organism, than to the Christian 
scientism of Teilhard de Chardin. 
The importance of this non-individuated concept of mind for our 
purposes is that if character is learned as Bateson suggests, through 
social interactions, then it is arguably less a characteristic of the 
individual than it is of his society or culture. This recalls Ruth 
Benedict's psychological descriptions of culture types, but is in fact 
rather different. Benedict's typology pertained primarily to more 
primitive, homogeneous cultures than our own, while Bateson "debated 
the pertinence of the concept of national character to modern nations" 
(Ibid., 166): 
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It was argued that no uniformity of experience existed in such 
politically contrived states. Such countries were rather 
diversities of sex, ethnic, and occupational differentiation which 
had considerable deviance from norms and cultural flux. Bateson 
dismissed all challenges to the validity of the idea of national 
character by referring to a familiar holistic assumption. Both 
individuals and communities were necessarily organized units "such 
that all [their] 'parts' or 'aspects' [were] mutually modifiable 
and mutually interacting . . . 
As long as sufficient time was permitted to elapse so that habits 
of behavior could form between groups, the ethnically synthetic 
quality of modern nations would not hinder national character 
analysis. (Ibid., 167) 
In other words, groups within a society interact through the 
interactions of their members. If one group tends towards dominance 
and another towards submission in its dealings with the other, that 
does not mean they have opposing character traits but that together 
they display the single, binary trait of dominance/submission. Indeed, 
it would probably be truer to say that individuals' character traits 
are shaped by such group interactions than the other way around, since 
subsystems tend over time to adjust to the requirements of the supra- 
system. I would even hazard to guess (since he nowhere addresses the 
question) that Bateson would explain the development of character 
traits at the social level in terms of sytemic interactions that 
included the physical environment: if man-felling-tree is a systemic 
whole which functions as a mind and adapts neural and muscular 
subsystems to its purpose, surely the physical environment of the 
Eskimo or the Polynesian would play some role in the development of 
their character. 
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This is a far cry from the "climactic determinism" that was once 
fashionable in anthropology and still occasionally rears its head today 
(as in Professor Jeffries' now infamous distinction of "sun" and "snow" 
people), since climate is only one, perhaps minor, factor. But it is 
similar to Bateson's caution that the "unit of survival" in evolution 
is not "an individual or family line or a species" but an "organism in 
environment" (Bateson 1992, 171); that in the evolution of the horse, 
for instance, "the horse isn't the thing that evolved. What evolved 
actually was a relationship between horse and grass" (Bateson 1992, 
275-6). 
It is interesting to reflect on how Bateson's theory of character 
development itself develops over time. Those ideas which first took 
shape in his work on schismogenesis in Naven are never so much given up 
as given over to larger and larger systems of theory: they are nested 
at first in a theory of learning, which in turn gets nested in a theory 
of mind, which itself gets nested in a theory of evolution. It 
proceeds from level to level, each meta to the last -- an examplar of 
the principles he was so earnest to communicate. 
What he wound up with is in many ways a radical position, but a 
coherent one I think, well grounded in established scientific theory. 
In terms of the criteria for adequate explanation we have laid out so 
far, it would be fair to say that Bateson's approach to character 
development is both broad in scope (it claims, at least, to cover all 
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such phenomena) and profound in its depth, emerging as it does from a 
theory of the fundamental nature of mind and biological evolution. 
Like the Greek approach, it has important implications for social 
analysis as well. By Bateson's own criterion of explanatory adequacy, 
that the theory connect with scientific fundamentals, it also succeeds 
to a degree unusual in the behavioral sciences. 
The problems Bateson's approach runs into, at this general level, 
stem from the fundamental ambiguities in his presentation. He does 
not offer us a systematically laid out theory but rather decades of 
work in progress, organized mostly as articles on discrete and diverse 
topics. Virtually all are theoretical rather than empirically 
oriented; but some are recognizably scientific papers while others are 
ruminations on problems of methodology that are more philosophic than 
scientific. The attempts at synthesis that mark his later writings are 
predominantly philosophical (and increasingly exhortational) but, like 
those earlier articles, only loosely connected to the philosophical 
tradition. It is hard to determine, in the end, where it all fits and 
where or how a proper critique should begin. 
Bateson's eventual identification of his field of research as 
"natural epistemology" is a good example of how the incongruence of his 
ideas with prevailing worlds of academic discourse worked to inhibit 
scholarly critique. His approach is decidedly more philosophical 
than, say, Piaget's -- it draws on experimental observations without 
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pretending to be determined by them; yet it has little to do with what 
philosophers consider epistemology (which appears to require no 
observable phenomena at all). Thus he's an odd duck in both camps. In 
addition, Bateson was working largely with what scholars in both fields 
would consider derived ideas -- McCullough's work on frog perception, 
Russell's theory of types, etc.; so he was not readily viewed as an 
"original thinker" demanding serious consideration from either. 
(Though his double bind theory of schizophrenia did draw scholarly 
critique, it was largely misunderstood by therapists and its 
epistemological implications were entirely ignored.) The range of his 
theoretical pursuits made it inevitable that he would find himself, at 
times, a bit out of his depth; that is the perennial complaint of 
specialists about generalists. The result is that Bateson's 
epistemological theories have attracted not the slightest critical 
attention from either psychologists or philosophers. 
What tends to be missed is the fact that Bateson did not rely on 
derived ideas as might a popularizer or amateur. He used them rather 
like an artist might use found materials in a collage or assemblage: 
the art is in the relationships these materials are brought into. The 
problem is to understand and evaluate the nature of Bateson's 
theoretical art. It is not scientific theorizing of any recognizable 
sort -- it is neither empirically analytic nor mathematically deductive 
in any obvious way; nor can it be considered properly philosophical 
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inasmuch as its methods are not explicitly addressed and carried out in 
any systematic fashion. 
The lack of an explicit methodology makes the usual methods of 
critique problemmatic: his results are not easily duplicated, his 
procedures are not easily assessable by comparison to some 
methodological standard. That's not to say that his approach isn't 
methodical, only that it isn't formulaic or reproducible. I think it 
would be fair to call Bateson's method intuitive: a series of 
increasingly bold abductions -- discerning common patterns -- leading 
towards a final, over-arching perception of the "pattern that 
connects:" a pattern that Bateson thought might eventually encompass 
even the holy. But intuition is not inviting to critique, the merest 
hint of mysticism leads to scientific excommunication, and the 
difficulty in critiquing Bateson's theory is certainly a weakness. 
At this point, nonetheless, we do have the main threads of 
Bateson's theoretical filigree in hand. What we don't have, still, is 
a clear idea of how Bateson would use this theory to explain the 
development of an abiding commitment towards achievement. While we can 
see how Bateson would recast into relational terms the standard Greek 
explanation in terms of the desire for honor, we saw too that this was 
not an especially compelling explanation. 
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We can also see why Bateson could not support anything along the 
lines of Plato's solution: the mode of explanation in cybernetics and 
in the world of pleroma generally is not teleological but formal. 
Individual humans may harbor dreams of immortality -- maybe, at some 
time or at some level everyone does. But it is difficult to see how 
that could be a functioning parameter of all living systems, as Plato 
argued. The reproductive urge can certainly be explained without it, 
and limiting the explanation to the human world robs it of considerable 
metaphysical weight. It then becomes just another explanation for the 
Greeks' preoccupation with honor -- instead of a concern for self-worth 
in this world, we have a concern for an undying memory in ages to 
come. By looking not at intentions but at the schismogenic structure 
of the social interaction that defines the pride/admiration relation¬ 
ship, Bateson substitutes formal for final explanation and crosses a 
new bridge to the formal side of the ancient dichotomy. 
The Psychologies of Achievement 
Since Bateson nowhere provides a specific explanation for achieving 
behavior -- just hints and ideas in addition to his more general 
explanation for character development -- our best bet for constructing 
an explanation consistent with his approach might be to do as he did, 
drawing freely on the thinkers that went before him and reviewing their 
insights from a cybernetic perspective. It makes sense, actually, to 
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resume our examination of the general history of thought from the 
period just after Descartes, inasmuch as the foundations of modern 
science that were laid then helped shape all the explanations of 
character development that followed. We have a handle on Bateson's 
basic intellectual tools at this point and an understanding of his 
general theory of character development. By using these to eliminate 
those positions in the historical debates he could not have held, and 
to reconfigure those he might, we may hopefully arrive at the same 
territory he would himself have settled on. 
The Two Traditions 
An important consequence of the Cartesian dualism, pernicious in 
some ways but healthy in others, was the splitting off of two distinct 
traditions in what was to become modern philosophy. Descartes' stark 
distinction between intellectual and extended substance raised 
difficult questions about how mind and body could possibly affect each 
other, which in turn raised questions about how knowledge and action 
based on knowledge was possible. The two traditions originated in the 
split between the "Rationalists" and "Empiricists," those who argued 
that certain ideas were innate in our minds versus those who argued 
that all ideas were the product of our sensory experience. These two 
traditions became geographically concentrated on the European continent 
and in Great Britain respectively and, though both gave way to a 
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variety of other approaches in the succeeding centuries, the split 
between Continental and Anglo-American philosophy persists along the 
same lines even today. Each of the traditions generated a distinctive 
approach to psychology and major contributions to our understanding of 
achieving behavior, and so it is to these we turn now. 
The centuries after Descartes spawned numerous, ingeniously varied 
attempts to bridge the dualism that established efficient causality as 
the explanatory paradigm for the natural sciences while relegating mind 
and teleology to the metaphysical plane. Hobbes in England and Pierre 
Gassendi in France were the first of many who tried to reduce the 
mental world entirely to physical terms. Hobbes, who worked the idea 
out in greater detail, proposed to locate the basis of all mental 
phenomena in elemental sense impressions, by whose "combination and 
transformation memory and thought also come about" (Windelband 1958, 
413): 
[This view] . . . cannot be characterised much otherwise than as an 
anthropological materialism; for it aims to understand the entire 
series of empirical psychical activities as a mechanical process 
connected with the bodily functions . . . [I]n doing so [Hobbes] 
became the father of the so-called associational psychology. 
(Ibid., 412-3) 
Descartes' psychology had demonstrated a crude mechanism in trying 
to reduce mental life to psychic motions. Hobbes' mechanism was more 
sophisticated in that, while recognizing the role of motions and 
140 
impacts in sense impressions he was considering also the combination of 
simple ideas into complex ones. Though the analogy wasn't available 
then, it was rather like the progression from physics to chemistry. 
Hobbes was determined to restrict philosophy solely to naturalistic 
research, and under the heading of natural philosophy he included the 
study of natural law and the state. His philosophy of the state was 
built, like Plato's and Aristotle's, on his theory of human nature. 
Unlike theirs, his theory offered little support for the striving after 
arete: 
The English philosopher found the fundamental, all-determining 
character-istic of human nature in the impulse toward self- 
preservation or egoism, the simple, self-evident principle for 
explaining the entire volitional life. (Ibid., 434) 
Prior to the social contract that formed the state (a logical 
fiction that goes back to Occam in the Middle Ages), humans in the 
state of nature were engaged in a war of all against all and life, in 
Hobbes' immortal words, was "nasty, brutish, and short:" 
[T]o escape this the state was founded as a contract for the mutual 
warrant of self-preservation. The social need is not original: it 
only results necessarily as the most efficient and certain means 
for the satisfaction of egoism. (Ibid.) 
A state founded on this basis might make life longer and less 
nasty, perhaps even less brutish; but it is hard to see how it might 
ennoble that life and inspire it towards a commitment to achievement. 
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A mind that arises solely in sensation seems destined here to fall into 
sensualism. 
Hobbes' emphasis on the psycho-genetic role of sense impressions 
was nonethless picked up and popularized by John Locke and became a 
staple of Enlightenment thinking, spreading even to France and 
Germany. There was a note of religious skepticism in the background of 
much of this thinking and an attack on the notion of soul. Voltaire's 
"skeptical sensualism became the fundamental note of the French 
Enlightenment" (Ibid., 456), his influence extending even to otherwise 
religious souls, like Etienne Condillac, a priest whose impatience with 
Church dogma parading as science led him to compose one of the 18th 
century's most compelling arguments for an empirical psychology: 
Condillac develops the theory of associational psychology in 
connection with the fiction of a statue, which, equipped only with 
capacity of sensation, receives one after another the excitations 
of the different senses which are added to it, and by this means 
gradually unfolds an intellectual life like that of man. (Ibid., 
456) 
These early attempts at an associational psychology based on 
efficient causality alone all seemed quite crude and unconvincing and 
certainly laid no groundwork at the time for an understanding of 
character or an explanation of commitment to achievement. The central 
role that Bateson ascribes to social relationships in the development 
of character were difficult even to conceive between the social atoms 
that hammer out the state in contract theory. The successes of the 
naturalistic approach pioneered by Hobbes and his fellow empiricists 
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would not be realized until the development of an experimental science 
of psychology in the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, the foundations 
for a rather different psychology were being laid out by the 
rationalists. 
Final causality, which seems so necessary to the explanation of 
intellectual life, was firmly relegated -- indeed restricted -- by 
Enlightenment thinkers to the dubious metaphysical realm, where God 
still held sway. Spinoza, to be sure, tried to devise a metaphysics 
stripped of all teleology, even in connection with God; but Spinoza was 
a rationalist who believed mind was formed not only of the association 
of sense impressions but of innate ideas, as well. He still sought 
something beyond the efficient causality of the material world. His 
rationalism is evident not only in the geometric form his system takes, 
'-S 
beginning with definitions, axioms, and postulates and proceeding via 
logical proofs to conclusions punctuated with the geometricians' 
"Q.E.D." (Latin, quod erat demonstrandum -- which was to be proved); 
but also in the prominent role played by formal causality, in the form 
of logical implication, in his psychology. There are parallels and 
contrasts to both Plato and Bateson here which are worth examining. 
Spinoza resolved Descartes' mind/body dualism by declaring that 
mind and body were only two attributes of the single infinite, Divine 
system which is Nature: 
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. . . [T]he one system can be looked at from two points of view: 
it can be conceived under the attribute of thought or under the 
attribute of extension. To every mode under the attribute of 
extension there corresponds a mode under the attribute of thought, 
and this second mode Spinoza calls an "idea". 
. . . [T]he human body is man considered as a mode of the 
attribute of extension, and the human mind is man considered as a 
mode of the attribute of thought. They are, then, two aspects of 
the one thing. The Cartesian problem of "interaction" between soul 
and body is, therefore, no real problem. (Copleston IV 1963, 228-9) 
Beginning from an infinite unity rather than from finite 
individuals also neatly circumvents Plato's problem with the 
"participation" of material beings in abstract forms. In viewing mind 
and the Divine as somehow immanent rather than transcendant to the 
natural world, Spinoza sounds rather like Bateson, only less 
complicated. But, as Copleston points out, there is something rather 
facile in his solution: 
. . . [T]he problem is not eliminated simply by framing one's 
language in such a way that the problem does not arise in this 
language. For it has to be shown that the data are more adequately 
expressed or described in this language than in any other. (Ibid., 
229) 
And it must be said that Spinoza's language does not always seem 
adequate to the data. Like Plato, for instance, Spinoza's epistemology 
and ethics are hierarchical, and he has a notion of the perfection of 
one's nature. His emphasis on the underlying unity of thought and 
extension suggests that the perfection of the mind corresponds to 
perfection of the body, which hardly seems the case. Spinoza's 
solution also leads to a rather extreme position on causality: 
144 
We read in the Ethics that "the order and connection of ideas is 
the same as the order and connection of things" (Spinoza, Ethics P. 
II, prop. 7). In the proof of this proposition he remarks that its 
truth is clear from the fourth axiom of the first part of the 
Ethics, namely, "The knowledge of effect depends on the knowledge 
of cause, and involves the same" [Ibid.) ... It is arguable, 
of course, that even if we grant that to know an effect adequately 
involves knowing its cause, it does not follow that the causal 
relation is akin to the relation of logical implication. (Copleston 
IV 1963, 218) 
But this is apparently where Spinoza's thought led him. Windelband 
defines Spinozism as "a consistent identification of the relation of 
cause and effect with that of ground and consequent:" 
The geometrical method knows no other causality than that of the 
"eternal consequence"; for rationalism, only that form of the 
dependence which is peculiar to thought itself, namely, the logical 
procedure of the consequent from its antecedent reason, passes as 
in itself intelligible: . . . real dependence also should be 
conceived neither mechanically nor teleologically but only logico- 
mathematically. (Windelband 1958, 418-9) 
So while Spinoza insists on the analysis of extended things solely 
in terms of motion and efficient causality, and of ideas in terms of 
logical implication, it is "misleading," Copleston suggests, to 
conclude that there are "two orders, two chains of causes, namely, the 
order of bodies and the order of ideas" (Copleston IV 1963, 228). 
There is only one order, which we can conceive in two ways; and 
ultimately, since the universe unfolds of logical necessity from the 
essence of God-as-Nature, the formal has priority. Efficient causality 
maps logical implication, rather than the other way around. Spinoza's 
monism thus puts him at odds not only with his scientific 
contemporaries but with Bateson, whose position is that mind, while 
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immanent in the material order, operates according to a different set 
of rules, a different and entirely non-parallel order of causality. 
It's not surprising that the hierarchal ethics which follows from 
Spinoza's rationalist position is, like Plato's and Aristotle's, geared 
towards the intellectual life and closely tied to his epistemology. 
Unlike the Greek philosophers, but in keeping with Hobbes whom he 
follows here in many respects (Windelband 1958, 434), Spinoza begins 
from an elemental egoism: "Everything, in so far as it is in itself, 
endeavours to persist in its own being" (Spinoza, Ethics P. Ill, propo¬ 
sition 6). The individually existing thing "as it is in itself" refers 
to its essential nature, which is the source of all its activity: 
[T]his endeavour [of each thing to persist in its being] Spinoza 
calls conatus. Nothing can do anything else but that which follows 
from its nature: its essence or nature determines its activity. 
The power or "endeavour", then, by which a thing does what it does 
or endeavours to do what it endeavours to do is identical with its 
essence. . . . [T]he truth of the statement is, according to him, 
logically demonstrable. It can be shown that every thing tends to 
preserve itself and to increase its power and activity. (Copleston 
IV 1963, 245) 
This all seems dryly philosophical, no doubt, and perhaps a bit 
sophistical as well inasmuch as Spinoza seems to move all too easily 
from self-preservation, which is comfortably Darwinian, to the increase 
of power which is uncomfortably Machiavellian. But the move is 
logically justifiable since passively suffering the actions of others 
(and thus putting one's self at risk) equates to loss of power and 
active control over oneself; and what seem like dry distinctions in 
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Spinoza turn out to have interesting consequences for the understanding 
of intellectual achievement. 
For Spinoza, the actions of other men, objects or entities upon us 
affect not only our bodies but, since body and mind are just two sides 
of the same coin, our ideas as well: 
The human body is affected by other bodies, and every modification 
or state so produced is reflected in an idea. Ideas of this kind 
are more or less equivalent, therefore, to ideas derived from 
sensation, and Spinoza calls them ideas of imagination. They are 
not derived by logical deduction from other ideas, and in so far as 
the mind consists of such ideas it is passive and not active. 
(Copleston IV 1963, 237) 
Plato's world of becoming and of mere opinion is plainly visible in 
the back-ground here. And, as in Plato, the way to the Good lies along 
the path of true knowledge: 
The perfection of the mind, according to Spinoza, increases in 
proportion as the mind is active, that is to say, in proportion as 
the ideas of which it consists are logically connected with one 
another and are not simply reflections of changing states produced 
by the action of external causes on the body. (Ibid., 246) 
Spinoza calls such logically connected ideas the "ideas of reason, 
and argues that as we move towards this higher level of knowledge we 
are at the same time increasing our own power of activity, our ability 
to direct our actions rather than respond to the action of others. In 
other words, knowledge is power. And as we increase in knowledge and 
power, we increase the perfection of our nature and this gives us 
pleasure: 
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[I]t follows from Spinoza's definitions that everyone necessarily 
pursues pleasure. This does not mean that everyone takes pleasure 
as the consciously conceived end or purpose of all his actions: it 
means that one necessarily seeks to preserve and perfect one's 
being. And this perfecting of one's being, when looked at in its 
mental aspect, is pleasure. (Ibid.) 
There are echoes of Aristotle here, too, only without the overlay 
of final causality whereby each thing seeks to realize its form and 
thus find its fulfillment. But while Spinoza examines at length the 
emotions in relation to understanding and to memory, he is strangely 
silent about character development and even habit formation. He 
assumes an associational psychology in those passive aspects of mind 
affected by sensation, which suggests habituation; but the constella¬ 
tion of habits into character types is simply not addressed. Neither 
has he much to say about education. 
So what we have, in effect, is an explanation for the pursuit of 
intellectual achievement without foundation in a theory of character 
development. Spinoza makes it clear that the pursuit of understanding, 
though it may not issue in public works, is basic to our nature. Since 
this ties in to Spinoza's entire metaphysic and epistemology, one can 
certainly say the explanation shows depth. But its limited scope is 
revealed not only in its silence on other character types, but in its 
silence on achievements other than intellectual. The idea that 
physical perfection is achieved through intellectual understanding, 
which is implicit in the Ethics, is simply indefensible; and the idea 
that one might pursue physical perfection as a means to intellectual 
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clarity, while plausible in some cases, certainly doesn't address the 
typical professional athlete. 
The problem of how to inculcate and encourage the desire for 
intellectual achievement is not addressed because it is our nature to 
pursue it; and yet it becomes unclear, if that is the case, why some do 
and some don't achieve it. As a strict determinist, of course, it 
would be hard for Spinoza to specify how education could make a 
difference -- though he acknowledges that humankind "must seek the 
assistance of . . . [a] Theory of Education," and that "a means must be 
devised for improving the understanding" (Spinoza 1955, 7). Strict 
determinists, of course, find it very difficult to be consistent. 
In addition to these difficulties, Bateson would have found 
Spinoza's assumption of a pre-societal "state of nature," like Hobbes' 
war of all against all, to be anthropologically and epistemologically 
absurd, which it certainly is. For Bateson, learning develops through 
relationships and it is the kinds of relationships we enter into that 
determines our character. The notion that the ideal human character 
type should be pursued through what seems like a process of extricating 
oneself from relationships into some sort of logical autonomy, would 
have struck him as entirely misdirected: we are always in 
relationships, even if they are relationships of aloofness and 
avoidance. 
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In Spinoza's own day, his views were widely "criticized and 
belittled:" 
Indeed, the philosophers of the French Enlightenment in general, 
though they respected Spinoza as a man . . . did not extend their 
respect to his philosophy. They regarded it as obscure sophistry 
and a juggling with geometrical and metaphysical terms and 
formulae. (Copleston IV 1963, 266) 
His resuscitation awaited the German romantics, and it is to the 
German philosophers we now turn. In Germany, the connection of 
metaphysics with matters of spirit and final purpose continued to be 
thought important and worth defending. Towards the end of the 17th 
century, Leibniz, the founder of that distinctly German tradition in 
philosophy which dominated thought on the Continent at least through 
Nietzsche's time, managed to forge a major "reconciliation of the 
mechanical and teleological views of the world" (Windelband 1958, 
420). His solution was to acknowledge that efficient causality rules 
in the world we experience, but to argue that God chose for the world 
appear to us in this way; for despite all appearances, it reflects 
God's purposes entirely: 
The ultimate goal of his philosophy is to understand the mechanism 
of the cosmic processes as the means and phenomenal form by which 
the living content or import of the world realizes itself. (Ibid., 
420-1) 
Leibniz' God is the Christian God. Unlike Spinoza's Nature, He is 
a Creator God, transcendent and benevolent. And there is not just one 
substance in Leibniz' metaphysics but innumerably many of them, each an 
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incorporeal "metaphysical point" without extension, which he called a 
monad. Their incorporeality aside, these are rather like Democritus' 
atoms, being simple, indivisible unities which combine to form the 
compound, visible substances of everyday life. How unextended monads 
combine into extended bodies is a question whose answer, according to 
Copleston, "seems to me extremely obscure" (Copleston IV 1963, 305). 
I can do no better. 
Although they are the building blocks of the material universe, the 
monads are also like souls. Not only are they immaterial, they are 
active: 
Each substance or monad is the principle and source of its 
activities; it is not inert but has an inner tendency to activity 
and self-development. Force, energy, activity are of the essence 
of substance. . . . 
. . . [I]t involves what Leibniz calls a conatus or positive 
tendency to action, which inevitably fulfills itself unless it is 
hindered. (Ibid., 303) 
But for the fact that Spinoza arrives at individual beings by 
working his way down from the one substance, while Leibniz arrives at 
them by working up from innumerable substances, there seems to be much 
they could agree on here. Both postulate a conatus as the source of 
activity, though Leibniz goes further in stipulating it as the very 
essence of what it means to exist. And both view the conatus as a 
process of self-development. Leibniz even shares some of Spinoza's 
general epistemological principles. Copleston, quoting from Leibniz' 
letters, notes that "Monads 'are not pure forces: they are the 
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foundations not only of actions but also of resistances or passivities, 
and their "passions" lie in confused perceptions'" (Ibid., 304). 
And like Spinoza, Leibniz too fosters reader impatience with what 
seems like "obscure sophistry and a juggling with . . . metaphysical 
terms." But Leibniz marked a major shift in our understanding of being 
and substance, one that has been pervasive in science as well as 
philosophy: 
[Leibniz] could no longer think "substance" as characterised merely 
by an attribute of unchangeable existence, and could no longer 
think its states merely as modifications, determinations, or 
specifications of such a fundamental quality: cosmic processes or 
change became again for him active working (Nirken); substances 
took on the meaning of forces, and the philosophical conception of 
God also had, for its essential characteristic, creative force. 
This was Leibniz' fundamental thought, that this creative force 
evinces itself in the mechanical system of motions. (Windelband 
1958, 421) 
It helps to remember that Leibniz was not a cloistered mystic but a 
leading figure of the Enlightenment, who devised his infinitesimal 
calculus in response to the problems posed by Galileo's analysis of 
motion. His basic insight "that the essential nature of bodies . . . 
consists not in extension, nor yet in their mass (impenetrability), but 
in their capacity to do work -- in force" reflects a fairly modern 
scientific sensibility (Ibid.). 
But the introduction of the transcendent creator God into Leibniz' 
scheme brought his differences with Spinoza -- and many of his 
contemporaries -- to a head. For while both Leibniz and Spinoza agree 
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that efficient causality rules the physical, visible world, and both 
agree that there is another order of causality which tracks it, for 
Leibniz that parallel causality is not formal but final: 
Leibniz did not, of course, deny that on the phenomenal level there 
is what we call efficient or mechanical causality. . . . But we 
must distinguish between the physical level at which this statement 
is true and the meta-physical level at which we speak about 
monad[s]. . . . The monads are, to use Leibniz' term, 
'windowless.' . . . 
Though each monad is a world apart, it changes in harmonious 
correspondence with the changes in all other monads according to a 
law or harmony pre-established by God. . . . [T]here is no direct 
causal interaction between monads . . . "[They] act according to 
the laws of final causes, by appetitions, ends and means" (Leibniz, 
Monadology 79). (Copleston IV 1963, 312-4) 
In other words, God has arranged the universe so that mechanical 
causality seems to hold sway -- and this is the only way for science to 
understand it; but in fact, every being operates solely according to 
its own internal principle and it is only God's pre-established harmony 
that meshes all their individual activities so that efficient causality 
can explain it. 
Why would God resort to such an elaborate ruse? According to 
Leibniz, the dominion of efficient causality in our world, while 
complete, isn't at all necessary and could have been otherwise. Among 
all the possible worlds He might have chosen, God only chose to create 
this one because "it contains the least and the fewest evils": 
The contingency of the world consists in the fact that it exists, 
not with metaphysical necessity, but through a choice exercised 
among many possibilities; and since this choice proceeds from the 
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all-good will of God, it is unthinkable that the world is any other 
than the best. (Windelband 1958, 492) 
I've taken some time with Leibniz' peculiar metaphysics for several 
reasons, none of which involve his explanation of the development of 
character or of a commitment to achievement -- in these matters, there 
seems little difference between his views and Spinoza's: "The monad is 
the more perfect . . . the more it shows its activity in clear and 
distinct representations" (Ibid., 506). And the same criticisms can be 
made of his position. But Leibniz is one of those pivotal figures who 
can only be passed over at the risk of constantly referring back to 
him. His identification of substance with force, for instance, helped 
launch German idealism which in turn laid the foundation for Freud's 
psychic forces. It also led to Nietzche's theory of the will-to-power, 
which we will examine later. 
Leibniz' optimism regarding God's pre-established harmony in this 
"best of all possible worlds" also proved influential, though not in 
the way he intended. While teleology (and the role of the Christian 
God in human affairs) had been on the defensive all through the age of 
the Englightenment, the faith of many in "the perfection and 
adaptedness of the world's arrangement" was profoundly shaken by what 
came to be known as the Lisbon earthquake (Ibid., 493). On the morning 
of All Saints' Day, 1755, a devastating earthquake struck Portugal and 
North Africa: 
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[I]n six minutes thirty churches and a thousand homes were 
demolished, fifteen thousand people were killed, and fifteen 
thousand more were fatally injured, in one of the most picturesque 
capitals in the world. ... Why had the Great Inscrutable chosen 
so Catholic a city, so holy a festival, and such an hour -- when 
nearly all pious citizens were attending Mass? 
. . . Where now was Leibniz' "best of all possible worlds"? Or 
Pope's "Whatever is, is right" -- or his pretense that "all partial 
evil" is "universal good"? (Durant 1965, 720-1) 
The rush of the theologians to justify this disaster as part of 
God's plan sickened Voltaire who responded first with his scathing poem 
"On the Lisbon Disaster," and then with his famous satire, Candide. In 
that book, a parody of Leibniz named Dr. Pangloss, a professor of 
"metaphysico-theologo-cosmoloni-gology" is made to utter such 
absurdities as this: 
"Tis demonstrated," said he, "that things cannot be otherwise; for, 
since everything is made for an end, everything is necessarily for 
the best end. Observe that noses were made to wear spectacles; and 
so we have spectacles. Legs were visibly instituted to be breeched, 
and we have breeches. . . . [A]nd as pigs were made to be eaten, 
we eat pork all the year round." (Voltaire 1946, 2) 
While this was hardly fair to Leibniz, it was a near deathblow to 
any serious efforts to construct a metaphysics in which a transcendent 
God pursues His purposes in the universe. 
The last remaining reason for examining Leibniz' legacy is the odd 
fact that Humberto Maturana, one of the co-authors of Warren 
McCulloch's paper "What the Frog's Eye Tells the Frog's Brain" (which 
strongly influenced Bateson's episte-mology), and Francisco Varela, 
whom Bateson cites along with Maturana for contributions to our 
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understanding of recursiveness, have in recent years come to embrace 
what has been described as a Leibnizian position on the description of 
living systems: 
[They] have undertaken the construction of a systematic theoretical 
biology which attempts to define living systems not as they are 
objects of observation and description, nor even as interacting 
systems, but as self-contained unities whose only reference is to 
themselves. . . . Maturana goes on to define cognition as a 
biological phenomenon; as, in effect, the very nature of all living 
systems. 
The radical shift in standpoint here requires an imaginative leap 
and the abandonment at the outset of the standard characterizations 
of living systems in terms of function or purpose, or of organism- 
environment relations, or of causal interactions with an external 
world. ... In effect, Maturana and Varela propose a theoretical 
biology which . . . from the 'point of view' of the system itself, 
is entirely self-referential and has no 'outside', Leibnizian for 
our day. (Stafford Beer, in his preface to Maturana 1980, v) 
The idea that cognition is "the very nature of all living systems" 
is shared by Bateson, as is the implication that we have no access as 
cognitive systems to any thing-in-itself outside us -- that our minds 
work only through maps of maps of maps, ad nauseum. The idea of 
"entirely self-referential" systems -- monads in effect -- certainly 
seems incongruous with Bateson's emphasis on interaction and 
relationship; but, as we've seen with Spinoza and Leibniz, it appears 
but a short step from postulating two orders of causality to 
establishing the internal principle as primary from the "point of view 
of the system itself." And if Bateson's emphasis on relationship seems 
to preclude entirely self-referential systems, it should be noted that 
his concept of supra-organismic minds can be extrapolated into an 
argument for a single supra-mind connecting the entire living world and 
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its environment -- a scientific pantheism with some parallels to 
Spinoza's. Bateson's plans and notes for his last book, Where Angels 
Fear to Tread, completed and published posthumously by his daughter 
Catherine Bateson, in 1990, was expressly intended to explore the 
possibility of resurrecting a sense of the Holy on cybernetic 
principles. It would take us too far afield to pursue this parallel 
any farther, but it should be kept in mind how alien Bateson's position 
really is to the standard empirical tradition, and how reminiscent it 
is, at times, of the rationalist philosophies of the Continent. 
Leibniz' most enduring and direct influence stems, again, from his 
role in the development of German idealism, a role mediated (ironically 
enough) by the withering skepticism of David Hume. Hume followed the 
empiricists' program of analyzing all knowledge in terms of sense 
impressions to its ultimate, unlikely conclusions. His skepticism even 
called into question the sancrosanct notion of cause and effect 
itself. He argued that a scrupulous examination of our immediate 
experience would have to allow that our notion of efficient causality 
was simply the result of a "constant conjunction" between certain 
perceptions, lacking any logical or empirical necessity beyond our 
habitual expectations. 
Hume went on to demolish the concepts of substance, self, and even 
induction, arguing that none of these is warranted by what is 
empirically given or logically demonstrable. The metaphysical realm 
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was thereby demolished and, so far as most English speaking 
philosophers coming after him were concerned, that was the end of it. 
Science would explain the world while philosophy restricted itself to 
explaining how explanation was possible -- an oversimplification to be 
sure, and compromised by the occasional maverick or acolyte of Conti¬ 
nental thought; but not an unfair description, I think, of English 
speaking philosophy after Hume. 
German Philosophy 
On the Continent, however, the Leibnizian legacy was picked up by 
Kant. Well aware of Hume's metaphysical devastation, Kant adopted what 
he called the "critical method," the much watered-down result of which 
persists today in the "constructivist" view of knowledge. According to 
Kant, causality (like substance, the self, and even space and time) was 
a framework imposed on sensations by the subject (not the self we 
experience, but the "transcendental ego") as a condition for having any 
experience at all. The "thing-in-itself," apart from the forms of our 
perception and understanding, was unknowable. While Kant thus 
dismissed most of Leibniz' metaphysical speculations as a "dream," he 
agreed with him that things are not what they seem, and that the 
phenomenal world we experience is a product of mind. And he agreed 
that science is the only valid way of understanding and explaining the 
world as presented to us, the world of nature: 
158 
... [I]n Nature substance is permanent, and . . . its quantum 
can be neither increased nor diminished; ... all changes take 
place according to the law of cause and effect, and . . .all 
substances are in thorough-going reciprocity or inter-action. 
(Windelband 1958, 546) 
Though Kant insisted that all scientific explanation of nature 
depends on efficient causality and a mechanical view of the universe, 
he did allow that there were aspects of the world which we could not 
explain in this way: 
The first of these is Life. A mechanical explanation of the 
organism has not only not yet succeeded, but it is, according to 
Kant, impossible in principle. All life can only be understood 
through other life. . . . [W]e shall always be obliged to bring 
into our account the peculiar nature of organized matter and its 
capacity of reaction, as a factor incapable of reduction. . . . 
This explanation is impossible because the essential nature of the 
organism is that the whole is determined by the parts just as the 
part is determined by the whole, - that every member is both cause 
and effect of the whole. This reciprocal causality is incompre¬ 
hensible mechanically: the organism is the miracle in the world of 
experience. It is this inter-related play of forms and forces 
which in the organism makes the impression of the purposive, or of 
adaptation to an end." [Ibid., 565-6) 
This limitation on the effectiveness of mechanical explanation 
permits us to employ teleological explanation only as a heuristic 
principle. It cannot claim to provide scientific, objective 
explanation; and we can never profess to be "satisfied with this in an 
individual case"; but we can use it in "seeking out the mechanical 
connections by which this purposeful vitality realizes itself in each 
particular case" [Ibid., 566). 
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Kant's claim that reciprocal causal relations were impossible to 
explain mechanistically was not entirely true, of course. But his 
connection of reciprocal causality with the appearance of purposiveness 
was the clearest explanation of the nature of teleological explanation 
to that time, and a remarkable anticipation of the cybernetic solution 
that followed almost 150 years later. 
Kant's approach managed to turn Enlightenment skepticism and 
materialism on its head. Instead of reducing our mental universe to 
physical terms, he had reduced the physical universe to a construction 
of the mind. Although Kant himself agreed with Hume on the 
impossibility of metaphysics, since we have access only to our own 
experience and never to the thing-in-itself, his examination of the 
logically necessary conditions for having experience at all opened a 
whole new arena for speculation. 
The direction that German philosophy took after Kant found its 
impetus in the contradiction at the heart of Kant's concept of the 
thing-in-itself. While nothing supposedly can be said about it, the 
fact that it is there at all indicates that somehow it is the cause of 
our experience. But how can it cause us to have experience when Kant's 
philosophy specifies that a category like causality applies only within 
our experience and can not be applied outside it? It wasn't long before 
the contradiction was spotted and exploited: 
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This [contradiction] was first seen by Jacobi, when he confessed 
that without the presupposition of realism one could not enter the 
Kantian system, and with the same could not remain in it; . . . 
If, therefore, [the Kantian philosophy] will not fall into nihilism 
or absolute skepticism, the transcendental idealist must have the 
courage to assert the "strongest" idealism; he must declare that 
only phenomena are. (Windelband 1958, 573-4) 
As this idea worked its way through German philosophical circles, 
what emerged was a concept of Absolute Mind or Reason which, in trying 
to think itself, creates a subject-object relationship containing 
enough inherent contradic-tions to drive it (dialectically) on to more 
and more adequate conceptions, recreating not only Kant's entire 
pantheon of philosophic categories but all the structures of existing 
reality along the way, until finally arriving at the full self- 
consciousness which is its final realization. 
This idealistic philosophy found its most complete expression in 
Hegel. Hegel proposed that the Absolute was none other than the 
Christian God who, in His process of becoming fully self-cognizant, 
drove world history toward the creation of philosophers in whose 
thought the self-consciousness of the Absolute finds its completely 
conscious realization. The history of philosophy is the history of 
Absolute Thought thinking itself: "Hegel's history of philosophy is 
thus a philosophy of the history of philosophy" (Copleston VII, 289). 
And if his was not the ultimate philosophy, it was at least the highest 
stage that God had yet reached in thinking Himself. It was perhaps the 
most grandiose philosophical conception ever, and certainly one of the 
most obscure. 
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It is not hard to understand the idealists' interest in Spinoza. 
Spinoza's one infinite substance is similarly identified with God, in 
which the ideal and the material are reconciled. And Spinoza's 
substance (no less than its modes, the individually existing beings 
like ourselves) is essentially active, unfolding its own essence in a 
formal, logical development. Like Leibniz' philosophy, however, 
idealism was thoroughly teleological and generally accomodating to 
Christianity. And it contributed only a bit more than its rationalist 
predecessors to our understanding of the development of character or 
the sources of commitment to a life of achievement. 
It did, however, lay some important groundwork for others to 
advance our understanding of psychology. Hegel, in particular, by 
taking an historical approach to the life of the mind, and by 
approaching history itself as a developmental process instead of just 
an ongoing sequence of events, was certainly a pivotal figure on the 
way to a modern, developmental psychology. 
Perhaps their most important contribution to the questions that 
concern us here, however, stem from the idealists' connections to the 
German romantic movement. While those connections were sometimes 
tenuous (Hegel, for one, was often impatient with the vagueness of 
romantic ideas), the influence of the movement is evident in the 
prominent place of art and aesthetics in the idealists' philosophies 
(Copleston VII 1963, 29). Their exaltation of the creative personality 
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-- the "genius" -- was a particularly intriguing expression of that 
affinity. 
Somewhere over the course of the centuries stretching from 
Renaissance Humanism to Englightenment skepticism, Christian humility 
had lost its lustre. The rise of a class of artists and artisans who 
made their living off their works and their reputations certainly 
promoted the glorification of talented individuals, and their numbers 
clearly abounded in that period. Renaissance men like da Vinci and 
Michelangelo, and prodigies like Newton and Mozart gave the notion of 
some special "genius" a boost, and Goethe provided a literary model of 
the type for the tide of German romantic poets who came after him. 
Their idealist philosopher contemporaries were prey to the same 
infatuation. 
Rarely in the history of philosophical thought was the aesthetic 
sensibility so prominently featured as in the transcendental idealism 
of Friedrich Schelling. Schelling began from the common idealist 
notion that "Absolute Reason" is essentially an "eternal act of self- 
knowledge" (Ibid., 136), and that its initial consciousness of self is, 
in fact, a "production of itself as object" (Ibid., 144). This 
"production of itself" is nothing less than the creation of nature. 
And that same productive intuition that created the natural world finds 
further expression and, ultimately, intuition of itself through the 
creations of the artist: 
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Genius is not reducible to a technical proficiency which can be 
imparted by instruction: the creative artist is, as it were, the 
vehicle of a power which acts through him . . . In other words, 
the same power which acts without consciousness in producing 
Nature, the unconscious poetry of the Spirit, acts with 
consciousness in producing the work of art. That is to say, it 
works through the consciousness of the artist. And this 
illustrates the ultimate unity of the unconscious and the 
conscious, of the ideal and the real. (Ibid., 150) 
Schelling, in effect, did for artists what Hegel had done for 
philosophers: he made them the instruments of the Absolute's search to 
realize itself. In the work of genius, the Absolute found its own 
reflection. 
The romantic notion of "genius" helped refocus attention on human 
achievement, though the idealist notion of a Universal Reason 
expressing itself through "world-historical individuals" (Hegel's term) 
did little to help explain the psychology behind it. For Schelling, 
instruction was not only ineffective in producing genius, it was 
ineffective in producing character. 
Schelling accepts the notion which we met already in Spinoza, that 
a person's choices of action proceed from his "intelligible essence," 
but he goes a step further by identifying that essence with his 
character and suggesting that it is freely chosen: 
. . . [Schelling] does not wish to say that it is God who 
predetermines a man's acts by conceiving him in the eternal Idea. 
Hence he is forced to depict a man's intelligible character as due 
to an original self-positing of the ego, as the result of an 
original choice by the ego itself. He can thus say both that a 
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man's actions are in principle determined and that they are free. 
They are necessary; but this necessity is an inner necessity, 
imposed by the ego's original choice: . . . "This inner necessity 
is itself freedom, the essence of man is essentially his own act." 
(Ibid., 165) 
There are premonitions of existentialism in this idea that 
character is essentially chosen through one's freedom to act, and 
indeed Kierkegaard was, for a time, one of Schelling's students (Lowith 
1964, 113). How exactly, one might originally choose to become 
achievement-oriented in one's future choices is, of course, never 
addressed. 
More immediately significant for our purposes was Schelling's 
introduction of the notions of the unconscious and the irrational 
within human personality. The existence of unconscious elements in the 
mind was implicit in the basic idealist notion of Universal Mind 
seeking to become fully conscious of itself through the dialectical 
process. Schelling identifies those unconscious elements, both at the 
Universal and the individual levels, with the irrational impulses and 
urges that underlie the will: 
There is in man a dark foundation, as it were, the unconscious and 
the life of urge and natural impulse. And it is on this foundation 
that personality is built. Man is capable of following sensual 
desire and dark impulse rather than reason: he is able to affirm 
himself as a particular finite being to the exclusion of the moral 
law. But he also has the power of subordinating selfish desire and 
impulse to the rational will and of developing his true 
personality. (Ibid., 163) 
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The old associational psychology, which Hobbes had relied on 
completely and which Spinoza had limited to those passive aspects of 
mind which were driven by the sensations of the body, is here let go 
entirely. Spinoza had described the ethical path as one that leads 
from reacting to the inadequate and passive perceptions of sense to 
acting on the basis of the clear and distinct ideas of reason, from 
outer to inner direction, and from sensual confusion to rational 
clarity. For Schelling, the ethical path is more inward and less 
obviously epistemological. It is a matter of will: 
We talk about human beings as persons, but personality, Schelling 
maintains, is not something given from the start, it is something 
to be won. "All birth is birth out of darkness into light," and 
this general proposition is true of the birth of human personality. 
... He can do this, however, only by strife, conflict and 
sublimation. For the dark foundation of personality always 
remains, though it can can be progressively sublimated and 
integrated in the movement from darkness to light. (Ibid., 163) 
There is a battle within us (and within the Absolute) between a 
higher and lower will, a rational will that obeys universal law (Kant's 
categorical imperative) and an unconscious, egoistic will, founded in 
"natural impulses" and "dark urges." Rationalizing those impulses and 
urges -- that is, subjecting them to reason and sublimating them to 
more noble endeavors -- is the path towards a fully human, virtuous 
personality. The identification of substance with mind and of mind 
with will thus forged a distinctly Continental tradition in modern 
thought -- and not just in philosophy. We have all the elements here 
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of a very different sort of psychology, as well, one which is as far 
removed from mechanistic associationalism as Freud is from Pavlov. 
It would take some time, however, for the potential of this new 
approach to psychology to be developed. The dialectical development of 
Universal Mind had real pitfalls when used as an analog for the 
contingent historical development of individuals. It did help shift 
attention from the role of reason to the role of the will, however, and 
thus from conscious ideas to the unconscious and to feelings and 
impulses. This led to a more empirical, experimental strain of 
Continental psychology in the mid-19th century called "voluntarism" 
(Windelband 1958, 637-8), which was the milieu from which Freud 
developed his theories. 
It was increasingly obvious to most 18th century thinkers that a 
variety of other factors besides philosophical logic needed to be 
considered for the understanding of persons. As psychology was among 
the last disciplines to break away from philosophy, it is 
understandable that biological and pseudo-biological concepts like 
natural inheritance, physiology, and the press of "national character" 
initially seemed more important than personal history and education in 
determining an individual's potential and limitations. The practice of 
animal husbandry and breeding was well established at the time, though 
Mendel had yet to supply the theory behind it. And so the limitations 
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-- and biases -- of early 19th century science were often apparent in 
their discussions of character. 
An interesting example of this can be found in Schopenhauer's essay 
"On Genius," published in 1851. Schopenhauer is typically cited as a 
progenitor of voluntarism (Windelband 1958, 637), as he was the first 
to reduce Kant's thing-in-itself directly to the will. Like Schelling, 
Schopenhauer locates genius primarily in relation to the arts, and his 
definition is closely tied to the assumptions of his philosophical 
position: 
Talent is a merit to be found in the greater versatility and 
acuteness of discursive rather than of intuitive knowledge. The 
person endowed with talent thinks more rapidly and accurately than 
do the rest; on the other hand, the genius perceives a world 
different from them all, though only by looking more deeply into 
the world that lies before them also, since it presents itself in 
his mind more objectively, consequently more purely and 
distinctly. (Schopenhauer 1956, 376) 
The distinction between talent and genius is plausible (that's the 
sort of thing philosophers do best), though it leaves ample room for 
Schopenhauer's notorious biases to intrude, as in his dictum: "Women 
can have remarkable talent, but not genius, for they always remain 
subjective" (Ibid., 392). In keeping with the rising empirical tide in 
psychology, Schopenhauer draws heavily on the science of his day for an 
explanation of the generative conditions for genius -- an account as 
remarkable for its wrongheadedness as for its specificity: 
Mainly the brain . . . must be of unusual development and size, 
especially broad and lofty; on the other hand, its dimension in 
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depth will be inferior and the cerebrum will preponderate 
abnormally in proportion to the cerebellum. Very much depends 
undoubtedly on the shape and formation of the brain as a whole and 
in its parts, but our knowledge is not yet sufficient to determine 
this accurately, although we easily recognize the form of a skull 
that proclaims a noble and exalted intelligence . . . Cuvier's 
brain weighed five pounds; the normal weight is three. In contrast 
to the preponderance of the brain, the spinal cord and nerves must 
be unusually slender. A finely arched, lofty and broad skull of 
thin bone must protect the brain without in any way cramping it. 
The whole of this quality of the brain and nervous system is the 
inheritance from the mother; ... But this is quite inadequate 
for producing the phenomenon of genius, unless there is added as 
the inheritance from the father a lively, passionate temperament, 
manifesting itself somatically as unusual energy of the heart, and 
consequently of the blood circulation, especially towards the head. 
(Schopenhauer 1966, 392-3) 
Ludicrous as this may seem today, it should be recalled that the 
practice of removing, weighing, and measuring the brains of great men 
persisted well into the 20th century and that the remaining pieces of 
Einstein's brain "now rest in a Mason jar packed in a cardboard box 
marked "Costa Cider" and housed in an office in Wichita, Kansas" (Gould 
1982, 151). And while today we know this to be an inadequate 
explanation, progress in explaning intelligence remains slow. 
If the science and philosophy of the 1800's were finding it 
difficult to explain intelligence, it should come as no surprise that 
the explanation of character was proving elusive as well. It is a 
testament to the influence Freud has had on our century that what seems 
to us the obvious importance of childhood experience on the development 
of character and personality was not generally recognized at that 
time. The role of inheritance was certainly appreciated, though not 
well understood. Again, quoting from Schopenhauer: 
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. . . [EJveryday experience teaches that, with procreation, the 
combined seed of the parents transmits not only the 
characterististics of the species, but those of the individuals 
also, as regards the bodily qualities; . . . Whether this holds 
good of mental (subjective, internal) qualities also, so that these 
too are transmitted from parents to children, is a question that 
has often been raised, and almost always answered in the 
affirmative. More difficult, however, is the problem whether it is 
possible to distinguish what belongs to the father and what to the 
mother, what is the mental and spiritual inheritance coming to us 
from each of our parents. If we throw light on this problem by 
means of our fundamental knowledge that the will is the true inner 
being, the kernel, the radical element in man, while the intellect 
is the secondary, the adventitious, the accident of that substance, 
then before questioning experience we shall assume . . . that man 
inherits his moral nature, his character, his inclinations, his 
heart, from the father, but the degree, quality, and tendency of 
his intelligence from the mother. (Ibid., 517) 
The key words here, of course, are "before questioning experience 
we shall assume;" but Schopenhauer was not taking a radical 
philosophical position here, simply reflecting the opinions of his 
time. And he finds more than enough corroboration for his assumptions 
in everyday experience: 
Thus, for example, [you] will find the special tendency to tell 
lies, peculiar to many people, equally present in two brothers, 
because they have inherited it from the father. {Ibid., 518) 
That kids learn to lie from being lied to (by either parent) never 
seems to have occurred to folks in an era where biology was coming into 
ascendancy and children were to be seen and not heard. 
The gathering emphasis on will, irrationality, and the unconscious 
in 19th century German philosophy and psychology found its most 
powerful expression in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. Considered 
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(along with Kierkegaard) one of the originators of existentialism, his 
focus on the individual helped free him from the preconceptions of his 
idealist predecessors. He immodestly -- but accurately -- considered 
himself "a psychologist without equal" (Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, trans. 
Kaufmann 1968, III, 5). Freud was an admirer of Nietzsche (as well as 
of Schopenhauer, who was himself a major influence on Nietzsche) and 
readily acknowledged that "his premonitions and insights often agree in 
the most amazing manner with the laborious results of psychoanalysis" 
(Kaufmann 1966, 382n). Nietzsche employed and developed many of the 
basic concepts of later psychiatry, including repression, sublimation, 
internalization, and projection. In fact, Freud acknowledged a direct 
debt to Nietzsche for his concept of the Id (Ginsberg, "Nietzschean 
Psychiatryin Solomon 1973, 295). 
Nietzsche's psychology benefited both from his rejection of the 
idealists' focus on a universal mind or will operating through 
individuals and from his related rejection of the grand, systematic 
approach. His foremost biographer and translator in English, Walter 
Kaufmann, suggests that "Nietzsche's relation to Hegel somewhat 
resembles that of Leibniz to Spinoza" (Kaufmann 1966, 210). His 
thought returns always to individuals, and his aphorisms and short 
essays lend themselves to thought experiments, ruminations on a vast 
range of topics, fresh starts, and apparent contradictions. As a 
result, he is one of the most misunderstood and misinterpreted of all 
philosophers. 
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In his thinking about mind and causality, and about the primacy of 
interactive relationships we also find remarkable parallels to 
Bateson's thought, though couched in a very different idiom. These 
parallels are close enough to suggest that had Bateson seriously 
tackled the question of achieving behavior, his conclusions on that 
subject also might have paralleled Nietzsche's in some interesting 
ways. This is all the more remarkable, considering that Bateson's 
thinking is based in genetics, cybernetics, and information theory -- 
three sciences that didn't even exist when Nietzsche wrote (Mendel's 
work was published in 1865 but ignored until Bateson's father came to 
advocate it in 1900 -- the year Nietzsche died). I'll try to draw out 
those parallels here. 
Like Hegel, Nietzsche understood his thought as the final end 
towards which all the long history of philosophy before him had been 
reaching; unlike Hegel, he perceived the endpoint he represented not 
only as the culmination but as the destruction of all that went 
before. For Nietzsche rejected not only the Geist of Hegel but the 
cogito of Descartes --he rejected the very idea of a subject. He 
likewise rejected the idea of material objects, as well as the 
efficient causality that presupposed them. In short, he rejected the 
notion of Being: 
Formerly, alteration, change, any becoming at all, were taken as 
proof of mere appearance, as an indication that there must be 
something which led us astray. Today, conversely, precisely 
insofar as the prejudice of reason forces us to posit unity, 
identity, permanence, substance, cause, thing-hood, being, we see 
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ourselves somehow caught in error, compelled into error. 
(Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. Kaufmann 1954, III 5) 
Nietzsche thought of these "prejudices of reason" as necessary 
fictions -- as the kinds of error "without which a certain species of 
life could not live" (Nietzsche, Mill to Power, trans. Kaufmann 1968, 
493). Obviously, we couldn't function in this world without assuming 
these "fictions." We couldn't even comprehend or discuss our world 
without them. What is left to the universe after unity, identity, etc. 
are removed? Not just nothing, obviously; but, according to Nietzsche, 
not just chaos, either: 
If we eliminate these additions, no things remain but only dynamic 
quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: their 
essence lies in their relation to all other quanta, in their 
"effect" upon the same. (Ibid., 636) 
These "quanta" are forces in relation to other forces, 
distinguishable only by the quantity of their power, measured "by the 
effect [they] produce and that which [they] resist" (Ibid., 634). 
Nietzsche is struggling against the constraints of language to speak of 
centers of force and activity without any implication of permanence or 
identity. These are forces essentially in flux, but having for at 
least a time some power to produce effects and to retain that power in 
the face of all the other forces affecting it. 
There is no way of talking about this process without employing 
metaphor. Nietzsche realizes that to talk about effects is to 
implicitly re-introduce the notion of causality, and that causality in 
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turn implies some "thing" to serve as cause. He insists that, in 
truth: 
[T]here is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' 
is merely a fiction added to the deed. The popular mind in fact 
doubles the deed; when it sees the lightning flash, it is the deed 
of a deed: it posits the same event first as the cause and then a 
second time as its effect. Scientists do no better when they say 
"force moves," "force causes," and the like . . . (Nietzsche, 
Genealogy of Morals, trans. Kaufmann 1968, I 13). 
In other words, the force exists only in its effects. If we are 
going to speak of effects and use the language of causality, however, 
our "methodological conscience" should insist that we not "assume 
several kinds of causality as long as the experiment to get along with 
a single one has not been pushed to its final limit" (Nietzsche, Beyond 
Good and Evil, trans. Kaufmann 1968, 36). 
The mechanists made a similar commitment, but Nietzsche agrees with 
Hume that our faith in efficient causality is without foundation in 
fact or experience. He suggests that our sense of final causality is 
about the only foundation it has: 
The question "why?" is always the question after a final cause, 
after a "wherefor?" We have nothing resembling a "sense for the 
perception of efficient causes." Thus Hume is right that only 
habit (but not just that of the individual!) makes us expect that 
one often-observed process follows another. What gives us the 
extraordinary firmness of our faith in causal-ity, however, is not 
the great habit . . . but our inability to interpret what happens 
except as something that happens on purpose. It is the faith that 
only what lives and thinks is effective -- the faith in will and 
purpose; it is the faith that all that happens is a doing, and that 
all doing presupposes a doer. (Nietzsche, Mill to Power 550, in 
Kaufmann 1956, 229) 
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What we perceive are events unfolding in time. Our isolation of 
some moment in the initial unfolding to serve as the cause of what 
comes after is simply our interpretation: "The calculability of an 
event does not reside in the fact that a rule is adhered to; . . . it 
resides in the 'recurrence of identical cases'" (Nietzsche, Hill to 
Power, 551). What we call a "cause" is simply the means by which we 
trigger the recurrence of an event. And therefore, since the only 
experience we really have of causality is our sense of our own 
efficacy, Nietzsche proposes that we use the metaphor of will in all 
discussions involving causality: 
The question is in the end whether we really recognize the will as 
efficient, whether we believe in the causality of the will: if we 
do -- and at bottom our faith in this is nothing less than our 
faith in causality itself -- then we have to make the experiment of 
positing the causality of the will hypothetically as the only one. 
"Will," of course, can affect only "will" -- and not "matter" (not 
"nerves," for example). In short, one has to risk the hypothesis 
whether will does not affect will wherever "effects" are recognized 
-- and whether all mechanical occurrences are not, insofar as a 
force is active in them, will force, effects of will. 
Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive 
life as the development of one basic form of the will -- namely, of 
the will to power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic 
functions could be traced back to this will to power and one could 
also find in it the solution of the problem of procreation and 
nourishment -- it is one problem -- then one would have gained the 
right to determine all efficient force univocally as -- will to 
power. The world viewed from inside, the world defined and deter¬ 
mined according to its "intelligible character" -- would be "will 
to power" and nothing else. (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 36) 
I have quoted at some length here from what may seem one of 
Nietzsche's more dubious thought experiments because it effectively 
culminates and concludes the arguments for final causality which we've 
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been tracking since Aristotle. As in Kant's critical philosophy, the 
claim is not metaphysical but methodological: it claims not that will 
actually underlies everything in the world, but that will is necessary 
for us to understand the world. It is not a truth about the world but 
about the perspective which we inevitably bring to it, the perspec-tive 
we must assume towards ourselves if we are to function in that world. 
The effort to reconceive all things, in some way, as will has roots 
reaching back beyond Schopenhauer and Spelling's Universal Will at 
least to Leibniz' redefinition of extended substance as force. But 
Nietzsche's will to power is not the methodological equivalent of 
Leibniz' or Spinoza's conatus, which is that inherent tendency of 
beings to preserve themselves and actualize their essential form. 
Nietzsche's quanta are not self-contained, windowless monads; they 
exist only in relation to other quanta; and they struggle not simply to 
preserve themselves from passions suffered through the activities of 
others, but to extend their own power over themselves and others: 
My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over 
all space and to extend its force (--its will to power:) and to 
thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually 
encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by 
coming to an arrangement ("union") with those of them that are 
sufficiently related to it: thus they can conspire together for 
power. And the process goes on -- (Nietzsche, Mill to Power, 636) 
The language here is annoyingly anthropomorphic, even allowing for 
Nietzsche's methodological starting point. But, to be fair, there was 
no scientific language available in 19th century physics for what he 
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was trying to express. Whitehead struggled to devise a language for a 
process philosophy, a philosophy of flux and becoming, several decades 
later only to arrive at what is possibly the most obscure philosophy 
inthe English language. Nietzsche was, in effect, following Kant's 
dictum that reciprocal causality cannot be understood mechanistically 
but only teleologically. And I believe he came closer than anyone 
before him to glimpsing those truths that the cyberneticians and infor¬ 
mation theorists finally grasped a half century later. Consider this 
passage from the Mill to Power: 
Regarded mechanistically, the energy of the totality of becoming 
remains constant; regarded economically, it rises to a high point 
and sinks down again in an eternal circle. This "will to power" 
expresses itself in the interpretation, in the manner in which 
force is used up; transformation of energy into life, and "life at 
its highest potency," thus appears as the goal. (Ibid., 639) 
Nietzsche is referring here to the Laws of Thermodynamics, the 
first of which states that energy remains constant, that it is neither 
created nor destroyed. If that's true, then Nietzsche says we should 
be able to conceive a total amount of energy in the universe that 
remains constant. That is important for his theory of the eternal 
return -- an ethically relevant variant on the recurring big bang 
theory that doesn't concern us here. 
The second Law is relevant, and we've examined it before: it's the 
entropy law, which stipulates the inevitable degradation of that 
energy's quality, i.e., the inevitable loss of energy available for 
work (energy "regarded economically") in the universe. And Nietzsche 
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is making several interesting points about it. First, he's pointing 
out the obvious, that on the path to final entropy we find "negentropy" 
-- energy which is localized, organized and available for use -- and 
often organizing other negentropies like itself. Life is the examplar 
here. 
Second, he's claiming that negentropic energy is used up through 
transformations in the general direction of "higher potencies," meaning 
the ability to "achieve[] more and more with less and less force" 
(Ibid., 639). Nietzsche associates this evolution towards higher 
potency with increasing complexity (Ibid., 644, 660). Bateson also 
notes the "directionality" of evolution towards greater complexity, and 
associates it both with increasing economies of effort and with 
hierarchies in systems regulation (Bateson 1991, 99-104). Nietzsche 
understood and made use of the language of systems and organization. 
Because his quanta can only exist in relation to other quanta, what 
assumes the appearance of existence in Nietzsche's universal becoming 
is always a system of some kind. He argues that "all unity is unity 
only as organization and cooperation ... as a pattern of domination 
that signifies a unity but is not a unity" (Nietzsche, Hill to Power, 
561). A "pattern of domination" implies an hierarchical relationship 
in which the parameters are determined from above. And so for both 
Nietzsche and Bateson, there is an evolution of complexity which is 
inherently hierarchical. 
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Third, and most significantly, Nietzsche says that the will to 
power expresses itself in the "interpretation, in the manner in which 
force is used up." This is obscure as it stands, but only because 
"interpretation" is being used here in an unfamiliar context. The 
basic idea is similar to Bateson's notion of mapping, which is the 
transform of differences; but Nietzsche's interpreting is more 
interactive because of its connection with will and because all 
existents are, at bottom, will to power: 
The will to power interprets (-- it is a question of interpretation 
when an organ is constructed): it defines limits, determines 
degrees, variations of power. Mere variations of power could not 
feel themselves to be such. . . In fact, interpretation is itself 
a means of becoming master of something. (The organic process 
constantly presupposes interpretations.) {Ibid., 634) 
The references to organic process and the construction of organs 
are clues to Nietzsche's meaning here. He says: "The body and 
physiology [are] the starting point" {Ibid., 492) Why? Because an 
organism is an hierarchy of meanings: cells are defined functionally in 
terms of the tissues they make up, tissues are defined in terms of 
organs, organs in terms of systems, and so on. And this isn't just an 
external definition imposed by biologists. As Nietzsche saw it, the 
parts of a biological sub-system are defined organically through their 
appropriation by and consequent adaptation to that system. He was an 
early critic of Darwinism, marshalling arguments still heard today 
against strict selectionism (the idea that "every part of every 
creature is fashioned for and only for its immediate use" -- which 
Darwin, in fact, did not advocate); and against "gradualism" (the idea 
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that "nature does not make leaps" -- a phrase attributed to Linnaeus 
which Darwin did, in fact, embrace) (Gould 1982, 56; 179). Nietzsche's 
picture of the evolutionary process was much less orderly. He portrayed 
the internal environment of an organism as a struggle of wills among 
the various parts and systems to impose their form and needs upon the 
rest: 
The utility of an organ does not explain its origin; on the 
contrary! For most of the time during which a property is forming 
it does not preserve the individual and is of no use to him, least 
of all in the struggle with external circumstances and enemies. 
The influence of "external circumstances" is overestimated by 
Darwin to a ridiculous extent: the essential thing in the life 
process is precisely the tremendous shaping, form-creating force 
working from within which utilizes and exploits "external 
circumstances" -- The new forms molded from within are not formed 
with an end in view; but in the struggle of the parts a new form is 
not left long without being related to a partial usefulness and 
then, according to its use, develops itself more and more 
completely. (Nietzsche, Hill to Power, 647) 
Nietzsche took this perspective from physiology and applied it to 
all nature. Because all organization is hierarchical, all subsystems 
are definable in terms of the wholes of which they are parts, in the 
inorganic as well as the organic realms -- much as acids and bases, for 
instance, are defined in terms of their ability to form salts. The 
quanta which exist only in relation to each other are, in effect, each 
trying to define that relationship between them, to define their 
organization according to their own perspective -- that is, with their 
own needs driving the hierarchy. Again, our language here tends 
inexorably to the anthropomorphic, but Nietzsche understood the limits 
of the metaphor: 
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. . . [Becoming stronger involves an ordering process which looks 
like a sketchy purposiveness; . . . apparent ends are not 
intentional but, as soon as dominion is established over a lesser 
power and the latter operates as a function of the greater power, 
an order of rank, of organization is bound to produce the 
appearance of an order of ends [Ibid., 552). 
This is a pretty fair anticipation of the cybernetician's explanation 
of teleology. And the idea that organization entails interpretation, a 
mutual defining of relationships among the parts, anticipates the 
connection between organization and information that is central to 
information theory. The quanta can be considered the impermanent, 
nearly indeterminate elements of negentropy. They are to the 
information theorists' bits of information -- those differences that 
make a difference -- as will is to reason: they are units of 
information conceived as actively self-organizing. Nietzsche, in 
short, was trying to conceptualize the transition point between entropy 
and information long before Shannon's equations even suggested their 
connection. 
Lacking the formalisms of Shannon's equations (and Mendel's genetic 
theory), Nietzsche employed the anthropomorphism of "will " while 
frequently reminding his readers of its limitations. In fact, 
Nietzsche went Bateson one better by insisting not only there was no 
will in actuality, but that there was no unknown thing-in-itself behind 
the metaphor either: 
Properly speaking, there are no longer any things or any persons. 
There are no facts, there are only interpretations and 
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interpretations of interpretations. (Lingis, "The Will to Power " 
in Allison 1977, 42) 
This recalls Bateson's formulation that "the mental world is only 
maps of maps of maps, ad infinitum;" but having absorbed the idealists' 
critique of Kant, Nietzsche knows that talking about the physical world 
behind the appearances -- the territory behind the maps -- or even the 
"unknowable" ding-an-sich, as Bateson does, soon lands one in hopeless 
self-contradiction. All territories are maps. All facts are 
interpretation from some perspective. 
The limitations of a well developed metaphor in comparison to a 
fully quantified theory needn't diminish the strengths it shares with 
theory, such as the capacity to reveal new insights beyond the 
experiences on which it is based. Nietzsche may have chosen the 
metaphor of will for methodological reasons -- or rather, had this 
choice forced upon him by virtue of his focus on individual ethics and 
psychology; but once he had detached will from any being to exercise it 
and placed it firmly in the context of becoming -- the world of coming- 
to-be and passing-away -- it was obvious that its agency could not be 
directed towards self-preservation. A self must be established before 
it can be preserved, and that means it must be imposed upon the flux 
and against whatever would resist it (Nietzsche, A//77 to Power, 634). 
The will to power is always directed towards growth, towards the 
expenditure of excess energy, and towards more power. 
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This was the basis of Nietzsche's critique of Darwin and Darwinism 
(not always the same thing -- in fact, much of Nietzsche's writing on 
evolution seems to be directed rather at Darwin's contemporary, Herbert 
Spencer). From it he derives two lines of argument. The first is that 
organisms do not possess a "survival instinct" but rather a basic drive 
towards power; they are organized, in other words, not for adapting to 
environments but for mastering them: 
Physiologists should think again before positing the "instinct of 
preservation" as the cardinal drive in an organic creature. A 
living thing wants above all to discharge its force: "preservation" 
is only a consequence of this. (Ibid., 650) 
Life is not the adaptation of inner circumstances to outer ones, 
but will to power, which, working from within, incorporates and 
subdues more and more of that which is "outside." {Ibid., 681) 
In the language of cybernetics, Nietzsche is arguing that we not 
look at life solely in terms of homeostatic organisms and populations 
seeking an adaptive equilibrium with their environment -- that we not 
overestimate the role of negative feedback. Though natural selection 
provides the ultimate regulation, life as lived and evolved involves 
processes of competition and domination/ submission in which positive 
feedback rules. While Bateson himself discovered the critical role of 
positive feedback in his analysis of these schismogenesic interactions, 
he was too much the conservative to ever feel comfortable with it. He 
argued that "the whole progress, so-called, of evolution is stimulated 
by the need to stay put": 
The grass changes and the horse changes, and the grass changes and 
the horse changes, and they change in such a way that the 
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relationship between them may stay constant. And evolution 
essentially is a vast operation of interlocking changes, every 
particular change being an effort to make change unnecessary, to 
keep something constant" (Bateson 1991, 276). 
He typically treated schismogeneses as pathologies in his 
anthropological and pyschological studies. Not so with Nietzsche, who 
saw this restless striving to overcome not only in every creature's 
relationship to its environment, but in man's relationship to others 
and to himself -- and embraced it. 
Nietzsche's second line of argument against Darwinism was directed 
at those who tried to draw social and ethical conclusions from Darwin's 
theory, hoisting what came to be known as Social Darwinism atop 
scientific Darwinism. The Social Darwinists were a diverse group of 
thinkers and propagandists whose views ranged from the benign to the 
malignant. Though Darwin himself argued in his Origin of Species that 
natural selection does not imply progress, the Social Darwinists all 
portrayed evolution as a progressive improvement of the species, 
differing only in how they defined "improvement." 
There were those like Spencer, who believed that "evolution will 
modify human nature until the individual will find his highest 
blessedness in sacrifice, although not so as to hinder the development 
of others" (Hoffding 1955, 485). And then there was William Graham 
Sumner, who claimed that "the millionaires are a product of natural 
selection, acting on the whole body of men to pick out those who can 
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meet the requirement of certain work to be done" (Garraty and Gay 1972, 
959). Marx appealed to Darwinism for support and so did the Fascists. 
The idea that character and genius are heritable, developed by 
Schopenhauer and others out of the scientific and popular prejudices of 
the day, now took on a socio-historical dimension. In an era marked by 
the ascendancy of capitalism and nationalism, competition and conflict 
were cast in ennobling roles: these were the forges of character and 
achievement. The ethical implications (post-Spencer) moved all too 
often in the direction of might makes right. 
It was the Nazis who misquoted Nietzsche most shamelessly, trying 
to enlist his posthumous support for the racial superiority of Aryan 
Germans over Jews, a position he vehemently rejected. His doctrine of 
the will to power and the ubermensch -- the superman -- did seem to 
echo the Social Darwinists' refrain of unremitting struggle on the way 
to the next evolutionary step, but in fact Nietzsche's thought moves in 
a very different direction. Nietzsche saw profound social and ethical 
implications in the theory of evolution and even in his earliest 
writings, prior to his discovery of the will to power, he realizes that 
it poses the question of man's worth: 
Darwinism, however, instead of infusing him with optimism, 
convinces him that empirical facts do not bear out the prevalent 
view that all men, as such, occupy a unique position in the 
cosmos. Most men are essentially animals, not basically different 
from chimpanzees -- distinguished only by a potentiality which few 
of them realize: they can, but rarely do, rise above the beasts. 
Man can transcend his animal nature and become a "no-longer-animal" 
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and a "truly human being"; but only some of "the philoso-phers, 
artists, and saints" rise to that point. (Kaufmann 1956, 129) 
In the will to power, Nietzsche found the mechanism by which those 
rare individuals may transcend man's animal nature, justifying his 
existence through their achievements. Their occasional appearances in 
the course of history have little to do with natural selection, 
however. 
While Nietzsche believed that the evolution of will to power from 
the simplest quanta onward tended toward greater complexity and 
differentiation, he rejected any implication that evolution was a 
progress towards perfection or that the human species itself was ever 
likely to improve over time. He believed that species were essentially 
conservative with respect to any individuals whose exceptional 
qualities might work to change them. That is their will to power at 
work: 
What surprises me most when I survey the broad destinies of man is 
that I always see before me the opposite of that which Darwin and 
his school see or want to see today: selection in favor of the 
stronger, better-constituted, and the progress of the species. 
Precisely the opposite is palpable: the elimination of the lucky 
strokes, the uselessness of the more highly developed types, the 
inevitable dominion of the average, even the sub-average types. If 
we are not shown why man should be an exception among the 
creatures, I incline to the prejudice that the school of Darwin has 
been deluded everywhere. 
That will to power in which I recognize the ultimate ground and 
character of all change provides us with the reason why selection 
is not in favor of the exceptions and lucky strokes: the strongest 
and most fortunate are weak when opposed by organized herd 
instincts, by the timidity of the weak, by the vast majority. 
(Nietzsche, Hill to Power, 685) 
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Thus not just Nietzsche's superman, but all higher types -- "the 
strongest and most fortunate" -- are more like freaks of nature than 
the inevitable next step in evolution. And yet these types, these 
lucky accidents, Nietzsche insists, are the ones who give value and 
point to the entire process. Since evolution isn't progressing, "The 
goal of humanity cannot lie in the end but only in its highest 
specimens" (Nietzsche, On the Use and Abuse of History 9, in Kaufmann 
1956, 127). Thus, in stark contrast to the Social Darwinists, 
Nietzsche finds the normative element to be tangential and even opposed 
to the process of adaptation and evolution. 
Who then are these "highest specimens" and how do they come to be? 
Nietzsche offers a "genealogical explanation," a developmental theory 
of a sort falling somewhere between Hegel's universal history of the 
spirit and Freud's psycho-history of childhood. It is at once 
historical and philological, sociological and psychological. 
Nietzsche's "highest specimens" are those in whom the will to power 
has achieved its highest potency, but the meaning of this term shifts 
through history. Clearly, they are not the blond beasts of Aryan 
descent glorified by the Nazis. Though Nietzsche does use the term 
"blond beasts" in connection with the Aryans, the primary reference is 
to lions -- the king of beasts -- and it is used to describe various 
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ancient, conquering peoples including the Arabs and Japanese 
(Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, I 11). Their warrior-rulers were the 
highest specimens of an age long past. 
The Homeric heroes are Nietzsche's real prototype as he describes 
how these noble peoples routinely credited their dominance to their 
innate superiority, fashioning their notions of what is valuable and 
good around their own traits --thus arete (and virtus), as we noted 
earlier, originally denoted valor. From this self-congratulatory 
notion of "good" devolves a contrasting notion of "bad" to describe the 
despised and conquered others who obviously lacked such noble traits; 
thus "in the word kakos" (Greek for bad, ugly, ill-born, craven, etc.) 
"cowardice is emphasized" (Ib/cf., I 5). The "bad," in other words, is 
defined simply as a lack in relation to the good. Nietzsche gives 
philological evidence from a number of conquering cultures to establish 
this general pattern of aristocratic values. And he commends them for 
thus imposing their will, their interpretation on the lands and peoples 
they ruled. These conquering types exuded a raw and healthy will to 
power. They were men of action and deeds, acting out of unconscious 
instincts, delighting in war and conquest. 
They were not so well appreciated by those peoples who were less 
powerful, whom they enslaved and labelled "barbarians." There arose 
among these an impotent hatred of those who were now their masters, who 
acted as they pleased while they were forced to obey. Eventually, the 
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will to power found a way even for such oppressed and weaker types as 
these to assert themselves. Where force of arms could not prevail, 
there was at last a slave revolt in morality: 
The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself 
becomes creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of 
natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and 
compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While every noble 
morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave 
morality from the outset says No to what is "outside," what is 
"different," what is "not itself"; and this No is its creative 
deed. (Ibid., I 10) 
Ressentiment is one of those conceptually charged terms like angst 
that some time after its initial translation receives such precise and 
seminal definition through philosophical analysis that it is re¬ 
borrowed with original spelling and pronunciation intact as a new word, 
separate from its former translation. Nietzsche's "conception of 
ressentiment constitutes one of his major contributions to psychology" 
(Kaufmann 1956, 445), having influenced Scheler and Weber, among 
others. It is a repressed anger, an ill will which shapes the 
psychological landscape in reaction to what seems a "hostile external 
world" (Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals I 10). The slaves' ressentiment 
against the "triumphant monsters" who conquered and debased them led to 
the fashioning of a new ethical valuation -- the concept of "evil": 
[The] "bad" of noble origin and that "evil" out of the cauldron of 
unsatisfied hatred -- the former an after-production, a side issue, 
a contrasting shade, the latter on the contrary the original thing, 
the beginning, the distinctive deed in the conception of a slave 
morality -- how different these words "bad" and "evil" are, 
although they are both apparently the opposite of the same concept 
"good." But it is not the same concept "good": one should ask 
rather precisely who is "evil" in the sense of the morality of 
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ressentiment. The answer, in all strictness, is: precisely the 
"good man" of the other morality, precisely the noble, powerful 
man, the ruler, but dyed in another color, interpreted in another 
fashion . . . {Ibid., I 11) 
The "evil ones," that is, are the slaves' masters: the arrogant, 
grabbing, murderous, uncaring ones who take without giving, who deny 
equal justice to the weaker, and for whom life is of little value. 
These weaker types then arrive at a conception of the good based on 
themselves -- but of themselves defined in relation to their former 
masters: "the wretched alone are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly 
alone are the good . . . alone are blessed by God" {Ibid., 17). In 
these delineations of "evil" and the "good" that opposes it, Nietzsche 
is clearly referring to the Judeo-Christian revolt against the Roman 
empire (he counted Julius Caesar among the highest types), and this has 
often been taken as evidence of his anti-Semitism. To the contrary, 
rather than revile or reject the development of slave moralities he 
credited them with having "spiritualized" man. "Spirit" {Geist) here 
refers to mind or reason not just as intellect but as the form-giving, 
creative force of German idealism. He notes that with this revolt came 
the positive value placed on intellect: 
While the noble man lives in trust and openness with himself . . . 
the man of ressentiment is neither upright nor naive nor honest and 
straightforward with himself. . . . [H]e understands how to keep 
silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally 
self-deprecating and humble. A race of such men of ressentiment is 
bound to become eventually cleverer than any noble race; it will 
also honor cleverness to a far greater degree: namely, as a 
condition of existence of the first importance. {Ibid., I 10) 
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And while the Jews of sterotype may again seem the intended 
reference here, Nietzsche knew this description could apply as easily 
to the constitutional movement in ancient Greece. Although the 
majority of Greeks behind that movement were not slaves but free men, 
driven more likely by resentment than ressentiment, they did manage to 
restrain and in some cities topple the ruling aristocrats while 
steadily inverting the meaning of arete to reflect their own 
interests. And they did "honor cleverness" to such an extent that they 
gave birth to classical Greek philosophy. This led to what Nietzsche 
called the "problem of Socrates": while Socrates was in many ways 
Nietzsche's model and ideal, he was acutely aware that "Greek 
philosophy = the decadence of the Greek instinct" (Nietzsche, The 
Twilight of the Idols, trans. Kaufmann 1954, X 2). 
Nietzsche retained enough of the idealists' dialectic to know the 
value of the negative. What he came to call amor fati -- the love of 
fate -- expresses his ideal that the affirmation of life requires an 
affirmation of all its moments, the bad as well as the good: "... for 
happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow 
up or . . . remain small together" (Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. 
Kaufmann 1974, 338). On the related principle that "what doesn't 
destroy us makes us stronger," he even manages to affirm those most 
insidiously "diseased" of the slave moralists, the priestly classes: 
. . . [I]t is only fair to add that it was on the soil of this 
essentially dangerous form of human existence, the priestly form, 
that man first became an interesting animal, that only here did the 
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human soul in a higher sense acquire depth and become evil -- and 
these are the two basic respects in which man has hitherto been 
superior to other beasts! (Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, I 6) 
The spiritualization brought about by morality was the positive 
consequence of an overall cultural decadence in which the majority 
exerted combined power over the individually stronger types -- a moral 
tyranny replacing the tyranny of strength. On the face of it, the 
demands of morality were unrealistic: 
To demand of strength that it should not express itself as 
strength, that it should not be a desire to overcome, a desire to 
throw down, a desire to become master, a thirst for enemies and 
resistances and triumphs, is just as absurd as to demand of 
weakness that it should express itself as strength. (Ibid., I 13) 
While the demands were impossible, they did have an effect: 
All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn 
inward -- this is what I call the internalization of man: thus it 
was that man first developed his "soul." The entire inner world, 
originally as thin as if it were stretched detween two membrances, 
expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth, and height, 
in the same measure as outward discharge was inhibited. . . . 
[A]11 those instincts of wild, free, prowling man turned backward 
against man himself. Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in 
attacking, in change, in destruction -- all this turned against the 
possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of the bad 
conscience. (Ibid., II 16) 
Nietzsche distinguishes the "good conscience" -- the sense of 
responsibility for keeping one's promises -- from the "bad conscience," 
which is the one we recognize through feelings of guilt. Guilt is 
lately become an unfashionable accessory in the psychological closet, 
something to be cast off and left behind. But once again affirming the 
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negative, Nietzsche finds in the bad conscience the distinguishing mark 
of the truly human: 
. . . [T]he existence on earth of an animal soul turned against 
itself, taking sides against itself, was something so new, 
profound, unheard of, enigma-tic, contradictory, and pregnant with 
a future that the aspect of the earth was essentially altered. . . 
. [H]e gives rise to an interest, a tension, a hope, almost a 
certainty, as if with him something were announcing and preparing 
itself, as if man were not a goal but only a way, an episode, a 
bridge, a great promise.-- (Ibid., 11 16) 
It is the bad conscience, in other words, that makes the "higher 
types" possible -- certainly not inevitable, since they are always 
"exceptions"; but possible. There are, in fact, two ways that morality 
can turn one against one's self and one's instinctual will to power: 
Moral intolerance is an expression of weakness in a man: he is 
afraid of his own "immorality," he must deny his strongest drives 
because he does not yet know how to employ them. . . . 
Instead of taking into service the great sources of strength, those 
impet-uous torrents of the soul that are so often dangerous and 
overwhelming, and economizing them, this most shortsighted and 
pernicious mode of thought, the moral mode of thought, wants to 
make them dry up. 
Overcoming the affects? -- No, if what is implied is their 
weakening and extirpation. But putting them into service: which 
may also mean subjecting them to a protracted tyranny ... At 
last they are granted freedom again: they love us as good servants 
and go voluntarily wherever our best interests lie. (Nietzsche, 
Mill to Power 383-5) 
The political metaphor of a "tyranny" in the soul by which the 
affects are trained to obey, recollects the Greek analogy between the 
well-ordered soul and the well-ordered state. And the rightful ruler 
in both Nietzsche's and the Greek philosophers' soul is reason. In 
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The Antichrist, one of Nietzsche's last works, he goes so far as to 
reiterate the three classes of citizens in Plato's ideal Republic: 
In every healthy society there are three types which condition each 
other and gravitate differently physiologically; each has its own 
hygiene, its own field of work, its own sense of perfection and 
mastery. Nature . . . distinguishes the pre-eminently spiritual 
ones, those who are pre-eminently strong in muscle and temperament, 
and those, the third type, who excel neither in one respect nor in 
the other, the mediocre ones -- the last as the great majority, the 
first as the elite. 
The most spiritual men, as the strongest, find their happiness 
where others would find their destruction: in the labyrinth, in 
hardness against themselves and others, in experiments; their joy 
is self-conquest; asceticism becomes ip them nature, need, and 
instinct . . . Knowledge -- a form of asceticism. (Nietzsche, The 
Antichrist, trans. Kaufmann 1954, 57) 
This passage is notable in several respects. While it echoes 
Plato's formal divisions within the state and the soul, for instance, 
it differs in arranging the three types along a single continuum: the 
most spiritual types rule not because they have a different and better 
understanding of the Good, but because in pursuit of the power that 
everyone seeks they are, in fact, "the strongest." Theirs is the most 
potent form of the will to power, according to Nietzsche. Because they 
have mastered their desires and passions and conquered themselves, they 
are always in control: "Nietzsche agreed with the ancient tradition 
. . . that the man who conquers himself shows greater power than he who 
conquers others" (Kaufmann 1956, 219). Plato used this argument in the 
Republic (Book IX) to refute Thrasymachos' claim that "might is right;" 
here, Nietzsche uses it to reconcile the rule of reason with the 
philosophy of power. 
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The well ordered state is a useful analogy for understanding the 
power of reason and spirituality in Nietzsche's conception of the 
soul. Here too, there are echoes of Plato along with a reduction to a 
single underlying continuum. Nietzsche does not divide the soul into 
essentially different elements or faculties as Plato and so many other 
philosophers have done. Instead, he rejects the dualistic "ghost-in- 
the-machine" entirely by dividing the body itself into a plurality of 
"souls" -- "under-souls" -- which are simply the wills to power, the 
commanding (and commanded) interpretations, of all the various organs 
and systems: "our body is but a social structure composed of many 
souls," he says. (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 19). 
That doesn't mean there are innumerable little reasoning faculties 
scattered throughout the body, however: while Nietzsche identifies soul 
with will, and acknowledges that will is a complex of sensation, 
thought, and the feeling of command (Ibid., 20), he stops short of 
objectifying reason at any level. He speaks of the "misunderstanding 
of passion and reason, as if the latter were an independent entity and 
not rather a system of relations between various passions and desires" 
(Nietzsche, Mill to Power, 387). Reason is not a faculty or an organ, 
but simply another form of the will to power -- in fact, "the 'highest' 
manifestation of the will to power" (Kaufmann 1956, 199). 
The "higher potencies" of will to power are realized, as we've 
seen, through transformations -- reorganizations -- which "achieve more 
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and more with less and less force" (Nietzsche, W/7 7 to Power 639). 
What the will to power as the rational spirit represents is an 
organization of the passions, a command of them, which is, in effect, a 
"self-conquest." Nietzsche frequently refers to this process as a 
"sublimation," whereby some particularly strong passion (like 
sexuality) is essentially preserved in its will to power while its 
immediate object is cancelled, replaced by an object posed by the more 
potent will to power of the rationalized self, perhaps something more 
noble or even "sublime." And this is all made possible through the 
development of the bad conscience: 
To become powerful, to gain freedom, to master his impulses and 
perfect himself, man must first develop the feeling that his 
impulses are evil. This recognition is the essence of the bad 
conscience; man says to himself: my inclinations are damnable, and 
I am evil. At that point, man is divided against himself. There 
are two selves, as it were, one rational and the other irrational. 
The one self then tries to give form to the other; man tries to 
remake himself, to give "style" to himself, and to organize the 
chaos of his passions. (Kaufmann 1956, 220) 
Those who can organize their passions instead of extirpating them, 
who can then use their power to more concerted effect -- who can 
rationalize and sublimate their impulses and instincts -- eventually 
overcome their bad conscience. They overcome themselves. These are 
the "higher men." Nietzsche provides us this portrait of them: 
To "give style" to one's character -- a great and rare art! It is 
practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of 
their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every 
one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight 
the eye. Here a large mass of second nature has been added; there 
a piece of original nature has been removed -- both times through 
long practice and daily work at it. Here the ugly that could not 
196 
be removed is concealed; there it has been reinterpreted and made 
sublime . . . It will be the strong and domineering natures that 
enjoy their finest gaiety in such constraint and perfection under a 
law of their own; the passion of their tremendous will relents in 
the face of all stylized nature, of all conquered and serving 
nature ... 
Conversely, it is the weak characters without power over themselves 
that hate the constraint of style. (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 
290) 
The similarities and differences between Nietzsche's and Bateson's 
approach to character development begin to come into view here. Both 
start with the idea that life and character develop through 
interaction, but for Bateson character is a meta-learning about 
context, about the types of interaction one finds -- and expects to 
find -- oneself engaging in with others. Because our recognitions of 
context are habits developed from infancy, and because they lead us to 
choose actions that then shape events to fit that context, the meta¬ 
learnings constituting character are typically unconscious and 
difficult to alter. 
Nietzsche provides no such formal definition of character. He 
seems to share Aristotle's view that our character consists of our 
habits in choice of actions and emotions, which is compatible with 
Bateson's view. For Nietzsche, however, character is more a matter of 
affective development than of cognitive develop-ment. The passions and 
"instincts" are fundamental in Nietzsche's thinking about the higher 
types -- the stronger they are, the better the chance of a truly 
exceptional individual; but emotions for Bateson are defined like any 
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other characterological element, in terms of the social relationships 
in which they are embedded. Nietzsche's (and Freud's) entire internal 
apparatus of drives and instincts -- analogues of energy, measurable in 
intensities -- is something he explicitly rejects. 
We have emphasized that for Nietzsche, too, interaction is 
fundamental. His drives and instincts exist only as rational 
interpretations of their effects, their intensities being merely the 
measure of those effects. But there is no denying that Nietzsche's 
metaphors tend to get reified, and that Bateson more successfully 
manages to focus on relationships rather than things. Cybernetics is a 
language for talking about systems and their hierarchies -- for talking 
about relationships. And it is a mathematical language, so that its 
elements can be precisely defined and its operations specified. It is 
not surprising then that Bateson begins from the metaphor of mind 
rather than will, or that his notion of mind transcends the individual 
while Nietzsche's philosophy centers on it. 
And while Nietzsche's philosophy emphasizes interaction to a far 
greater degree than any before him, it is worth noting that there is 
ultimately but one interaction we are all everywhere and always engaged 
in, one drive that defines all our actions and emotions -- namely, the 
will to power (what Bateson would call domination/submission). Bateson 
engages in no such reduction. His interactions around competition, 
pride and admiration, nurturance and dependence, and other schismogenic 
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relationships should, as they come to predominate one's outlook or 
reinforce each other in distinctive ways, define different character 
types. It's true that the will to power can take many forms, and 
Nietzsche does identify and analyze various character types; but he 
views them all as tending toward essentially the same end. And, 
perhaps for this reason, Nietzsche is clear in his conviction that 
one's passions can be sublimated and one's character transformed and 
improved: 
. . . [W]herever society is still dominated by the herd instinct 
it is still most expedient for every one to pretend that his 
character and occupation are unchangeable, even if at bottom they 
are not. "One can depend on him, he remains the same" . . . 
[Sjociety honors this instrumental nature, this way of remaining 
faithful to oneself, this unchangeability of views, aspirations, 
and even faults and lavishes its highest honors upon it. Such 
esteem . . . breeds "character" and brings all change, all re¬ 
learning, all self-transformation into ill repute. (Nietzsche, The 
Gay Science, 296) 
Bateson does not speak of "self-transformation" or suggest that 
emotions may be developed or refined. Instead, he acknowledges that 
one can "reverse" or "replace" certain premises of behavior and, in 
rare instances, attain a meta-learning about one's contextual learning 
which can, perhaps, alter aspects of the character one has already 
acquired. But his picture of this last process suggests less the 
scuptor's chisel than a jackhammer: [Note: in this description 
"Learning II" is the meta-learning which constitutes character, while 
"Learning III" is the meta-meta-learning which reconstitutes it] 
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What has been said . . . about the self-validating character of 
premises acquired by Learning II indicates that Learning III is 
likely to be difficult and rare even in human beings ... But it 
is claimed that something of the sort does from time to time occur 
in psychotherapy, religious conver-sion, and in other sequences in 
which there is a profound reorganization of character. . . . 
"I" am my habits of acting in context and shaping and perceiving 
the contexts in which I act. Selfhood is a product or aggregate of 
Learning II. To the degree that a man achieves Learning III, and 
learns to perceive and act in terms of the contexts of contexts, 
his "self" will take on a sort of irrelevance. 
Even the attempt at level III can be dangerous, and some fall by 
the wayside. These are often labeled by psychiatry as psychotic, 
and many of them find themselves inhibited from using the first 
person pronoun. . . . 
For others, more creative, the resolution of contraries reveals a 
world in which personal identity merges into all the processes of 
relationship in some vast ecology or aesthetics of cosmic 
interaction. That any of these can survive seems almost miraculous 
. . . (Bateson 1972, 301-6) 
For those who know something of his life, this description suggests 
interesting parallels to Nietzsche's near-mystical vision of the 
eternal return in the mountains near Sils-Maria, "6000 feet beyond man 
and time," and perhaps (though unfairly) even his lapse into madness 
over the last ten years of his life. The merging of personal identity 
"into all the processes of relationship in some vast ecology or 
aesthetics of cosmic interaction" recalls Nietzsche's denial of Being 
in a universe of Becoming. 
But Nietzsche wasn't suggesting that the mark of the higher types 
was their ability to alter or throw off their personal identities at 
will. The types described here, the mystic as well as the psychotic, 
he viewed alike as products of weakness and exhaustion. The styling of 
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one's character that Nietzsche had in mind was rather like that of the 
sculptor who, looking deeply into a lump of marble, understands his 
efforts as "freeing the unique form buried within." Nietzsche's 
formula for self-overcoming is not to cast off the self but to pursue a 
truer, higher self. Borrowing from Pindar, he counsels us: "What does 
your conscience say? You shall become who you are!" (Nietzsche, The 
Gay Science 270). 
This is where his differences with Bateson come to a head, for 
Bateson does not convey this same sense of a critical and creative 
relationship with one's self. Like Nietzsche, he considers the self (no 
less than the soul) a sort of mythic construction, "abstracted] from 
the experiences of interaction and difference" (Bateson 1991, 190). 
Unlike Nietzsche, he doesn't value or creatively engage that myth. To 
be fair, the ethics of individual existence is not his over-riding 
concern, except insofar as the Western insistence on self as opposed to 
the larger systems we are part of serves to falsify and destabilize our 
world. Bateson's ethics are ecological rather than individual. 
Perhaps this helps explain why he never addressed the subject of human 
achievement more directly. 
As in his reference above to those more "creative" types who can 
"resolve the contraries," however, Bateson does speculate on the 
sources of creativity in a few passages; and his views on that bear 
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directly on Nietzsche's discussion of the potential for a bad 
conscience to produce "higher specimens." 
Bateson's notion of "resolving the contraries" could easily have 
been lifted from Nietzsche, but wasn't. The embrace of contradiction 
has a long and honorable philosophical history, from Heraclitus' 
ancient dictum, "War is the father of all" (Kirk & Raven 1957, 195) to 
its 19th century apotheosis at the hands of German idealists, whose 
notion of dialectic depended on it. Bateson, however, arrived at this 
notion through his work with schizophrenics in the 1950's. 
The contribution for which Bateson was most honored in his lifetime 
and will probably be remembered longest is his "double-bind" theory of 
schizophrenia, which can fairly be described as "damned if you do and 
damned if you don't." Bateson's research over several years at a VA 
hospital convinced him that a factor in the onset of schizophrenia was 
a family system in which a child is continually receiving conflicting 
signals at different contextual levels. He gives this example: 
A young man who had fairly well recovered from an acute 
schizophrenic episode was visited in the hospital by his mother. 
He was glad to see her and impulsively put his arm around her 
shoulders, whereupon she stiffened. He withdrew his arm and she 
asked, "Don't you love me any more?" He then blushed, and she 
said, "Dear, you must not be so easily embarassed and afraid of 
your feelings." (Bateson 1972, 217) 
We can imagine the young man obediently trying to explain his 
confusion at her behavior and her scolding reply, "How can you say 
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that?" -- but the schizo-phrenic has learned to retreat in order to 
avoid such exchanges. Bateson reports that "the patient was able to 
stay with her only a few minutes more and following her departure he 
assaulted an aide and was put in the tubs." What happens is that a 
message communicated at one level is continually contradicted at 
another level. 
Bateson found that confusions among levels of communication were 
also common to humor, art, poetry, and religion -- that they were 
connected in many instances and in many ways with creativity (Bateson 
1991, 189). Those who are adept at playing these levels off against 
each other, he credited with "transcontextual skills." How are these 
gained? Bateson suggests that they can be learned by overcoming double 
binds that are critical in one's relationship to some significant 
other. He gives the example of the Zen koan, an insoluble paradox 
presented to a student by his master to help him achieve enlightenment, 
as a "conceptual double bind" (Ibid., 212). 
Nietzsche would submit that the bad conscience foisted on the 
strong by the morality of society represents a similar but far more 
profound double bind. The person of strong impulse and strong passions 
is told, in effect, that such passions and desires are wrong -- that he 
is wrong for having them. But they are him and to deny them is to 
wrong himself. Denying them causes unhappiness; not denying them 
causes unhappiness. Sublimating them becomes his way out, for then he 
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gets to use their power for ends of his own choosing --he is no longer 
the slave to his passions but their master. In choosing his own ends, 
he is expressing his highest will to power, his "instinct for 
freedom". He can now "transcontextually" mediate between his affective 
and rational selves. He has resolved his contraries and given form to 
himself -- indeed, he has chosen his higher self. And in this process 
lies the source of man's creativity: 
This secret self-ravishment, this artist's cruelty, this delight in 
imposing a form upon oneself as a hard, recalcitrant suffering 
material and in burning a critique, a contradiction, a contempt, a 
No into it, this uncanny dreadfully joyous labor of a soul 
voluntarily at odds with itself that makes itself suffer out of joy 
in making suffer -- eventually this entire active "bad conscience" - 
- you will have guessed it -- as the womb of all ideal and 
imaginative phenomena, also brought to light an abundance of 
strange new beauty and affirmation, and perhaps beauty itself. 
(Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, II 18) 
It is interesting to note that Bateson and Nietzsche agree on the 
connection of creativity with a distinctly pathological double bind: we 
don't become creative by hearing jokes or reading poetry, however 
"transcontextual" they may be. The double bind must be lived, 
experienced, in a way that challenges and perhaps changes us. Self¬ 
destructive guilt seems an important component in both Nietzsche's 
divided soul and Bateson's schizogenic family. And Bateson even agrees 
that the pathological double binds conducive to creativity might be 
generated culturally: 
Certainly creative and artistic processes are in part determined by 
epoch and cultural milieu. It is therefore likely that pathologies 
of culture will produce pathologies of aesthetic perception and 
monsters of aesthetic creation. (Bateson 1991, 257) 
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Granted then that there are interesting parallels between 
Nietzsche's and Bateson's understandings on the nature and origin of 
creativity, the question remains as to why an orientation towards 
achievement develops in some and not others. Not all the strong are 
creative, and not all the creative are achievers; Bateson implies that 
"transcontextualists" are more likely to be labelled psychotic than 
creative. What sets the creators and achievers apart? 
Nietzsche is very clear about the necessity of discipline. The 
weak and the psychotic clearly lack it. Morality, he argues, is a form 
of discipline that begins as a requirement that one harden oneself 
against the passions. And what is involved in this hardening 
discipline, exactly? In the language of will to power, Nietzsche 
describes it as an obeying: 
What is essential "in heaven and on earth" seems to be . . . that 
there should be obedience over a long period of time and in a 
single direction: given that, something always develops, and has 
developed, for whose sake it is worth while to live on earth; for 
example, virtue, art, music, dance, reason, spirituality. . . . 
Slavery is, as it seems, both in the cruder and in the more subtle 
sense, the indispensable means of spiritual discipline and 
cultivation [Zucht und Zuchtung], too. Consider any morality with 
this in mind . . . (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 188) 
Bateson proposes that the discipline necessary to pursue 
achievement may depend on self-imposed double binds (Bateson 1991, 
209). He gives the example of the mountain climber: the climber's body 
"screams for relief" from the pain of his exertions, while his mind 
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screams back in protest to the pain of leaving such an all-consuming 
task uncompleted. The climber's discipline, he suggests, consists in 
"not listening to the body when it screams for relief," and in giving 
himself no reward "except such reinforcement as he can reflexively 
generate for himself" [Ibid., 212). Athletes formulate such 
reinforcement for themselves in the mantra "no pain, no gain." 
The reflexivity and refusal to hear pain that Bateson refers to 
here seems to bear a family resemblance to Nietzsche's divided soul 
"that makes itself suffer out of joy in making suffer." And yet, there 
are many, many people capable of such discipline who have no obvious 
background of pathology. Of course, the conditions for creative genius 
might well be more extreme than the conditions for creating mountain 
climbers and other athletes. Where personal pathology doesn't appear 
to play a role, cultural pathology might. While Bateson doesn't 
attempt to connect the capacity to impose double-binds on oneself with 
the preparatory experience provided by cultural pathologies or 
morality, Nietzsche clearly does make that connection. 
For Nietzsche, morality and the bad conscience that comes of it are 
necessary conditions for the divided self that makes any exacting 
discipline possible. That possibility can not be realized, however, 
without strength of will to power. A major difference between 
Nietzsche and Bateson arises at this point because Nietzsche, like 
Schopenhauer, still attributes strength of character to heredity. 
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Bateson, following Freud, places a much greater emphasis on social 
interactions in early childhood. If some are more inclined than others 
to self-imposed double binds, Bateson would trace those differences to 
differences in the patterns of reward and punishment used by parents, 
on the idea that the patterns of parental discipline would likely be 
repeated in a child's later attempts at self-discipline. 
Mitigating the difference here, a bit, is the fact that Nietzsche 
doesn't clearly distinguish between the physiological endowment 
provided by one's parents and the cultural endowment provided by one's 
social background: 
One cannot erase from the soul of a human being what his ancestors 
liked most to do and did most constantly: whether they were, for 
example, assiduous savers and appurtenances of a desk and cash box 
. . . or whether they lived accustomed to commanding from dawn to 
dusk ... It is simply not possible that a human being should not 
have the qualities and preferences of his parents and ancestors in 
his body, whatever appearances may suggest to the contrary. This 
is the problem of race. (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 264) 
Kaufmann points out that this view is a corollary of Nietzsche's 
position on the mind-body problem: 
The two are so inextricably entangled with each other that "it is 
not at all possible" to explain heredity by ignoring the spiritual 
life of man... Nietzsche's definition of a people is consistent 
with this view; he emphasizes not the blood but the common 
experience. (Kaufmann 1956, 256) 
Given these views, it isn't surprising that Nietzsche was a 
defender of Lamarck against Darwin. (It's more of a surprise, given 
Bateson's patrimony, to note that he also defended Lamarck, although 
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his defense in no way questions the basic tenets of natural selection 
and in no way supports the inheritance of habits of thrift or 
command.) While Nietzsche overemphasized the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, his emphasis on the role of culture in preserving and 
transmitting a potential for self-discipline may nonetheless have not 
been all that different from Bateson's. 
During the second world war, Bateson himself engaged in research on 
"national character," to identify techniques for motivating American 
and British troops and demoralizing the Germans and Japanese in 
psychologically specific ways. He defended this research against 
charges of invalid stereotyping by rooting his approach in childrearing 
practices and rejecting unitary character descriptions in favor of 
relational, bipolar and even tripolar descriptions -- dominant/ 
submissive, exhibitionist/spectating, and nurturing/dependent, for 
instance, along with various combinations of these: 
[The American] pattern differs from the English not only in the 
reversal of the spectatorship-exhibitionism roles [fathers, not 
children, are the centers of attention], but in the content of what 
is exhibited. The American child is encouraged by his parents to 
show off his independence... 
Although the analogous German pattern probably resembles the 
American. . . certainly it differs from the Americans in that the 
father's dominance is much stronger and much more consistent, and 
especially in that the content of the boy's exhibitionism is quite 
different. He is, in fact, dominated into a sort of heel-clicking 
exhibitionism which takes the place of overt submissive behavior. 
(Bateson 1972, 102) 
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Whether Bateson is unconscionably promoting stereotypes here or 
carefully uncovering the grounds for those we have is less important 
than the fact that he has a clear empirical approach to identifying the 
mechanisms by which character traits are passed on from generation to 
generation. Nietzsche's approach is vaguer and less defensible against 
charges of stereotype and bias. 
Although Nietzsche's emphasis on strength is a weak criterion for 
identifying specific conditions leading an individual to dedicate 
himself to achievement, his will to power provides a profound 
teleological insight into the motivating force behind such dedication. 
At this point in the discussion, it only states the obvious to say that 
Nietzsche perceived all pursuit of achievement as the pursuit of 
mastery and power. A few quotes will suffice to show how he approached 
this reduction: 
[I]n beauty opposites are tamed; the highest sign of power, namely 
power over opposites; moreover, without tension: that violence is 
no longer needed; that everything follows, obeys, so easily and 
pleasantly -- that is what delights the artist's will to power. 
(Nietzsche, Mill to Power 803) 
Science -- the transformation of nature into concepts for the 
purpose of mastering nature. (Ibid., 610) 
[Philosophy] always creates the world in its own image; it cannot 
do otherwise. Philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most 
spiritual will to power, to the "creation of the world" . . . 
(Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 9) 
It is intriguing that years before Nietzsche developed his concept 
of the will to power, he approached the problem of achievement in terms 
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of envy and competition rather than domination. In the unpublished 
fragment Homer's Contest, he draws attention to the prominence of the 
contest [agon) in ancient Greece, from athletic competitions like the 
Olympics to the prizes awarded for the best poets, musicians, and 
tragedians. Even philosophy, Nietzsche argues, arose in a spirit of 
envy and competition: 
What, for example, is of special artistic significance in Plato's 
dialogues is for the most part the result of a contest with the art 
of the orators, the sophists, and the dramatists of his time, 
invented for the purpose of enabling him to say in the end: "Look, 
I too can do what my great rivals can do; indeed, I can do it 
better than they . . . and now I repudiate all this entirely and 
condemn all imitative art. Only the contest made me a poet, a 
sophist, an orator." (Nietzsche, Homer's Contest in Kaufmann 1954, 
37-8) 
It may seem that the discovery of the will to power only shifted 
Nietzsche's attention from the process to the goal; but the will to 
power in fact comprises both. It also helped forge a connection 
between his earlier insight here and the broader concerns of both 
German idealism and modern science. The Social Darwinists tried to 
extrapolate and extend the notion of competition in much the same way, 
but I think it's not hard to argue that the will to power was better 
suited to the task. 
The adequacy of will to power as an explanation of an achievement 
orientation can perhaps best be appreciated by comparison with Plato's 
account which, I believe, was by far the most successful attempt 
previous to Nietzsche's. Recall that the customary Greek explanation 
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for the pursuit of excellence was that men pursue it for the sake of 
honor, for the recognition it brings of one's arete. Plato extended 
and deepened this explanation by grounding it in the idea that all 
mortal beings seek immortality: just as animals and ordinary men want 
to bear children in whom some part of them will live on, so do nobler 
souls want to generate great works by which their reputation will be 
secured with honor and their name live on -- not for a generation, but 
for eternity. 
This was such a beautiful explanation that Nietzsche simply cribbed 
it. There may be a better word, but there's no better explanation. 
Much as Diotima urges Socrates away from the love of physical bodies 
towards the higher love of abstract Beauty, Nietzsche begins his 
remarks on immortality by reminding us that all the great philosophers 
were unmarried (excepting Socrates who, he suggests, "married 
ironically, just to demonstrate this proposition") (Nietzsche, 
Genealogy of Morals III 7). He then reiterates Plato's argument: 
As for the "chastity" of philosophers, finally, this type of spirit 
clearly has its fruitfulness somewhere else than in children; 
perhaps it also has the survival of its name elsewhere, its little 
immortality. . . . There is nothing in this of chastity from any 
kind of ascetic scruple or hatred of the senses, just as it is not 
chastity when an athlete or jockey abstains from women: it is 
rather the will of their dominating instinct, at least during their 
periods of great pregnancy. (Ibid., Ill 8) 
The imagery of pregnancy and children of the soul pervades 
Nietzsche's writings. He says that "making music is another way of 
making children" (Nietzsche, Mill to Power 800). In "The Yes and Amen 
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Song" from Zarathustra he employs the refrain, "Never yet have I found 
the woman from whom I wanted children, unless it be this woman I love: 
for I love you, 0 eternity" (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra in 
Kaufmann 1954, 16). And like Socrates, who described himself as a 
"midwife" of the soul, Nietzsche saw his own role as helping give birth 
to the higher men -- who are themselves creators, first and foremost. 
While there is a deep affinity here between Plato's and Nietzsche's 
understanding of the goals that drive the creative achievements of 
mankind, it must be said that Nietzsche's grounding of that 
understanding in the will to power makes for an ultimately more 
satisfactory explanation. Plato's suggestion that all mortal beings 
desire immortality extends a distinctly teleological form of 
explanation into regions where not just science but even common sense 
simply can't go along. In Nietzsche's account, the desire for 
immortality -- and even eternity -- is distinctly human; in fact, it 
marks those higher types who alone distinguish man from the rest of the 
animals. It is the supreme degree of the will to power (Kaufmann 1956, 
216), but as will to power it is otherwise essentially the same force 
at work in all being. 
For Nietzsche, the will to power was a teleological explanation 
only in the same way as the organs of the body can be described 
teleologically -- in terms of the function they perform within the 
larger systems they are parts of. Nietzsche lacked the cybernetic 
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concepts necessary to describe mutually interacting causal systems in 
any but teleological terms, but it is clear from his statements 
concerning will to power as interpretation that he was scientifically 
more committed to formal than final explanations. To the extent that 
the language of final causality, stretching back to Plato and 
Aristotle, is capable of mapping the territory mapped by modern 
science, I think Nietzsche managed it. 
His explanation for human achievement thus ties in to an 
explanation of all Being -- or rather, becoming. Explanation gets no 
deeper than that. Yet it manages to avoid the fate of those 
metaphysical explanations (like God) that, because they explain 
everything, really don't explain any particular thing at all: Nietzsche 
traces the evolution of the will to power, at least sketchily, from 
fundamental quanta to biological organisms; and then, in considerable 
detail, from man's uncivilized past, through the civilizing/moralizing 
process, and on into the post-civilized nihilism of the present day. 
He shows how the will to power works in a wide variety of contexts, 
from religion and altruism, through politics and commerce, to art and 
philosophy. The breadth of his applications of will to power and the 
discriminations it makes possible go a long way in making this as a 
satisfying theory. 
And like Plato's account -- but even more so -- it is elegant in 
its simplicity. 
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Its weaknesses are few and hard to make a case for: that it is not 
predictive --that it can't tell us which individuals will prove to be 
of the highest rank -- is true of just about any explanation in the 
social sciences. Nietzsche himself seemed to think he could manage 
predictions of a probabilistic sort insofar as his analyses of cultural 
potential can be taken as anything more than rationalizations of 
stereotype -- and I'm not sure they can, since both his pronouncements 
and the methods he used in arriving at them were dubious at best. I do 
believe Bateson's approach has more potential on this score. 
Probably its chief fault -- and fatal flaw -- is that it represents 
the last great achievement of the metaphysical tradition, a tradition 
which (as Nietzsche did predict successfully) ended with him. While 
the existentialist movement proudly claims Nietzsche as one of its 
progenitors, its methods tend more to the phenomenological than the 
metaphysical -- meaning that its intent is to describe what is rather 
than discover its underlying nature. The will to power, which was the 
foundation of his "anti-metaphysic" and the basis for his psychology, 
has only been passed on in bits and pieces. Its use in the century 
since Nietzsche introduced it has been restricted pretty much to the 
fields of political science and psychology. Uprooted from its own 
ground, it seems to have lost vigor -- it no longer commands the 
attention it should. 
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Freudian Psychoanalysis 
Freud's psychoanalytic theory provides a good example of the 
attenuation of Nietzsche's philosophical psychology -- and of the 
entire German philosophical tradition -- in the hands of the new, 
experimental psychology that emerged in Germany and elsewhere in the 
middle of the nineteenth century. Freud's debts to Nietzsche and the 
German idealists, while real, should not be overstated: Freud was 
trained in medicine, not philosophy; and what may seem to be borrowed 
concepts were mostly common terms in educated if not everyday German 
discourse at the time (Ginsberg "Nietzschean Psychiatry," 295-7). But 
the notion of a dynamic mind, actively engaged in shaping its 
experience, and of an impulsive, unconscious element in that mind was 
clearly shaped by German philosophy and has helped to distinguish 
Continental from Anglo-American approaches to psychology ever since. 
Freud's associate, Alfred Adler, was more directly beholden to 
Nietzsche, as he made the will to power a significant part of his 
psychology. Its counterpart in Freud's system, the infamous erotic 
instinct, bears "more resemblance to the all-inclusive and all¬ 
preserving Eros of Plato's Symposium" according to its author (Freud 
"The Resistances to Psychoanalysis," in Rieff 1963, 258). All that 
being said, however, it is difficult not to hear echoes of Nietzsche in 
some of Freud's basic formulations: 
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Human civilization rests upon two pillars, of which one is the 
control of natural forces and the other the restriction of our 
instincts. The ruler's throne rests upon fettered slaves. [Ibid.) 
A progressive renunciation of inherent instincts, the satisfaction 
of which is capable of giving direct pleasure to the ego, appears 
to be one of the foundations of human civilization. Some part of 
this repression is effected by means of the various religions, in 
that they require individuals to sacrifice the satisfaction of 
their instincts to the divinity. (Freud "Obsessive Acts and 
Religious Practices," in Rieff 1963, 25-6) 
. . . [Analysis] sought to show that these same sexual components, 
which could be diverted from their immediate aims and directed to 
other things, made the most important contributions to the cultural 
achievements of the individual and of society. (Freud "The 
Resistances to Psychoanalysis" 257) 
There are many other examples, but these serve to draw attention to 
the striking similarities between Nietzsche's and Freud's views on the 
connections among instincts, religious and moral repression, 
sublimation, and achievement. The differences between the two become 
more visible when we examine Freud's views on character development. 
In the end, they can be traced to differences in their choice of causal 
models. 
It is difficult to discuss Freud's views on anything without going 
into all the arcane terms and psychical relationships that undergird 
psychoanalytic theory. We'll have to make do with some very broad 
brushstrokes here. On the most general level, Freud proceeds by 
distinguishing between the contributions of the external and the 
internal environments in our mental life. Our sense organs are, 
obviously, a way of gathering perceptions of the external environment. 
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But our body is also a source of perceptions -- internal perceptions of 
sensations and feelings: 
Very little is known about these sensations and feelings; those 
belonging to the pleasure-unpleasure series may still be regarded 
as the best example of them. . . . [T]hey may come from different 
places simultaneously and may thus have different or even opposite 
qualities. 
Sensations of a pleasurable nature have not anything inherently 
impelling about them, whereas unpleasurable ones have it in the 
highest degree. The latter impel towards change, towards discharge 
. . . (Freud 1960, 12) 
Sensations and feelings are not the only furniture in the internal 
environment, however. There is also an array of "impulses" stemming 
from the various organs of the body, which may themselves be connected 
with the sensations of pleasure and unpleasure as in the impulses that 
arise from the "erotogenic" areas of the body (genitals, mouth, anus, 
etc.). Most importantly, there is a higher organization of such 
impulses into two broad classes of instincts, "one of which, the sexual 
instincts or Eros, is by far the most conspicuous": 
It comprises not merely the uninhibited sexual instinct proper and 
the instinctual impulses of an aim-inhibited or sublimated nature 
derived from it, but also the self-preservative instinct . . . The 
second class of instincts was not so easy to point to ... a death 
instinct, the task of which is to lead organic life back into the 
inanimate state. (Ibid., 30) 
Among the many discrepancies already apparent between Freud's and 
Nietzsche's accounts, the positing of a death instinct stands out in 
sharp relief. This notion is as alien to Nietzsche as to Darwin. The 
divergence is all the more striking in that Freud's descriptions of 
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Eros sound at times very much like an echo of Nietzsche's most 
fundamental conception of will to power: 
. . . Eros, by bringing about a more and more far-reaching 
combination of the particles into which living substance is 
dispersed, aims at complicating life and at the same time, at 
preserving it. [Ibid.) 
On the other hand, so does his description of the death instinct: 
It appears that, as a result of the combination of unicellular 
organisms into multicellular forms of life, the death instinct of 
the single cell can successfully be neutralized and the destructive 
impulses be diverted on to the external world through the 
instrumentality of . . . the muscular apparatus; and the death 
instinct would thus seem to express itself -- though probably only 
in part -- as an instinct of destruction directed against the 
external world and other organisms. [Ibid., 31) 
Although Freud emphasizes how often "the two classes of instincts 
are fused, blended, and alloyed with each other," as in sadism, he 
argues nonetheless for a dualistic conception of "the goal and purpose 
of life" [Ibid.). Nietzsche would doubtless find this intellectually 
unnecessary, and to Freud's credit he admits that "the distinction 
betwwen the two classes of instincts does not seem sufficiently 
assured" (Ibid., 32). It is hardly surprising that where an empirical 
scientist sees diversity a philosopher will insist on underlying unity, 
but the differences between Nietzsche and Freud here go deeper than 
that. Freud himself suggests that both instincts, while at odds with 
each other, ultimately share a fundamentally conservative principle: 
while Eros works to preserve life, the death instinct is needed to "re¬ 
establish a state of things that was disturbed by the emergence of 
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life" (Ibid., 30-1). Nietzsche, whose will to power was anything but 
conservative, would reject both descriptions as the utterances of a 
decadent and world-weary spirit. Freud's contention that pain has a 
greater impelling force than pleasure would be similarly rejected. 
The gulf between Nietzsche's monism and Freud's dualism entails a 
certain irony. Freud's less metaphysical, more empirical approach 
manages somehow to seem less common-sensical: it is, in fact, easier to 
recast all human endeavour in terms of power than in terms of sex and 
death. And it is not just that the former is more acceptable. Sex is 
a more defined and definite term; power is less definite and therefore 
more protean. Some of Freud's equations seem unbearably contrived; 
Nietzsche's invariably less so. 
The monistic will to power also has the advantage of making the 
next step in the formation of character more than a bit clearer. For 
Freud, character takes shape through the manner in which the sexual 
instincts in particular are handled by the individual psyche. It is 
necessary at this point to introduce the familiar distinctions of ego, 
id, and super-ego. Freud generally begins with the ego, since that is 
the seat of consciousness and we are therefore most aware of it. The 
ego is centered around our perceptual apparatus and helps us deal with 
the external world. It is the more rational aspect, the "coherent 
organization of mental processes . . . that controls the approaches to 
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motility -- that is, the discharge of excitations into the external 
world" (Freud 1960, 7). 
The id, on the other hand, is the locus of our unconscious life and 
it is centered around the instincts: "perceptions may be said to have 
the same significance for the ego as instincts have for the id" (Ibid., 
30). The id, in other words, is the seat of the passions. It is the 
ego's job, as the reasoning faculty, to control them and in some cases 
(as in forbidden mother-love) to repress them utterly into 
unconsciousness: 
[T]he ego seeks to bring the influence of the external world to 
bear upon the id and its tendencies, and endeavours to substitute 
the reality principle for the pleasure principle which reigns 
unrestrictedly in the id . . . [I]n its relation to the id [the 
ego] is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the 
superior strength of the horse. (Ibid., 15) 
The analogy of horse and rider for reason's role in guiding the 
passions is as old as Plato. The notion of repression into the 
unconscious was unknown to the Greeks, but it was familiar to 
Nietzsche. Freud developed this Nietzschean parallel in his 
description of the super-ego. The super-ego, or ego ideal, arises 
through the child's resolution of the Oedipal complex. The resolution 
is typically managed through ego-identifications with the child's 
father and mother. The ego blocks the id's inadmissable mother love by 
"assuming the features of the object . . . trying to make good the id's 
loss by saying 'Look, you can love me too -- I am so like the object'" 
(Ibid., 20). This is the origin of narcissistic self-love. A more 
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ambivalent identification with the father, expressing both the child's 
love and hate for him, results in the super-ego: 
Clearly the repression of the Oedipus complex was no easy task. 
The child's parents, and especially his father, were perceived as 
the obstacle to a realization of his Oedipus wishes; so his 
infantile ego fortified itself for the carrying out of the 
repression by erecting the same obstacle within itself. It 
borrowed strength to do this, so to speak, from the father, and 
this loan was an extraordinarily momentous act. The super-ego 
retains the character of the father . . . (Ibid., 24) 
The "character of the father" as both an object of affection his 
own right and as a perceived obstacle to the mother dynamically 
expresses itself through the super-ego in the form of a series of 
positive and negative injunctions: 
The super-ego is, however, not simply a residue of the earliest 
object-choices of the id; it also represents an energetic reaction- 
formation against those choices. Its relation to the ego is not 
exhausted by the precept: 'You ought to be like this (like your 
father).' It also comprises the prohibition: 'You may not be like 
this (like your father) -- that is, you may not do all that he 
does, some things are his prerogative.' [Ibid.) 
The "oughts" and "ought nots" of the super-ego together form an 
ideal for the ego, an ideal the child will attempt to emulate in later 
life. In effect, it provides the child a conscience -- and a sense of 
guilt. And thus is man enabled to pursue his higher self: 
What has belonged to the lowest part of the mental life of each of 
us is changed, through the formation of the ideal, into what is 
highest in the human mind by our scale of values . . . 
It is easy to show that the ego ideal answers to everything that is 
expected of the higher nature in man. As a substitute for a 
longing for the father, it contains the germ from which all 
religions have sprung. The self-judgement which declares that the 
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ego falls short of ideal produces the religious sense of humility 
to which the believer appeals in his longing. . . . Social 
feelings rest on identifications with other people, on the basis of 
having the same ego ideal. (Ibid., 26) 
Starting from what seems like a very different perspective, Freud 
thus arrives at the same critical destination (if not the same notion 
of "higher nature") as does Nietzsche. Where Nietzsche sees guilt as 
the spiritualizing effect on the individual of a vast slave revolt in 
morality, Freud seems to see in it only a childish, if unavoidable, 
solution to family stress. But in fact, Freud's view is not all that 
different from Nietzsche's -- he is only providing a more detailed 
theory on how the spiritualizing process unfolds. In a phrasing which 
sounds rather like Nietzsche's understanding of the racial factor in 
producing higher types, Freud points out that it is not just the 
father's influence that is at work here: "Owing to the way in which the 
ego ideal is formed, it has the most abundant links with the 
phylogenetic acquisition of each individual -- his archaic heritage" 
[Ibid.). In Totem and Taboo, he explicitly lays out the origins of the 
Oedipal complex, and its resolution in religion, morality, and the 
social sense against a backdrop of revolt and ressentiment not all that 
dissimilar to Nietzsche's genealogy of morals. 
Freud's and Nietzsche's views of man's "higher nature" seem so 
different on the above account, however, that we must pursue a step 
further Freud's explanation of the character formation of those we have 
here called "achievers." This will require the introduction of one 
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more technical term from psychoanalysis, the notion of "libido." And 
here is where Freud's fundamental differences with both Nietzsche and 
Bateson come into full view. 
Freud describes libido as a "displaceable and neutral energy . . . 
employed in the service of the pleasure principle to obviate blockages 
and to facilitate discharge" [Ibid., 34-5). He suggests that it is a 
"desexualized Eros" which can now be added to either "to a qualita¬ 
tively differentiated erotic or destructive impulse" to "augment its 
total cathexis" (charge of energy) [Ibid.). This libidinal energy is 
stored as in reservoirs, in "one or another region of the mental 
apparatus" (Nietzsche "Libidinal Types," in Rieff 1963, 211). 
According to where it is stored, Freud claims "we can distinguish three 
main libidinal types" and then three more mixed types, which occur when 
the reservoirs in two regions are quantitatively similar [Ibid.). The 
three regions in question are, of course, the id, the ego, and the 
super-ego; and the three main types corresponding to them are the 
erotic, the narcissistic, and the obsessional: 
The erotic is easily characterized. Erotics are persons whose main 
interest -- the relatively largest amount of their libido -- is 
focused on love. Loving, but above all being loved. . . . From 
the social and cultural standpoint this type represents the 
elementary instinctual claims of the id, to which the other 
psychical agencies have become docile. 
The second type is that which I have termed the obsessional; . . . 
its distinctive characteristic is the supremacy exercised by the 
super-ego, which is segregated from the ego with great accompanying 
tension. Persons of this type are governed by anxiety of 
conscience instead of by the dread of losing love; they develop, we 
might say, an inner instead of an outer dependence; they develop a 
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high degree of self reliance, from the social standpoint they are 
the true upholders of civilization, for the most part in a 
conservative spirit. 
The characteristics of the third type, justly called the 
narcissistic, are in the main negatively described. There is no 
tension between ego and super-ego -- indeed, starting from this 
type one would hardly have arrived at the notion of a super-ego; 
there is no preponderance of erotic needs; the main interest is 
focused on self-preservation. . . . The ego has a considerable 
amount of aggression available. . . . Where loving is in question, 
they prefer loving to being loved. People of this type impress 
others as being "personalities"; it is on them that their fellow- 
men are specially likely to lean; they readily assume the role of 
leader, give a fresh stimulus to cultural development or break down 
existing conditions. (76/d., 211-2) 
We can quickly spot Nietzsche's warrior-aristocrats in the 
narcissistic type, though once again, his emphasis would be on their 
will to power rather than self-preservation. The "higher specimens," 
those narcissistic types who have undergone the regimen of morality and 
guilt, whose ego has been tempered by super-ego without being 
overwhelmed by it, Freud calls the "narcissistic-obsessional type": 
[T]his type "represents the variation most valuable from the 
cultural standpoint, for it combines independence of external 
factors and regard for the requirements of conscience with the 
capacity for energetic action, and it reinforces the ego against 
the super-ego. (Ibid., 212-3) 
Thus again, Freud comes around to a position closely resembling 
Nietzsche's, though clothed in heavy jargon. The jargon can be 
justified, as before, in terms of the specificity it provides on the 
mechanisms whereby an achiever begins to assume a different life 
trajectory from the guiIt-besotten alcoholic. But it must be admitted 
that psychoanalysis, like history, looks back instead of forward: it is 
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not a predictive science. Freud's psychdynamic mechanisms explain only 
in retrospect. That is nonetheless an advance on where Nietzsche left 
things, and Freud's overall emphasis on the psycho-sexual development 
of the child within the family system is certainly to be counted among 
the most influential theoretical insights of the last century. 
Its limitations as a theory are considerable, however. Aside from 
the many positivist critiques of the inherent unobservability of the 
psychical entities and structures described by the theory, that seem to 
grow like topsy; and aside from the objections that any theory 
inevitably generates when it explains away all criticism as 
"resistance;" and aside from all the criticisms of Freud's neurotic 
over-emphasis on sexuality, there remains Bateson's basic question 
concerning the legitimacy of his underlying metaphor of psychic energy: 
The nineteenth-century scientists (notably Freud) who tried to 
establish a bridge between behavioral data and the fundamentals of 
physical and chemical science were, surely, correct in insisting 
upon the need for such a bridge but, I believe, wrong in choosing 
"energy" as the foundation for that bridge. 
If mass and length are inappropriate for the describing of 
behavior, then energy is unlikely to be more appropriate. After 
all, energy is Mass X Velocity , and no behavioral scientist really 
insists that "psychic energy" is of these dimensions. (Bateson 
1972, xxii) 
Libidinal energy is the case in point. We know enough now about 
the electro-chemical nature of synaptic firings so that the metaphor of 
displaceable energy in the brain does not seem entirely implausible. 
But what does it mean to say that libido is "desexualized Eros" -- a 
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"neutral energy?" Electrical energy always has a charge -- and always 
the same charge. How does energy obtain this charge or that -- for the 
death instincts also represent a form of energy -- or no charge, by 
virtue of need? 
Perhaps we can reconstruct this phrase so that it doesn't imply any 
inherent qualitative difference in the energy itself. "Neutral energy" 
might simply mean energy which no longer has a sexual percept in the 
mind as its anode. Perhaps the "reservoirs" of libido that gather in 
the id or ego are cathodes in the cranial electrolyte. Perhaps there 
is a theory there, but it's not Freud's and it is doubtful that 
psychoanalysis could be translated into it ungarbled. In fact, the 
reduction of psychic energy to the formulas governing the behavior of 
any known physical energy is so fraught with difficulties as to be 
hopeless. Freud's metaphors of "energy reservoirs," sending libidinal 
impulses "flowing" and "backflowing" around "blockages" and such, 
actually sounds more like hydraulics than electronics. Whichever 
metaphor is most appropriate, it remains a thoroughly teleological 
system expressed in metaphors drawn from the physical universe where 
efficient causality rules: 
One of the main pathologies of psychological and psychiatric 
thinking is that these two ways of explanation are continually 
being crisscrossed, mixed up, and confused. We then get a whole 
economics of psychic energy in Freudian psychology and a whole mess 
of nonsense recurring over and over again in psychology, because 
people will think that the hard-science world should somehow be a 
part of the mental world, in which there are nothing but mental 
phenomena. (Bateson 1991, 163) 
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Nietzsche's will to power clearly has advantages over Freud's 
psychic energies in that it is simpler -- you needn't be either a 
philosopher or a psychoanalyst to understand it; its metaphorical 
status is acknowledged and its connection with the universe of 
efficient causality more carefully worked out; it better avoids mind- 
body dualism; it is even more basic psychologically, inasmuch as Eros 
and the death instincts are more easily reducible to will to power than 
they are to each other; and, finally, in its emphasis on interpretation 
it points to a way out of the teleological dead-end in which so many 
attempts at explaining psychic life have been trapped. 
Bateson's critique of the Freudian approach is not limited to his 
doubts about psychic energy. Despite its emphasis on the child's 
relationship to its parents in psychic development, Bateson notes that 
its approach to treatment is steadfastly one on one: 
This is not the place, and the time is not ripe, for detailed 
predictions about what will happen to individual psychology and the 
techniques of treating the individual when systems theory becomes 
assimilated into this field. It is worth noting, however, that 
many parts of conventional individual psychology have long been 
ready for framing within systems theory, notably the Freudian 
concept of psychological conflict where the contrasting poles of 
thought or motivation are conventionally presumed to be 
interactive, each promoting the other. (Bateson 1991, 260) 
Those parts that are ready for "framing within systems theory", are 
of course those same parts in which Freud and Nietzsche find most 
common ground. As for his unstated predictions about the impact of 
systems theory on psychotherapy, we can only speculate. Psychoanalysis 
227 
is still around; but family therapy and support group approaches 
certainly seem to have made a major impact on the field. Bateson did 
not seem to feel that there was much hope of saving the bulk of 
psychoanalytic theory: 
In other areas the assimilation [of individual psychology to 
systems theory] will not be so easy. Many of the common concepts 
of individual psychology, which are handled as nouns in the 
language of psychologists and even to some extent reified, will, no 
doubt, be translated into a language of process. Such concepts as 
ego, anxiety, hostility, psychic energy, need, etc., will have a 
new appearance and a very different status in the total system of 
explanation. These changes will be difficult to assimilate. 
Perhaps even more difficult will be the shift in the boundaries of 
the individual mind . . . [Ibid.) 
This last shift, of course, has proven very difficult indeed -- for 
systems theory. 
The Empirical Tradition 
While the rationalist tradition was building great cathedrals of 
philosophy on the Continent and digging the catacombs for Freudian 
psychoanalysis, the empiricists in England were busily clearing the 
site for a competing philosophical tradition and pouring the 
foundations for what has become the dominant paradigm of experimental 
psychology in the 20th century. 
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The empirical approach began with the assertion of the primacy of 
the outer world over the inner; the rationalists generally took the 
opposing view. The rationalists held that the mind itself contains 
certain innate, indisputably true ideas and necessary principles; that 
the mind is, as a result, an active shaper of its experiences; and 
finally, that the mind is autonomous -- freely self-determining -- 
precisely to the degree that its actions proceed from such innate ideas 
and principles. The empiricists, on the other hand, rejected the 
existence of innate ideas entirely. 
Like Hobbes, they believed that all knowledge is ultimately 
traceable to experience in the form of sense impressions. Unlike 
Hobbes, they were not necessarily wedded to materialism: 
Although Hobbes might be said to be the father of British 
associationism, Locke (1690) is usually credited with being its 
founder. Like Hobbes, Locke was an opponent of the traditional 
rationalism, but he was not a materialist. On the assumption that 
the innate mind is a tabula rasa (cleared slate) and that all 
knowledge is attributable to experience, Locke sought to understand 
the contents of the adult mind in terms of the gradual building up 
of ideas from experience. (Bolles 1967, 30) 
Locke acknowledged two sources for our experiential ideas, 
sensation and reflection, the latter being a sort of internal 
perception that is conscious of "the functions performed in connection 
with th[e] content" provided by external perception (Windelband 1958, 
451). These "functions" include the thought processes by which the 
simple ideas of sensation are built up into complex ideas through their 
association with other ideas in our memory. Out of these simple ideas 
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and thoughtful operations, Locke tries to reconstruct our entire inner 
life. 
Locke's common sense approach to the philosophical problems of 
perception and truth, combined with his influential writings on 
political theory, gave a great popular impetus to the associationist 
school of philosophical psychology. His tendency to ignore deeper 
problems and inherent inconsistencies left the field wide open for 
others to make their mark. 
The debates that Locke set off over "primary" and "secondary" 
qualities -- those that inhere in the object (like shape) vs. those 
that inhere in our perceptions of them (like color) -- led first to the 
idealism of Berkeley and then to the skepticism of Hume. Little if any 
progress was made toward understanding the higher activities of mind 
(like morality and the basis for achieving behavior) until John Stuart 
Mill brought the associationalist psychology together with 
utilitarianism. 
Mill was in many ways a radical empiricist and a forerunner of 20th 
century logical positivism. He argued in his System of Logic that even 
mathematical truths and logical syllogisms were ultimately rooted in 
experience (Lerner 1961, xix). His analyses and defenses of the 
principles of induction were critical to the development of the modern 
scientific method: 
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Contemporary science continues to rely on Mill's "methods," and our 
own easy commitment to the hypotheticodeductive method can be 
attributed to the immediate hold the System of Logic took on the 
scientific mind. Not many scientists in the late nineteenth 
century read Galileo; all of them read Mill (Robinson 1986, 327) 
Mill clarified the associationist position by distinguishing 
between various "laws of mind," including: a law stipulating that every 
sense impression corresponds to an idea; a law of connection between 
two successive or simultaneous stimuli such that, given sufficient 
repetition, one cannot think of one without thinking of the other; and 
finally, a law that assures that a single intense stimulus will have 
the same sort of effect on the mind as a repeated, weaker stimulus 
(Ibid., 328). Through laws such as these and the regularities to be 
discovered through experiment and observation, Mill believed that a 
science of psychology was possible, though it would never have the 
predictive value of the physical sciences since humans tend to operate 
in non-reproducible contexts: 
[T]he law of associations does not predict or even attempt to 
predict the exact result of an experiment. Rather, it refers to 
the tendency of something to occur, other things being equal. That 
other things are never equal in the affairs of man is only to say 
that our exact laws will not be testable, not that they are not 
laws. Mill gave (invented) the name ethology to cover this science 
which is deduced from the empirical laws of psychology. As 
conceived by hiim, ethology was to be the science of character or 
that discipline concerned with the effects of environmental 
conditions on the laws of thought, feeling, and conduct. [Ibid., 
329) 
Mill himself never managed to develop his ethological science and 
what has come to be known as ethology today concerns animal rather than 
human behavior. Mill did, however, modify and develop the egoistic 
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ethic that, in some version or other, had accompanied associational 
psychology since Hobbes to where it made a passable contribution to our 
understanding of virtuous behavior. 
Mill's utilitarian ethic is connected to Hobbes' egoism through its 
emphasis on pleasure. The utilitarians, however, situated the pleasure 
principle on an ethical foundation by advocating "the greatest good for 
the greatest number." There were many objections to this ethical 
system, ranging from the role of motives (Mill replied: "the motive has 
nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the 
worth of the agent") to the role of religion as a necessary basis for 
morality (he denied it was) (Mill, Utilitarianism, in Lerner 1961, 
205). One of the most persistent and forceful objections concerned 
utilitarians' apparent disregard for "higher ends": 
Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds . . . inveterate 
dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher 
end than pleasure --no better and nobler object of desire and 
pursuit -- they designate as utterly mean and grovelling; as a 
doctrine worthy only of swine . . . [Ibid., 195) 
Mill rebuffed this charge by reintroducing the Greek notion of 
"higher" and "lower" pleasures as well as the Greek standard by which 
they should be judged: by those who know both and who are judicious: 
Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal 
appetites, and, when once being made conscious of them, do not 
regard anything as happiness which does not include their 
gratification. . . . [Ibid., 195) 
It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are 
low, has the greatest chance of having them satisfied; and a highly 
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endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can 
look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. But he can 
learn to bear its imperfec-tions, if they are at all bearable; 
. . . It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig 
satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool 
satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different 
opinion, it is because they know only their own side of the 
question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides. 
[Ibid., 197) 
Mill's utilitarian explanation for the attraction of intellectual 
and artistic pursuits and for the tolerance of the inevitable 
dissatisfactions generated by those pursuits, is an eloquent version of 
the explanation in terms of reasons that we examined back in the 
beginning of this work. It is useful to recall it here because its 
limitations are, at this point, so clearly visible. While it bears 
resemblances to the Greek explanation in that it distinguishes 
different grades of pleasure and is teleological, it suffers by 
comparison. 
Plato and Aristotle set forth a tripartite view of the soul, for 
instance, each part with its own proper role and distinctive pleasures; 
Mill's psyche has only higher and lower pleasures with no inherent 
hierarchical principle. And the Greek view gains explanatory weight as 
it ties into political, epistemological and even cosmological 
theories. Mill's utilitarianism supports his 1iberal-to-socialist 
political philosophy, but the mesh between the principle of utility and 
his methodological empiricism is anything but tight. Utilitarianism 
was intended to be a scientific morality, inasmuch as the consequences 
of our actions are observable; but without his unrealized science of 
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ethology or a better developed psychology to back it up, the process of 
inculcating an ethical disposition in the young or getting them to 
choose the higher pleasures had to remain a matter of exhortation. The 
impetus of modern science toward prediction and control were not 
satisfiable by Mill's associational psychology. 
Mill, who had written most of his major works by 1861, was indeed 
the last serious defender of an associational psychology of 
consciousness. Though he advocated an empirical psychology, he 
understood that to mean the discovery of regularities between conduct, 
thought, and feeling -- the latter two being determined by 
introspection of the contents of our conscious mind. By the 1870's, 
however, psychology was coming into its own as a science and the 
philosophical introspection of Locke and Hume was already giving way to 
a more experimental version. In Germany, Wilhelm Wundt had developed 
Fechner's psychophysics into an experimental introspectionism to serve 
as the basis for a physiological psychology. Wundt rejected the 
empirical psychology of Mill and others as simply a "physiological 
interpretation" of 18th century associative process, which it was 
(Robinson 1986, 344). 
The distance between Mill and Wundt, however, was not nearly so 
great as that which was opening up between the introspectionists and 
the reductionists. Introspection, no matter what the approach, 
inevitably assumed the existence of a mind with distinctly conscious 
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mental furnishings available for examination there. The reductionists, 
no matter what their approach, rejected mind as an object of study. 
The rift between the two camps could not have been deeper, and 
divisions within each camp seemed shallow by comparison. Though Wundt 
rejected Mill's empirical psychology, he was still enough of a 
mentalist to argue that mind, whose workings are based always in 
physiology, could not in principle be reduced to physiology: 
If we could see every wheel in the physical mechanism whose working 
the mental processes are accompanying, we should still find no more 
than a chain of movements showing no trace whatsoever of their 
significance for mind . . . (A)11 that is valuable in our mental 
life still falls to the psychical side. (Wundt, Lectures on Human 
and Animal Psychology 446, in Robinson 1986, 371) 
The reductionist position on psychology was initially posed in 1748 
in a book entitled L'Homme Machine by de La Mettrie. He caused a minor 
furor by arguing that the faculties of mind could be reduced to the 
physiology of the brain. But La Mettrie was a minor figure, a scandal 
and little more. He was before his time. The tradition of French 
Enlightenment skepticism and naturalism took another hundred years to 
spawn a major philosophical and scientific figure capable of defending 
the reductionist position, and it arrived in the person of Auguste 
Comte. Comte coined the term "positivism" to indicate the modern 
ascendancy of science, with its positive contributions to knowledge, 
over and against superstition and metaphysics. "Negative" philosophy 
was another name for the critical, anti-metaphysical philosophy of 
Kant; the "positive" philosophy of Comte was to be the necessary next 
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stage in cultural evolution. The mentalistic psychologies of the 
metaphysical philosophers were henceforth to be abandoned: 
Agreeing with Kant that the mind itself is not directly observable 
and recognizing that much of what presented itself as "psychology" 
was no more than philosophers attempting to discover the laws of 
the mind introspectively, Comte dismissed psychology as "an idle 
fancy, and a dream, when it is not an absurdity." (Robinson 1986, 
332-3) 
That is not to say that Comte just threw up his hands at the 
possibility of understanding anything psychological. His strategy was 
rather to reduce or substitute for mental life matters more reliably 
available to scientific observation. He saw great potential in 
phrenology, and promoted the "direct observation of the products of 
mental life," which to him meant sociology, a science which he is 
generally credited with founding. He also advocated a comparative 
biological approach: 
Of course, had the philosophical psychologists not attempted the 
impossible and conceited task of looking into their own minds and 
had, instead, appreciated the importance of feeling and emotion, 
they would have looked throughout the animal kingdom and discovered 
bona fide psychological principles. Convinced, however, that only 
man was rational and intelligent, they ignored this most promising 
terrain. (Ibid., 333) 
It is interesting to note the variety of ways in which Comte was 
urging the reduction of mentalistic psychology to something more 
"scientific." In each case, the goal was the same: to replace the 
common terms of our mental life -- reason, memory, intention, and will, 
to name but a few -- with more readily observable phenomena. 
Phrenology was a forerunner of neurophysiology and the attempt to 
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reduce mind to brain; the emphasis on studying the "products of mental 
life" as opposed to its processes is not very different from the 
behaviorist program; and the idea of focusing research on emotional 
expression across various species suggests an early version of 
sociobiology. 
In fact, the latter approach was soon picked up and advanced by 
Darwin himself. Darwin's most extensive psychological work, The 
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, "may be said to have 
launched comparative psychology" (Ibid., 335): 
. . . Darwin examines the facial musculature of many species, Homo 
sapiens included, and notes not only the anatomical similarities 
(already well established) but the similarities in facial 
expression produced by conditions giving rise to similar emotions. 
The angry dog and the actor feigning anger both retract their lips 
back over their teeth, bare their teeth, and clench them. Signs of 
submission, of sexual attraction, and of melancholy are of a 
similar nature throughout phylogeny wherever we find the anatomical 
equipment necessary for the expression of affect. . . . Not only 
is the present [human] species the survivor of a long process of 
natural selection, but in the behavior and emotions of this 
species, we will discover elaborated forms of those behaviors and 
feelings that characterize simpler types. (Ibid., 356) 
Comparative psychology had a tendency to anthropomorphize its 
findings on other species, attributing human subtleties of emotion to 
species not clearly capable of them -- a tendency, it was said, to 
confuse "analogies with identities" (J6/cf., 374). But the idea that 
behavior evolves and could be explained would prove powerful. 
Sociobiologists a century later would be going well beyond analogies. 
In extending psychological investigation to species for whom 
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introspection and interview approaches were impossible, comparative 
psychology also laid the foundations for a more behaviorally oriented, 
experimental approach to the science of psychology -- a learning theory 
made to order for the theory of natural selection. 
Despite the influence of Comte, the turn away from mental ism 
towards some form of reductionism, whether to neural processes or 
observable behaviors, was far more pronounced in the English speaking 
scientific community than in its counterparts in France or Germany. 
Phrenology was the rage everywhere in the middle of the 19th century, 
but reductivism was only one of many psychological approaches 
developing on the Continent, where the rationalist and idealist 
traditions had always been stronger. The end of the century brought 
Freud's psychoanalytic school, most notably; but also the phenomenology 
of Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl, a "descriptive psychology" with 
roots firmly set in both the idealists' notion of freedom and the 
experimental introspectionism of Wundt. Instead of rejecting the 
contents of the mind in favor of something more elementary, Husserl and 
the phenomenologists set about trying to describe and define in precise 
terms just what those contents were. 
Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre were later to combine 
phenomenology with Nietzsche's and Kierkegaard's ethic of individual 
authenticity into an existentialist philosophy which remained connected 
to the rationalist, metaphysical tradition even while rejecting 
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metaphysics and emphasizing the role of irrationality. The 
existentialist emphasis on freedom and on choosing one's self, however, 
made it an unlikely source for explanations of the role of character in 
determining lifelong orientations. The famous existentialist dictum 
"existence precedes essence" suggests that appeals to the power of 
character in determining our choices are a matter of bad faith -- an 
abdication of one's fundamental freedom. This places the 
existentialist position squarely outside the realm of social science, 
so we needn't consider it further here. 
It is hard to understand, however, in light of this very different 
development from the techniques of experimental introspectionism on the 
Continent, how Anglo-American psychology fastened so resolutely onto an 
anti-mentalistic, reductionist course; but it did. Daniel Robinson, in 
his Intellectual History of Psychology, points out that in the first 
two decades of this century, "the most influential figures in American 
psychology were William James and E.B. Titchener," both of whom 
espoused an experimental analysis of consciousness. Their influence 
proved short-lived: 
Now, it is unmistakable to anyone surveying the contemporary 
psychological scene that there is hardly a vestige of the program 
envisaged by Titchener and James. The "rules of introspection" 
presented by the former are ap-plied in no laboratory, appear in no 
advanced treatment of the discipline, form no part of the modern 
psychologist's training. The same may be said of James' division 
of the discipline into Sensation, Cerebration, and the Tendency to 
Action. (Robinson 1986, 398) 
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What happened is a matter for speculation, and the answers are far 
from clear. Certainly, the ascendance of reductionist approaches was 
not the result of their unqualified success or popular acceptance. 
Even today, reductive explanations of the higher mental functions are 
typically unconvincing and psychology as an experimental science is not 
held in very high esteem. Nor were there compelling scientific reasons 
-- then or now -- for rejecting the mind as an object of study. There 
were certainly problems in getting subjects to "introspect" identically 
on separate occasions; but as Robinson points out, "the historical 
development was just that: historical and not scientific": 
No logical proof had been discovered by which it could be shown 
that a rationalistic psychology would fail. No experimental 
finding had made it clear that we lack a moral sense or a link with 
God or a love of beauty. No surgical procedure had established 
that the psychological dimensions of human life were readily 
reducible to neural mechanisms. . . . Rather, what had taken place 
was the adoption of a metaphysical position not on the nature of 
truth but on the nature of psychology. The decision was made that 
psychology was no more than a certain kind of method, an 
"experimental" method, and its subject matter would contain only 
those entries amenable to this method. [Ibid., 402-3) 
Whatever the reasons for adoption of the anti-mentalist orthodoxy, 
it is the reigning paradigm in psychology today and the last stop in 
our survey of thinking about character and the commitment to 
achievement. 
The two principal threads of modern, scientific psychology both 
reflect the spirit of positivism initiated by Comte. The first, which 
begins with the stipulation of a mind-brain identity, rejects all talk 
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of mind by professing faith in the eventual reducibility of all 
mentalistic descriptions into neurophysiological terms. The second 
thread, which has often intertwined the first, is the behavioristic 
redescription of mental phenomena in terms of observable behavior and 
environmental contingencies. Both the brain and behavior are, in 
principle at least, publically observable and measurable. Both can be 
assumed to develop through deterministic causal sequences that fit 
comfortably within the paradigms of physical science, thus eliminating 
the need for dualistic language in description and explanation. Both 
promise the possibility of prediction and control of behavior. 
The mind-brain identity theory, "reductionism" in the strict sense, 
has led to great strides in understanding brain functioning but it has 
not done much at all to advance our understanding of character. 
Neuroscientists have found distinctive profiles in the brains of 
schizophrenics, but such dysfunctions clearly operate on a different 
level than character formation. The possibility of developing 
neurological profiles of highly aggressive, potentially criminal brains 
has also been recently advanced (though not for the first time -- the 
19th century phrenologists similarly claimed to have found the lobe 
where criminal propensities were localized). Awash in controversy as 
this latter suggestion has been, the connection of aggression to 
hormones at least makes neurophysiological profiling of this sort 
plausible. The possibility of identifying profiles for personality 
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characteristics acquired by learning, however, is considerably more 
problemmatic. 
While the jury is still out on the potential of the neurosciences 
to manage anything approaching a truly useful reduction of mental life 
to biochemical terms, other investigators have been busily at work 
turning translating mental phenomena into behavioral descriptions of 
the sort that biochemistry might plausibly explain. The most famous 
name in this regard is Ivan Pavlov, whose experiments with salivating 
dogs, meat, and buzzers around the turn of the century have become the 
standard introduction to psychology for millions of high school 
children. It is interesting that, as famous as Pavlov's concept of 
the conditioned reflex has become, it has never played a major role in 
behavioral psychology outside Russia (Robinson 1986, 420): 
The point, of course, is that it was not his studies of the 
conditioned reflex that made Pavlov a figure to be contended with; 
it was the theory advanced on the basis of these studies. ... In 
the broadest terms, the Pavlovian theory requires that all so- 
called psychic functions are reducible to reflex mechanisms within 
the brain. By the frequent association of a neutral stimulus with 
one having unconditional biological significance, the former comes 
to have the power of eliciting responses originally produced by the 
latter only. Stimuli thus associated are now conditional (or 
conditioned) stimuli. (Ibid., 422) 
While conditioned reflexes hadn't been isolated and analyzed to 
this degree previously, the concept certainly wasn't difficult for 
anyone who had ever engaged in casual introspection of their salivary 
processes in the moments leading to dinner. What was new were the 
controlled experimental approach and the careful scientific 
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measurements that Pavlov brought to this study, and the addition of 
several new "principles" to the associationists' list -- for there was 
little question but that Pavlov was still operating within the general 
causal framework first advanced by the associational psychology: 
If [conditioned stimuli] are presented repeatedly without the 
application of the unconditioned stimulus, they will lose their 
power of elicitation; that is, extinction will occur. Not only 
does the specific, conditioned stimulus acquire the power of the 
unconditioned stimulus, but those stimuli physically similar to the 
conditioned stimulus acquire this power by generalization. [Ibid., 
420) 
There were other principles to Pavlov's psychology, such as 
radiation and excitation, but extinction and generalization proved to 
have the most staying power. Along with the more fundamental concepts 
of conditioning and reinforcement, these provided much of the basis for 
later behaviorism. 
The criticism of Pavlov's approach came first and foremost from 
adherents of what came to be known as Gestalt psychology. These 
researchers demonstrated in varied and clever ways that things weren't 
as straightforward as Pavlov indicated. It was shown through a variety 
of experiments, for instance, that damage to the neural pathways that 
presumably carried a conditioned reflex had little or no affect on the 
anticipated response, which led some to propose that the brain 
functions as a whole (equipotentiality) and must be understood as such 
[Ibid., 422). The gestalt psychologists did not deny the existence of 
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conditioned reflexes, but they questioned both Pavlov's neural 
explanation for them and the prominence assigned them in his system: 
It is one thing to assert that the conditioned reflex comes about 
by virtue of the formation of reflex associations among cortical 
neurons but quite another to suggest that the brain is capable of 
only such connections . . . Reflex organization within the brain is 
but one of the many forms of organization available to so complex a 
system. [Ibid., 416-7) 
Ultimately, however, Pavlov's conditioned reflexes were simply 
superceded by behaviorism, the approach to empirical psychology first 
laid out by John Watson in the years leading up to World War I. In his 
first published article in 1913 Watson laid out the behavioristic 
thesis in unmistakable terms: 
Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely experimental 
branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction 
and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of 
its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon 
the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in 
terms of consciousness. The behavior-ist, in his efforts to get a 
unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing line 
between man and brute. The behavior of man, with all its 
refinement and complexity, forms only a part of the behaviorist's 
total scheme of investigation. (Watson "Psychology as the 
Behaviorist Views It" 1913, in Robinson 1986, 405-6) 
Watson accepted Pavlov's conditioned reflexes as the "unit" of 
behavior and agreed that "all the more complex forms of behavior were 
compounded of these units" [Ibid., 410). What set behaviorism apart 
from Pavlov's physiological psychology were two essential differences 
in approach. First, Watson proposed to explain psychological phenomena 
primarily through behavioral redescriptions rather than through 
physiological reduction. While he expected physiology to one day 
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provide the ultimate explanations of behavior, he believed a behavioral 
psychology was required to purge the field of fallacious mentalistic 
concepts and provide a workable basis for physiological reduction. His 
worthy successor as spokesman for behaviorism, B.F. Skinner, went 
further and argued forcefully for the independence of a science of 
behavior which provides us relatively unintrusive means for the control 
of behavior along with a scientific framework for understanding 
"feelings and introspectively observed states" (Skinner 1974, 235-6). 
Behaviorism and physiological psychology are thus complementary: "What 
[the physiologist] discovers cannot invalidate the laws of a science of 
behavior, but it will make the picture of human action more nearly 
complete" (Ibid., 236). 
The second critical difference between Watson's and Pavlov's 
approach stems from a difference in their protocols for experimentally 
conditioning behavior. The behaviorists replaced Pavlovian 
conditioning with what they called "operant conditioning." Operant 
conditioning drew on the work of E.L. Thorndike, who set up primitive 
versions of the laboratory maze for cats to solve and reach the food 
outside: 
[Thorndike] generated a series of "learning curves" which showed 
systematic improvement with increased practice. On the basis of 
these and related findings, Thorndike presented his famous law of 
effect according to which behavior is determined by its 
consequences. (Robinson 1986, 408) 
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Pavlovian conditioning, as Bateson pointed out, represented a 
fatalistic world in which the behavior of the experimental animal could 
have no affect on the delivery of rewards: the buzzer sounds and, after 
a lapse of time, regardless of what the animal does or doesn't do, the 
food follows. Operant conditioning, on the other hand, delivers a 
reinforcing reward (or a negatively reinforcing punishment) contingent 
upon the animal's display of a particular item of behavior. 
Thorndike's law of effect came as no surprise to anyone who ever 
raised children or trained a dog, but it nonetheless managed to shift 
the utilitarian tenets of associational psychology onto a firmer 
experimental (non-mentalist) footing. The effect was to replace 
teleological reasons with more efficient, more scientifically 
acceptable causes: 
Salivation is elicited by certain chemical stimuli on the tongue 
. . . because the effect has contributed to the survival of the 
species. A person may report that a substance tastes good, but it 
does not elicit salivation because it tastes good. Similarly, we 
pull our hand away from a hot object, but not because the object 
feels painful. The behavior occurs because appropriate mechanisms 
have been selected in the course of evolution. The feelings are 
merely collateral products of the conditions responsible for the 
behavior. (Skinner 1974, 52) 
While it seems counter-intuitive to say that we don't pull our hand 
from the fire because it hurts, Skinner is certainly correct in this 
regard: the pull- back reaction typically begins even before the fact 
of pain is noted and a course of appropriate action can be decided 
upon. Jerking one's hand back is not the result of a goal oriented 
246 
reasoning process, but of an unconditioned reflex developed through the 
contingencies of survival over the course of evolution. And there is 
no reason to think that a conditioned reflex operates any differently: 
the dog doesn't salivate at the sound of the bell in order to obtain 
food, but because the sound of the bell has become associated with 
food, the stimulus which sets off the salivation response. Operant 
conditioning might be a bit more complex, but the causal structure is 
essentially the same: the sight of a maze, which has also become 
associated with food, triggers the exploration response which has been 
rewarded previously. No reasons, just stimuli. 
Skinner's references to "selection" and the "survival of the 
species" reflect an essential element in the explanatory strategy of 
behaviorism. While physiological psychologists, like Pavlov, place the 
explanatory emphasis for our aversive response to fire upon the 
identification (and ideally, the localization) of the reflex arc 
underlying it, behaviorists like Skinner take the question another step 
back, to seek an explanation for the reflex. Skinner faults Pavlov -- 
and Watson, too -- for an over-reliance on the push-pull causality of a 
mechanistic world view. His argument against over-reliance on the 
reflex arc parallels Bateson's argument against "dormitive hypotheses": 
At the moment, a reflex has only a descriptive force; it is not an 
explanation. To say that a baby breathes or suckles because it 
possesses appropriate reflexes is simply to say that it breathes or 
suckles, presumably because it has evolved in such a way that it 
does so. (Ibid., 38) 
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Until such time as the neurophysiologists can actually trace the 
electro-chemical processes by which such reflexive behaviors transpire, 
Skinner suggests that we focus on "the process of selection which made 
them part of a genetic endowment" {Ibid., 41). He notes that in 
identifying the role of selection, Darwin discovered "a kind of 
causality very different from the push-pull mechanism of science up to 
that time" {Ibid.). And Skinner argues that this kind of causality can 
be used to explain all behavior: 
Just as we point to contingencies of survival to explain an 
unconditioned reflex, so we can point to "contingencies of 
reinforcement" to explain a conditioned reflex . . . 
Thus, when a hungry organism exhibits behavior that produces food, 
the behavior is reinforced by that consequence and is therefore 
more likely to recur. Behavior that reduces a potentially damaging 
condition, such as an extreme in temperature, is reinforced by that 
consequence and therefore tends to recur on similar occasions. . . 
There are certain remarkable similarities between contingencies of 
survival and contingencies of reinforcement. Both exemplify . . . 
a kind of causality which was discovered very late in the history 
of human thought. Both account for purpose by moving it after the 
fact, and both are relevant to the question of a creative design. 
{Ibid., 43-5) 
Skinner's sense of the analogies between evolution and learning 
parallels Bateson's view to a surprising degree. Bateson also views 
both learning and evolution as stochastic processes, that is, as 
sequences of events combining a random component with a selective 
process "so that only certain outcomes of the random are allowed to 
endure" (Bateson 1979, 230): 
In basic theory, creative thought has come to resemble the 
evolutionary process in its fundamentally stochastic nature. 
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Reinforcement is seen as giving direction to the accumulation of 
random changes of the neural system, just as natural selection is 
seen as giving direction to the accumulation of random changes of 
variation. (Bateson 1972, 255) 
But where Skinner uses this analogy to argue that mind is no more 
necessary for explaining behavior than Mind is for explaining 
evolution, Bateson draws just the opposite conclusion -- that both 
thought and evolution are essentially mental processes, at least 
according to his criteria, as laid out previously in our discussion of 
Descartes (Bateson 1979, 149). 
Bateson's basic approach to psychology clearly comes out of the 
same empirical tradition as behaviorism. His rejection of "factitious 
inner tendenc[ies], principle^], instinct[s], or whatnot" as 
"dormitive explanations" -- as reified descriptions of behavioral 
processes pretending to be their causes -- is a basic tenet in 
Skinner's attack on mentalism. His belief in the essential continuity 
between mammalian and human psyches; his interest in the questions that 
Freud asked rather than the convoluted answers he gave; and, 
especially, his non-teleological understanding of purpose, all reflect 
Bateson's roots -- and Skinner's -- roots in the empirical, anti¬ 
idealist tradition of Anglo-American psychology. 
Nonetheless, Bateson never considered himself a behaviorist. 
Recalling his days as a psychological researcher at the Porter-Langley 
Clinic, Bateson observes that back in the 1950's "the categorical 
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bankruptcy of behaviorism was then a matter of taste or smell rather 
than cogent argument": 
The behaviorists were even more obviously power hungry than the 
curers [psychiatrists]. One of them put the matter clearly: I had 
asked him why he, an organism whose actions were supposedly to be 
explained by the invocation of causes, was performing learning 
experiments on fishes. He said "Because I want to control a 
goldfish. (Bateson 1991, 188) 
Taste is a greatly underrated criterion in scientific judgement, 
and in this case Bateson found sour the most prized fruit of the 
behaviorist enterprise. Recall that in his announcement of behaviorism 
in 1913, Watson stated that "Its theoretical goal is the prediction and 
control of behavior." If Bateson's resistance to this goal was a 
matter of taste, it was a taste sharpened by the experience of the 
second world war: 
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that this war is ideologically 
about just this -- the role of the social sciences. Are we to 
reserve the techniques and the right to manipulate people as the 
privilege of a few planning, goal-oriented, and power-hungry 
individuals, to whom the instrumentality of science makes a natural 
appeal? Now that we have the techniques, are we, in cold blood, 
going to treat people as things? (Bateson 1972, 162) 
Skinner, whose 1971 bestseller Beyond Freedom and Dignity presented 
a sustained attack on the notion of autonomous man, would have rejected 
the unflattering characterization of his efforts while answering in the 
affirmative. Bateson suggests that such "excesses of 'behaviorism' can 
only be corrected by empathy" (Bateson 1993, 76). His distaste for 
this emphasis on control was so deep that he castigated his friend 
Norbert Wiener for importing it into cybernetics: 
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[N]ote that the word "cybernetics" has become seriously corrupted 
since it was put into circulation by Norbert Wiener. And Wiener 
himself is partly to blame for this corruption of the conception in 
that he associated "cybernetics" with "control." I prefer to use 
the term "cybernetic" to describe complete circuiting systems. 
(Ibid., 202) 
More cogent arguments against behaviorism, however, soon became 
available to backup his taste. His own work on learning theory, for 
instance, was leading him steadily in directions opposed to the 
associational psychology on which behaviorism was based. As early as 
his work on Naven, he had observed certain uniformities in cultures 
that were difficult to explain on associational grounds: 
If we take the data from a given culture and sort them by subject 
matter, putting all the data which refer to sex in one heap, the 
data referring to initiation in another, the data referring to 
death in another, and so on, we get a very remarkable result. We 
find that similar types of order are recognizable in every heap. 
We find that, whether we are looking at the sex data, or the 
initiation data, or the death data, the system of classification of 
perceived objects and events (the eidos of the culture) is still 
the same. Similarly, if we analyze the heaps of data to obtain the 
system of linked responses and values (the ethos) of the culture, 
we find that the ethos is the same in each heap. Briefly, it is as 
if the same sort of person had devised the data in all the heaps. 
(Ibid., 46) 
These uniformities differ from culture to culture, so they cannot 
be due to innate human characteristics. But if they are learned, how 
can the associational learning theory of behaviorism account for such 
patterns? Bateson doubts it can: 
It would, I believe, be impossible to deduce these results, the 
uniformities within one culture and the contrast between cultures, 
from the simple associational learning theory from which we 
started. (Ibid., 47) 
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The generalization principle proposed in the associational learning 
theory only covers "physically similar" stimuli, which might be 
stretched to cover symbolic similarity as in the phallic symbolism of 
an initiation rite; but that explanation seems increasingly inadequate 
as it is applied across various different contexts in which the 
patterns of classification, values, and responses remain congruent. 
Bateson had his own hypothesis: 
[T]hese ethological and eidological uniformities within the single 
culture, and the corresponding contrasts between cultures, are 
precisely what we would expect if, in addition to the processes 
postulating simple learning, there is a carryover from learning in 
one context which will influence later behavior in quite different 
contexts. (Ibid.) 
The flaw in behaviorism, this suggests, is its inability to account 
for contextual learning. And since character formation, for Bateson, 
is precisly a matter of contextual learning, that is a flaw we must 
consider seriously here. 
Bateson hoped that Gestalt psychology would one day provide the 
empirical foundations for an alternative to the associational learning 
theory, one that recognized the essential role played by the perception 
of patterns and the identification of contexts in learning. It was 
noted earlier that Bateson accepted Kant's basic premise, that the mind 
imposes order upon our experience as it is mapped and transformed 
through the processes of perception, understanding, etc.. The 
Gestaltists also owe a debt to Kant: 
252 
The Gestaltists accepted the Kantian-Hegelian principle of the pure 
categories of the understanding; brought them to bear on studies of 
visual perception; and thereby provided a laboratory demonstration 
of the role of the mind in organizing and transforming the raw 
facts of experience. (Robinson 1986, 414) 
The Gestaltists were successful in demonstrating the tendency of 
our perceptual processes to seek out and recognize patterns and wholes 
not physically present within the data of experience. And though 
Bateson does not cite him, he may also have been aware of E.C. Tolman's 
work on the cognitive aspects of learning, summarized in his book, 
Cognitive Maps in Rats and Man (1948): 
Tolman distinguishes between performance, which is under the 
control of rewards and punishments and learning, which occurs 
whenever a complex organism has perceptual commerce with the 
immediate environment. Rats permitted to run freely in a maze come 
to solve the maze more quickly on subsequent occasions when food- 
reward is introduced than do animals without the original 
"irrelevant" experience. This so-called latent learning is assumed 
to violate the law of effect which requires reinforcement if 
learning is to occur. (Ibid., 416) 
I assume that Skinner would reply to this argument by observing 
that the absence of an experimenter's reward does not preclude the 
rat's finding low-level reinforcement from simply finding its way out 
of a confining situation. And Bateson does not challenge the law of 
effect so much as the laws of association. Tolman challenged these as 
well: 
[A]n animal receiving reward by responding to, say, a circle five 
inches in diameter and not rewarded for responses to one that is 
two and a half inches will subsequently choose one of ten inches 
over one of five inches. That is, after originally learning the 
choice of "5" vs. "2 1/2," the animal, given the new choices "10" 
vs. "5," does not choose the "5" (with which all previous rewards 
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were associated) but, instead, chooses the larger. This, according 
to the Gestaltist, requires us to assume that what was originally 
learned was a relationship and not merely a physical value. This 
is taken as an instance of transposition in which the relational 
properties are abstracted from the stimulus elements. {Ibid.) 
This supports very nicely Bateson's own less empirical, more 
theoretical argument against the associationism underlying the 
behaviorist position outlined above. Again, it's not clear whether he 
was aware of Tolman's work. Bateson himself, however, raises another 
question which he thinks "bridges the gap between the experimental work 
on simple learning and the approach of the Gestalt psychologists": 
This is not the simple type of question which is posed in most 
psycho-logical laboratories, "Under what circumstances will a dog 
learn to salivate to a bell?" ... We are asking, "How does the 
dog acquire a habit of punctuating or apperceiving the infinitely 
complex stream of events (including his own behavior) so that this 
stream appears to be made up of one type of short sequence rather 
than another?" 
Bateson tries to build the bridge by choosing as his example of a 
stream of events "any three events in a human interchange," choosing 
the number three to provide a triad analyzable in terms of stimulus- 
response-reinforcement: 
It is instructive to attempt analysis of an ongoing interchange 
between A and B. We ask about any particular item of A's behavior: 
Is this item a stimulus for B? Or is it a response of A to 
something B said earlier? Or is it a reinforcement of some item 
provided by B? Or is A, in this item, consummating a reinforcement 
for himself? Etc. 
Such questions will reveal at once that for many items of A's 
behavior the answer is often quite unclear. Or if there be a clear 
answer, the clarity is due only to a tacit (rarely fully explicit) 
agreement between A and B as to the nature of their mutual roles, 
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7.e., as to the nature of the contextual structure which they will 
expect of each other. (Bateson 1972, 298-9) 
In the laboratory situation, the scientist imposes the contextual 
structure by defining and controlling what will count as stimulus, 
response, and reinforce-ment. And the dog will learn to recognize that 
contextual structure so that in future situations it will itself 
attempt to impose that contextual structure onto the sequence of 
events. Thus, as noted earlier, the dog trained to await the rewards 
after a buzzer regardless of anything it does to bring them about, will 
perceive its own responses as ineffective and non-instrumental. It 
will not eagerly run through the maze or push its muzzle against 
buttons or engage in other trial and error patterns of response. It 
will develop an expectation of non-instrumental contexts even in what 
the scientist perceives as very different situations, and what seems 
like a form of canine fatalism will result. The dog that is rewarded 
for its efforts, on the other hand, will learn to expect and impose 
instrumental contexts, and this contextual learning will shorten its 
learning curves in what seem (to the associationalist, at least) like 
very different contexts. 
Though behaviorists recognize that behavior is embedded in circular 
causal sequences subject to feedback in the form of reinforcement, they 
are wedded to a model of efficient causality in which there is no place 
for hierarchy, for learning about and even altering parameters as well 
as the variables that fall within them. And so the formation of 
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character is explained by behaviorists in terms that are congruent with 
learning to run a maze: certain social behaviors are presumed to be 
reinforced by parents and peers, and so character is formed. Perhaps 
this accounts for how little in the way of specifics the behaviorists 
are able to provide on just how specific character types are formed. 
Skinner, indeed, is uncomfortable with the notion of character 
types or even character traits, since they suggest some inner, mental 
cause of behavior: 
Many supposed inner causes of behavior, such as attitudes, 
opinions, traits of character, and philosophies, remain almost 
entirely inferential. . . . Nevertheless, terms referring to 
traits of character are freely used in explaining behavior. A 
politician continues to run for office because of "ambition," makes 
shady deals because of "greed," opposes efforts to eliminate 
discrimination because of "moral callousness," holds the support of 
his followers because of his "leadership qualities," and so on, 
where no evidence of the inner causes is available except the 
behavior attributed to them (Skinner 1974, 175-6) 
Skinner does, however, propose a very interesting explanation of 
certain key traits of character, such as ambition, determination, 
dedication, and perseverance (which he defines as "continuing to 
respond over long periods of time without results" (Skinner 1974, 
66)). For Skinner, such traits constitute patterns of behavior and not 
the causes of them. Their causes, of course, lie in the contingencies 
of their reinforcement -- and in the case of these traits, a 
distinctive pattern of reinforcement. Traits like ambition, 
determination, and so on, which all seem closely allied, all work to 
support the achiever's pursuits of her goal despite frequent failures 
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or a lack of reinforcement. Skinner attributes such traits to the 
phenomenon of intermittent rather than constant reinforcement: 
Variable-ratio schedules, in which reinforcement occurs after a 
given average number of responses but in which the next response to 
be reinforced cannot be predicted, are particularly interesting. A 
favorable history in which the average is slowly enlarged is said 
to generate will power, together with large amounts of psychic 
energy, or libido. ... 
The same variable-ratio schedule affects those who explore, 
prospect, invent, conduct scientific research, and compose works of 
art, music, or literature . . . [Ibid., 66-7) 
In other words, a musical child who finds her growing skills 
regularly reinforced by praise from parents and peers will likely 
continue to practice --and even redouble her efforts -- in later years, 
as applause becomes more conditional on the quality of performance. 
Skinner notes that a similar pattern of variable reinforcement can make 
gambling a hard habit to break: "an early run of good luck which grows 
steadily worse may create a dedicated gamber" (Skinner 1971, 33). 
The problem with this account, according to Robinson, is that the 
laws underlying behavioral theory seem inadequate to explaining the 
effect: 
It has been found that behavior brought under the control of 
reinforcers that have been applied irregularly during the 
acquisition of a response is extremely resistant to extinction. 
The ability of random reinforcement to result in virtually 
unextinguishable responding is one of the more striking 
demonstrations in all of psychology. Yet there is no formulation 
of the law of effect that permits one to predict such an effect, 
nor is the effect logically deducible from the law that is asserted 
as covering it. 
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Bateson's explanation for this phenomenon, of course, is that what 
is being learned in the variable reinforcements of gambling and 
musicality is a context of interaction in which variability of outcome 
is expected and accounted for. By distinguishing between levels of 
learning, Bateson can explain why the unlucky gambler discards his 
"unlucky dice" instead of his dysfunctional habit, and why a poor 
performance will induce the musician to more practice instead of more 
easily rewarding pursuits. 
Apart from this problemmatic analysis of the sources of 
perseverance and dedication, Skinner is vague about the contingencies 
of reinforcement that might lead one to spend a lifetime in pursuit of 
achievement. As the dominant orientation within 20th century 
experimental psychology, however, it was bound to spawn some 
researchers who would grapple with the problem more directly. The most 
notable contribution from this tradition to the question of achieving 
behavior grew out of research begun in the late 1940's under the 
leadership of David McClelland. 
McClelland's work does not follow the strictly behaviorist 
principles laid down by Skinner, but it clearly falls within the 
experimental, anti-mentalistic, associationist tradition in Anglo- 
American psychology that the behaviorists helped lay out. McClelland 
considered his work a contribution to the field of motivation theory, 
thereby re-introducing a term which Skinner thought the science of 
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behavior could well do without; but the motivation theorists are very 
clear in their insistence that the term refers to nothing more than a 
theoretical construct. 
Theoretical constructs are of various types, depending on how they 
are arrived at and used in devising theory. They are not the names of 
observable phenomena but are rather the formal terms which are 
mathematically or in some other way systematically related so as to 
provide an explanation for some class of phenomena. "Momentum" is a 
theoretical construct of this sort, defined as the product of mass and 
velocity and employed in Newton's mathematical models for explaining 
mechanical phenomena. The validity of a theoretical construct is 
dependent not only on its coherence and utility within the theory but 
on how well "anchored" the theory as a whole is in empirical 
observation. The construct may thus be valid without having any 
observable empirical referent. McClelland does not claim that there 
are things in our minds or brains called "motivations" that we can 
surgically dissect or even introspectively inspect. He claims only 
that we need motivations to explain certain aspects of human behavior. 
Skinner explains the status of the motivational construct this way: 
A rat does not always respond to food placed before it, and a 
factor called its "hunger" is invoked by way of explanation. The 
rat is said to eat only when it is hungry. It is because eating is 
not inevitable that we are led to hypothesize an internal state to 
which we may assign the variability. Where there is no 
variability, no state is needed. Since the rat usually responds to 
a shock to its foot by flexing its leg, no "flexing drive" 
comparable to hunger is felt to be required. (Skinner 1938, 141) 
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Motivation theory, in some form or other, is as old as speculation 
on the nature of will. It is an attempt to find "an agency or factor 
or force that helps to explain behavior" (Bolles 1967, vii). 
Experimental psychologists, however, like modern physicists, have 
largely abandoned the notion of "cause" for the more neutral 
description of correlations by which the behavior to be explained is 
said to be "under the control" of, or a "function" of antecedent 
variables. The physical proximity and even temporal priority to the 
effect that is required of efficient causes is often irrelevant to the 
mathematical relationships revealed by correlation. 
In the context of experimental psychology, motivation plays the 
role of an "intervening variable" between the stimulus and the response 
it generates. The motivational construct -- whether in the form of a 
drive, an instinct, a need, or whatever -- is considered necessary by 
those in the field to resolve certain puzzles for the standard stimulus- 
response model. What is it, for instance, that makes a rat work harder 
for a food reward when he has been deprived of food for several days? 
How can the simple conditioning model explain the fact that when the 
initial response to a stimulus is blocked, the rat comes up with 
various other responses all geared toward securing that desired 
reinforcement? Motivation is a way of explaining this variability. 
McClelland's work on achievement motivation arose out his attempts 
to go beyond the sort of motives that are most easily provoked in lab 
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animals, like hunger, and to understand "the kind of motives which 
actually are important in the lives of human adults" (McClelland 1953, 
320): 
Psychology has been impoverished by the tacit assumption that the 
science of human behavior must be built on muscular responses which 
preferably will activate a machine -- all this despite the fact 
that man's obvious difference from other animals lies in his 
superior symbolic capacities. Thus if we can find and develop 
systematic objective ways of classifying and counting his symbolic 
behavior we will come much nearer getting a complete picture of 
man's nature. {Ibid., 323-4) 
His objective instrument for "classifying and counting symbolic 
behavior" was the Thematic Apperception Test developed by H.H. Morgan 
and H.A. Murray in 1935. The TAT calls for subjects to view a series 
of pictures and then to write short stories about them, the idea being 
that "a good place to look for the effects of motivation is in fantasy" 
{Ibid., 107). The content of the resulting stories or "thought 
samples" is then analyzed for imagery and phrasings that suggest 
various common motivations. It was shown, for instance, with respect 
to that old standby, hunger, that stories written after increasing 
periods of food deprivation revealed increasing references to food. 
The question for McClelland was whether there was some way of arousing 
a distinctly human achievement motive in the laboratory so that it 
could be similarly isolated, manipulated, and measured. 
His research team found that presenting the TAT to one group of 
male subjects as a measure of intelligence and leadership, while a 
control group was told it didn't measure anything important, led to a 
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marked increase in achievement imagery in the first group's stories. 
Inducing a similar result in women, however, required a presentation 
stressing social acceptance, and was not as conclusive; apparently, 
intelligence and leadership and achievement in the 40's and 50's were 
strongly associated with males alone. Achievement imagery included 
anything that might indicate "competition with standards of excel¬ 
lence," which was McClelland's operating definition of achievement. 
While this approach didn't quite parallel the measurement of the hunger 
drive since hunger presumably doesn't require any verbal cues at all, 
the results were different enough between the two groups to convince 
McClelland that they had tapped into a pre-existing motivational 
condition. He called this motivation or need to achieve "n-Ach." 
Once the technique was refined, they attempted to validate it by 
administering the instrument to scientists and other presumed high 
achievers. The results were judged to lend credence to their efforts, 
and so with TAT in hand they set about trying to relate high n-Ach 
scores to various behavioral consequences and possible antecedents. 
The search for antecedents, that is, for the origins of achievement 
orientation, were pursued through correlations with measures gained 
from a wide assortment of interview strategies and test measurements. 
McClelland began with a reasonable sounding hypothesis: 
[T]hose cultures or families which stress "competition with 
standards of excellence" or which insist that the child be able to 
perform certain tasks well by himself -- such cultures or families 
should produce children with high achievement motivation. 
(McClelland 1953, 275) 
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The problem with that hypothesis, Bateson would point out, is that 
the words "stress" and "insist" are opaque as to the actual inter¬ 
actions through which such expectations are communicated from parents 
to children. Anyone who has raised children knows that the connection 
between exhortations and results is tenuous. Fortunately, the data 
McClelland's team eventually gathered did give some idea of what 
specific sorts of activities on parents' part corresponded with high 
and low n-Ach scores. McClelland summarized their findings this way: 
The data we have to date strongly support the hypothesis that 
achievement motives develop in cultures and in families where there 
is an emphasis on the independent development of the individual. 
In contrast, low achievement motivation is associated with families 
in which the child is more dependent on his parents and subordinate 
in importance to them. In both types of home there may be plenty 
of love and affection, but in the homes of the "highs" the son is 
more apt to "talk back" without deep feelings of guilt and to go 
off on his own rather than submit to the standards imposed on him 
by his parents. (Ibid., 328-9) 
It should be noted that many different correlations were uncovered 
over the course of McClelland's research, and while many lent support 
to his hypothesis, many others had to be explained away or interpreted 
to fit. It was found, for instance, that high n-Ach college boys "tend 
to perceive their fathers as unfriendly and unhelpful" while high n-Ach 
high school boys reported the opposite (Ibid., 280). McClelland 
suggests that, for the college students, friendly and helpful fathers 
may be those who don't give their sons enough room to make decisions or 
try things on their own. For the high school students, on the other 
hand, who come from a broader, hence generally lower socio-economic 
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background, "a rating of 'unfriendly' ... may mean behavior which is 
objectively much more unfriendly than what the college student means by 
'unfriendly'" {Ibid., 282). Or, he adds, it may just indicate a 
difference in perception among college boys who are away from home for 
the first time "attempting to break loose from dependency on [their] 
parents," and who regard "any attempt to help [them] as an unfriendly, 
interfering act" {Ibid.). 
While these seem plausible enough as explanations for the anomaly, 
there are more anomalies and more explanations than one would like to 
see. There are positive correlations between high n-Ach boys and 
unsuccessful fathers, between high n-Ach boys and warmly supportive 
mothers, between high n-Ach boys and a preference for cool as opposed 
to hot colors, and on and on, all raising at least as many questions as 
they answer. And that is precisely the problem with the current 
empiricist emphasis on correlation rather than causality: correlations 
don't explain, they demand explanation. 
Noting that girls did not respond to the same achievement cues as 
boys and that sons of German and Italian families are thought to grow 
up in less individual-istic families though they seem no less motivated 
to achieve than sons in other cultures, McClelland suggests that it is 
"too simple to reason that a high achievement motive develops 
exclusively out of particular phenotypic parent behavior" {Ibid., 
329). And he sounds the call for more research. 
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All these qualifications aside, however, McClelland is convinced 
that the data on independence training as a whole supports the 
connection with n-Ach. And the arguments he makes and the data he 
provides, taken as a whole, are fairly convincing. It is hard to 
imagine someone with a lifelong commitment to achievement who is not 
independent minded, who has not learned to accept challenge, to take 
risks, and pursue mastery. The finding that those who are oriented 
towards achievement come from families where constraints are fewer and 
shorter lived and where expectations that the child will master things 
on his own are imposed earlier and over a broader array of 
circumstances is certainly interesting. While it isn't exactly counter¬ 
intuitive, neither is it obvious. 
McClelland's caution about the generalizability of these findings 
across gender and culture lines, however, is critical. Consider in 
this connection Bateson's study of the differences in national 
character that we examined earlier. The boastfulness that is (to the 
English, at least) so characteristic of the American male was explained 
there in terms of the tendency of American parents to encourage their 
child "to show off his independence" (Bateson 1972, 102). When an 
American boy learns to dress himself or tie his own shoes or ride a 
bike on his own, he is warmly applauded by his parents because they 
share his delight and because they want to encourage him to do more 
things on his own and thus become less dependent on them. This 
approach to what Bateson calls the "psychological weaning" of the young 
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is not shared by middle and upper class English families who accomplish 
that goal through nannies and boarding schools. Is this emphasis on 
exhibiting one's independence a peculiarly American mindset that has 
somehow worked its way into McClelland's analys is? 
The same question could, of course, be asked of Nietzsche's 
emphasis on power. Winston Churchill is reputed to have said of the 
Germans that they are always either "at your feet or at your throat," 
and Bateson confirms that in the childrearing practices of German 
parents "the father's dominance is much stronger" than in American 
families [Ibid.). Mightn't similarly extensive correlations on the n- 
Ach of German boys reflect this pattern of difference? 
To their credit, McClelland and others that followed him in the 
research on achievement motivation confronted these questions, pursuing 
various often ingenious cross-cultural and historical investigations of 
n-Ach and its numerous correlates. Interestingly, McClelland reports 
that the data on independence training of German boys is indeed very 
different from the American profile, in that "achievement training 
tends to come much later ... if at all" (McClelland 1961, 346). In 
fact, expectations placed on American (and, for that matter, Japanese) 
boys by age 8 are often not expected of their German counterparts until 
the age of 12 or 14. McClelland insists, nonetheless, that his 
hypothesis holds since "German mothers who expected achievement earlier 
(again at the same average age as the Japanese mothers) had sons with 
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high n Achievement" (Ibid., 347). Apparently, the age of 8 is a key 
since Brazilian mothers who typically demand that their children begin 
to do things on their own even earlier than American or Japanese 
mothers, typically produce low n-Ach boys; but those Brazilian mothers 
who delay those demands till later produce higher n-Ach sons. 
McClelland's later cross-cultural and historical research on 
achievement motivation is driven by another, more sweeping hypothesis 
which is of interest to us here. Finding data that seemed to confirm a 
high correlation between n-Ach and economic development in various 
cultures, McClelland set out to confirm and explain one of sociologist 
Max Weber's well known theories: 
Weber . . . described in convincing detail how the Protestant 
Reformation produced a new character type which infused a more 
vigorous spirit into the attitude of both workers and entrepreneurs 
and which ultimately resulted in the development of modern 
capitalism. If the Protestant Reformation repre-sented a shift 
toward self-reliance . . . [then it] might have led to earlier 
independence and mastery training, which led to greater n 
Achievement, which in turn led to the rise of modern capitalism. 
(Ibid., 47) 
In other words, independence and mastery training might provide the 
key intervening variables in Weber's theory. McClelland provides some 
plausible evidence to the effect that Protestant parents expect more 
independence and mastery at earlier ages than Catholic parents, and 
that predominantly Protestant countries have higher rates of economic 
development than Catholic countries. Again, there are many anomalies 
and explanations throughout his presentation, and I suspect there are 
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so many variables at work here that such studies can never be more than 
plausible. Still, it is a good indication of the potential scope of 
McClelland's approach that such broad historical and cross-cultural 
explanations can even be attempted. Even a problemmatic empirical base 
is appreciated after so many centuries of armchair introspection and 
speculation. 
Unfortunately, perhaps, the researchers on achievement motivation 
who have come after McClelland seem to lack his cross-cultural and 
historical interests as well as his synthesizing abilities. Subfields 
have emerged within the general area of achievement research around 
related psychological entities, including "test anxiety" (which more 
parsimonious theoreticians attempted to translate as "too much n-Ach 
will defeat itself" (Atkinson 1964; Hill 1982)); and "fear of success" 
(Horner 1968). Inadequacies in the theory with respect to achieving 
behavior in specific experimental situations have led other researchers 
into devising an ingenious array of qualifications to the original 
theory. 
Later studies, for instance, have questioned the optimal timing of 
independence and mastery demands, or whether the timing is even that 
important compared to reinforcing independent behavior or achieving, 
whenever it occurs. The type of reinforcement employed has also been 
the subject of study, with at least one study showing that test anxiety 
correlates positively with the amount of punishment in the home and 
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negatively with more positive reinforcement (Arkes and Garske 1982, 
274). 
Plowing through all this subsequent research reminds one of 
Bateson's frustration with the behavioral sciences a quarter of a 
century ago which, he said, relied on "heuristic" concepts "so loosely 
derived and so mutually irrelevant that they mix together to make a 
sort of conceptual fog which does much to delay the progress of 
science" (Bateson 1972, xviii). As concepts like "test anxiety" and 
"fear of success" are set forth as necessary supplements to the need 
for achievement, theoretical positions are preserved at the expense of 
comprehension: Do "anxiety" and "fear" denote different sorts of 
constructs? Is "fear of success" a motivational construct like a need 
or does it actually denote an identifiable emotion? How do anxieties, 
fears, needs, and so on interact? The inductive approach pursued 
through instruments like the TAT and the TAQ (the Test Anxiety 
Questionnaire), and all the others whose results their results are 
correlated with never quite seem to arrive at a coherent theoretical 
position. As Bateson points out: 
About fifty years of work in which thousands of clever men have had 
their share have, in fact, produced a rich crop of several hundred 
heuristic concepts, but, alas, scarcely a single principle worthy 
of a place in the list of fundamentals. [Ibid., xix) 
The difficulties in devising a coherent theory of motivation make 
Skinner's more radical behaviorism, which flatly rejects all attempts 
to explicate the mental and physical processes underlying behavior, 
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look all the more attractive. Bateson also shows little concern for 
detailing the mechanisms underlying behavior, but his approach remains 
quite different. A brief lookat another line of empirical research on 
achievement motivation should make their differences clearer. 
If McClelland's work failed to live up to Skinner's standard of 
anti-mentalism because it accepted motivation as a theoretical 
construct, attribution theory was even less likely to win his 
endorsement. Initially developed by Fritz Heider back in 1944, 
attribution theory looked at how individuals assessed the motives and 
causes of their own behavior (Arkes and Garske 1982, xxx). A key 
distinction centered on whether a subject attributed her performance to 
personal or to environmental factors -- to ability and effort or to 
task difficulty and luck. In the 1970s, research was initiated in 
various quarters to connect attribution theory to achievement 
motivation [Ibid.). 
The results were not unexpected. It seemed that persons highly 
motivated to succeed tended to attribute their successes internally and 
to take pride in their accomplishments; those motivated rather to avoid 
failure attributed their successes to external factors, thus taking 
less satisfaction in them. These findings helped clarify the sorts of 
reinforcement that perhaps led some persons to pursue opportunities to 
achieve and led others to avoid them. Attribution theory thus promised 
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to become a valuable complement and clarification of achievement 
theory. 
Interestingly, more recent research specifying relations among all 
the variables in the attribution/achievement scheme yields results 
consistent with a simpler self-esteem or self-confidence model: 
achievement motivation seems to vary directly according to one's 
perception of one's own ability and confidence of success (Arkes and 
Garska 1984, xxx). That confidence in one's competence affects one's 
motivation to achieve seems rather to be expected. But notice that the 
motivational construct is now connected with the subject's reports of 
his own perceptions and interpretations. What was but a construct 
articulating a variable relationship between stimulus and response is 
now part of a decidedly mentalistic approach to behavioral explanation. 
Skinner, as we noted, rejected the motivational construct for just 
this reason: it suggested a mentalistic explanation for behavior which 
he was dogmatically committed to stamping out. While Skinner claimed 
that his atheoretical posture included physicalistic explanations as 
well, urging that a science of behavior be pursued in behavioral terms 
alone, his clear expectation is that one day those behavioral terms 
will be mapped onto a fully reductivist neurophysiology. 
Bateson, on the other hand, is opposed to mentalistic explanations not 
because they compete with a behavioral vocabulary which is ultimately 
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more readily reducible to neuro-physiological terms, but because they 
focus attention on internal rather than interpersonal factors: 
Such an explanation, which shifts attention from the interpersonal 
field to a factitious inner tendency, principle, instinct, or 
whatnot is, I suggest, very great nonsense which only hides the 
real questions. (Bateson 1979, 133) 
What would most draw Bateson's attention in the welter of research 
around achievement motivation are precisely those items like parental 
demands for displays of independence and their reinforcement by 
punishment or reward that reveal the interactions and relationships 
between parent and child. It is certainly intriguing to learn that 
high n-Ach is found in sons whose displays of independence are rewarded 
by hugs while low n-Ach is found in sons whose failures to exhibit 
their mastery are met with punishment, since those findings conform so 
closely to Bateson's model of psychological weaning, American-style. 
Bateson typifies the American family as one in which the father 
dominates (slightly) and the children submit (slightly), with a 
stronger emphasis placed on both parental succorance/childish 
dependence and on parental spectatorship/ childish exhibitionism. 
While the child is encouraged to exhibit independence as a way of 
easing both parent and child out of the succorance/dependence 
relationship, a warm hug given as reward for such displays reaffirms 
parental succorance, while punishment shifts the emphasis towards a 
pattern of parental dominance and childish submission. Punishment thus 
serves as a more disruptive element, conceivably interrupting the 
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subtle linkage and evolution between the other two patterns of 
interaction. In other words, this is the sort of data that Bateson's 
approach can utilize and make sense of. 
Less amenable to Bateson's approach is McClelland's emphasis on a 
child's embrace of competition with standards of excellence. 
McClelland tends to conflate this factor in the development of 
achievement motivation with the mother's demands that a child master 
certain activities on his own, which is closely related to independence 
training. Independence stresses what the child is expected to do; 
competition with standards of excellence stresses how it is supposed to 
be done. It wouldn't seem that the interaction between parent and 
child would differ all that much then between the two concerns; perhaps 
the warm hug of approval might be withheld a bit longer, or some 
element of punishment might be introduced in response to poor efforts 
on the child's part. These possibilities aren't explored in 
McClelland's original research, however, and in his later work 
connecting n-Ach with economic development and with capitalism, 
"competition" is (implausibly) not even listed in the index while the 
needs for power and affiliation are. 
The problem with the notion of "competition with standards of 
excellence" as a motivational factor, at least from Bateson's 
standpoint, is that its origin in interpersonal relationships is 
obscured. The fact is that children begin to engage in competition 
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with one another at a very early age -- long before they begin to 
internalize abstract standards of excellence to regulate their own 
behavior. They compete for parental affection, they count up who gets 
more gifts at the holidays, they chafe under comparisons with older 
siblings or peers who are said to have mastered things at their age 
that they haven't. They argue over who's the strongest, tallest, 
cutest, smartest, and best liked. Gradually, they come to rank 
themselves on a less personalized scale and even strive to improve 
their station. 
By conflating "competition with standards of excellence" with 
independence training, McClelland overlooks essential differences 
between the patterns of interaction underlying them. Both 
succorance/dependence and spectatorship/ exhibition are complementary 
schismogeneses, in Bateson's terms, reinforcing different but 
interlocking behaviors on the parties involved. Competition, however, 
is a symmetrical schismogenesis in which both parties are driven to the 
same sorts of behaviors at increasing levels of intensity. Had 
McClelland been more aware of this difference, he might have included 
some very different data in his search for correlations. 
The problem with additional correlations, however, is that, like 
experimental psychology generally, McClelland generates a welter of 
data with very few principles for organizing it. He speculates on how 
an unfriendly father may interact with a warmly nurturing mother and 
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how both may interact with early independence demands and so on, but it 
is very hard to translate such speculations into contingencies of 
reinforcement that can be experimentally confirmed. The associative 
laws that stipulate the importance of repetition and intensity set all 
these contingencies on a continuum from strong to weak associations, so 
that the possible permutations are endless. Lacking the principles of 
positive and negative feedback and hierarchical organization, it is 
hard to see how McClelland could ever get beyond speculation in moving 
from innumerable correlations to a coherent explanation. 
McClelland's data remain, nonetheless, intriguing. It is time we 
turn this data, along with the theories of earlier thinkers, over to 
Bateson's cybernetic analysis to see what sense can be made of it. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS 
Understanding Achievement within Bateson's Ecology of Ideas 
Before we begin our analysis, it might be helpful to review the 
strategy guiding our inquiry, and identify how far we've gotten as well 
as how we've gotten here. Recall that since Bateson himself barely 
touched on the question of achieving behavior and thus generated no 
research data of his own, we proposed to review how others have 
approached the question and consider how Bateson might have assessed 
and even drawn on those approaches given the tools at his disposal. 
We have certainly covered a lot of ground. 
We began with the Greeks and with their (shifting) concept of 
arete, meaning virtue or excellence. We examined the common 
explanation the Greeks provided for why men pursue arete, which was to 
gain honor; we looked at Aristotle's theory of how character is formed; 
and we analyzed Plato's reworking of the common explanation into a more 
profound account of the pursuit of achievement in terms of the desire 
humans share with all mortal beings for immortality. Some of the 
276 
features that make for adequate explanation were also introduced at 
this point. 
We then identified the fundamental problem running through the 
Greek account as it developed from Homer through Plato and Aristotle, 
which is its reliance on final causality, a teleological explanation of 
human behavior which is difficult to square with the scientist's 
insistence that causes should precede their effects. The gradual 
ascendance of efficient over final causality in the scientific thinking 
of the Rennaisance period was recounted, with particular attention to 
Descartes' uncomfortable compromise -- the dualism of mind and body 
which forced so many thinkers coming after him to opt for one form of 
causal explanation or the other. 
The two traditions which arose in reaction to Cartesian dualism, 
the one trying to reduce the mental world to physical terms, the other 
taking the opposite approach, were then retraced from their initial 
conceptualizations through their reactions to the skepticism and 
critique of Hume and Kant, to the point where each was finally able to 
produce a serious contribution to the question of the sources of 
commitment to achievement. Nietzsche's approach to an explanation of 
achieving behavior, however, still relied on a teleological model that 
he himself could not fully embrace. And McClelland still assumes the 
efficient causal model of associationist psychology despite all the 
trappings of statistical correlation that are supposedly neutral on the 
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subject of causality. That each of these explanations draws on a model 
of causality which their authors can not fully justify in terms of 
theory supports Bateson's contention that it is time to build a new 
bridge to the ancient dichotomy of form and substance. 
Along the course of this historical review, we have also reviewed 
the principal elements of Bateson's own theoretical positions on the 
relationship of mind and body, form and substance, and final vs. 
efficient vs. formal causality. And we have sketched out some of 
Bateson's likely reactions both favoring and against the few serious 
alternatives that have been put forth on how to understand the human 
pursuit of achievement. It is time to begin pulling this data 
together, to see whether Bateson's ecology of ideas might offer us 
another way to resolve our question. 
We have framed the question of how a lifelong commitment to 
achievement is formed in terms of character development. And the 
explanations that we have uncovered, from the Greeks to the present, 
have all framed the question in much the same way. Although Bateson 
insists that all "characterological adjectives" should be redefined as 
bi-polar descriptions of social interactions, it is still a bit 
surprising to find, as we have, that each of the major historical 
accounts can be characterized in terms of a specific schismogenic 
interaction. This is even more surprising when we consider that, in 
all his writings on the subject, Bateson mentions hardly more than a 
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half dozen different schismo-geneses, and that the explanations we have 
reviewed involve almost all of them: the Greek account in terms of 
honor is redefinable into pride/admiration; Nietzsche's will to power 
equates to dominance/submission; and McClelland's various factors, as 
we've seen, involve succorance/nurturance, spectatorship/ exhibition, 
and competition. The only schismogenic interactions among individuals 
in Bateson's writings that are not mentioned are rivalry (which is a 
form of competition) and love. This raises a number of questions. 
We might ask first whether, perhaps, Bateson's redefinition of all 
these expla-nations into schismogenic terms signals a subtly disguised, 
quasi-metaphysical principle at work, like Nietzsche's will to power, 
which in effect redefines all behavior into schismogenic terms? Might 
all interactions between two or more people be somehow schismogenic? 
That would be a discomforting thought, since schismogeneses are, by 
definition, marked by positive feedback and instability. And the 
answer is clearly no. Asking a stranger for the time and receiving 
that information is hardly a schismogenic interaction. Bateson also 
mentions reciprocal behaviors as a distinctly non-schismogenic class of 
inter-actions, as in cultures where the potentially symmetrical roles 
of buyer and seller are regularly reversed, so that relationships 
remain stable (Ibid., 69). So not all interactions are schismogenic. 
Nor are all cultures and the character types they generate typified 
by one or another pattern of schismogenic interaction. Although 
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Bateson offers evidence to support our stereotypes of Germans as 
dominant/submissive and of Americans as competitive, he does not offer 
his half dozen schismogeneses as a typology of cultures and character 
types. Bateson refers to the Balinese culture, for instance, as "non- 
schismogenic," and reports finding no schismogenic sequences there. 
Instead, he details various patterns of interactions by which Balinese 
parents teach their children to avoid or to abort schismogenic 
sequences (Bateson 1972, 112-3). 
The fact that, in each of the theories we've examined, the 
character trait which leads to pursuit of achievement is forged through 
apparently schismogenic social interactions, is perhaps attributable 
then to the nature of achieving behavior itself. In that case, it 
would be a useful insight. It would suggest a way to identify cultures 
likely to produce achieving behavior: To the extent that achievement 
represents a distinctive or even unique attainment that sets one apart 
from one's peers, it would require an element of mobility within the 
social relationships of a culture and a genuine receptivity to 
innovation and invention. Balinese culture produces great beauty in 
its artifacts, music, and dances but these are typically just 
reworkings of long established forms so that social relationships are 
held stable. Rather than seeking to change their roles in society, the 
Balinese seek to perfect them (Ibid., 117). It is not that potentially 
schismogenic interactions are unknown, but that they are not allowed to 
develop as they might elsewhere. 
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This is probably true of many "primitive" cultures which have 
managed to retain essentially the same way of life over long periods of 
time. Although these cultures may recall the exploits of various 
heroic and Promethean figures from their ancestral lore and be 
surrounded by artifacts and practices indicating past achievements, the 
sorts of activities by which individuals currently in the group could 
set themselves clearly apart from and above the rest might routinely 
incur negative feedback in the form of social sanctions and disfavor. 
There are parallels here to small town life in our own societies. 
The fact that some cultures have learned to control potentially 
schismogenic social interactions may tell us something else. Although 
the commitment to achievement clearly differs from culture to culture 
and schismogenic sequences may be more or less pronounced, they never 
seem to wholly absent. In fact, the short list of schismogeneses that 
Bateson provides looks remarkably universal. Reciprocal exchanges like 
buying and selling or even gift giving, basic as they may be, are 
probably not so ubiquitous a part of human experience as the 
schismogeneses Bateson describes. Indeed, what sets these interactions 
most decidedly apart from all the other patterns of interlocking 
behavior that humans engage in is precisely the degree to which they 
are not just limited to humans: the ethology of many mammal and bird 
and even insect species would be impossible to describe without notions 
like nurturance and dependence, dominance and submission, display and 
spectating, competition and rivalry. 
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It is fair to ask whether what English speakers mean by 
"competition" or "display" and "spectating" and the rest can properly 
be applied to descriptions of other species' behavior, and ethologists 
are always careful to define those terms observationally. But whether 
we are making comparisons between species or between cultures, the 
connotations will differ while the underlying patterns of interaction 
remain very much the same. The schismogeneses simply describe the 
various patterns of positive feedback to which systems of behavioral 
interactions are subject. The fact that these patterns can be 
described as complementary or symmetrical and abstracted into 
mathematical and cybernetic terms is what constitutes their 
generality. Bateson calls them "pan-human elements in behavior" 
(Bateson 1991, 33), but he might just as well have said "pan-social." 
If our hypothesis is that achieving behavior is rooted in these 
interactions, then we can at least be assured that our explanatory 
approach is broad enough in principle to be applied across cultures and 
time periods. 
That our three main historical explanations each identify 
fundamentally different schismogenic interactions at the roots of 
achievement poses yet another set of questions. These interactions all 
seem quite distinctly different from each other, and one of the 
assumptions underlying our traditional notions of causality is that 
different causes have different effects. Could the terms "achievement" 
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and "achieving behavior," as we've attempted to explain them, in fact 
be so loosely derived as to cover distinctly different phenomena? 
That is most certainly true to some extent. If the notion of arete 
could change its connotations for the Greeks several times over three 
or four centuries, we must expect that in translating arete into the 
German Tugend or Lei stung, or into the English "excellence" or 
"achievement," something may be lost. It is significant that the 
Greeks attached the term to civic and military achievements far more 
often than Nietzsche, who attached it more often to artistic and 
spiritual attainments than did McClelland, who confirmed the validity 
of the TAT by giving it to scientists. And yet, there is considerable 
overlap among these terms as well, so that some attainments would 
probably be included at any time under any of these translations. 
Could the differences in connotation between the Greek, German, and 
English words for achievement lead nonetheless to differences in the 
schismogenic interactions offered to explain it? Probably. The notion 
\ 
V 
of honor, for example, seems suited to address a concept of achievement 
whose connotations lie in the military and civic arenas. The 
connection of achievement to financial reward in this country might 
similarly suggest a tie-in to competition as the ideological basis for 
a capitalist society. Perhaps a similar case could be made for the 
will to power in Germany. And given these differences, some variety in 
the explanations offered might be justified and even irreducible. 
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What Bateson adds to this discussion is important, because his 
analysis shifts the framework of explanation away from difficult to 
reconcile differences in the goals or needs of those who pursue 
achievement, towards patterns of interpersonal behavior which are 
capable of mutual interaction. Indeed, they are not only capable of 
mutually interacting, they virtually require it. As early as Naven, 
Bateson had noted that the boasting and competition so strongly in 
evidence among Iatmul males was a symmetrically schismogenic 
interaction that could destabilize relations within families and among 
moieties, and that it took complementary interactions, like the naven 
ceremony, to counter-act that tendency. The question that puzzled 
Bateson when he wrote the book was how these apparently independent 
interactions managed to balance each other so well in Iatmul society. 
As he encountered the principles of cybernetic theory, he came to 
realize that there was more than good fortune at work here: 
It was not good enough to say that the symmetrical schismogenesis 
happened by coincidence to balance the complementary. It was now 
necessary to ask, is there any communicational pathway such that an 
increase in symmetrical schismogenesis will bring about an increase 
in the corrective complementary phenomena? Could the system be 
circular and self-corrective? 
The answer was immediately evident . . . The naven ceremonial, 
which is an exaggerated caricature of a complementary sexual 
relationship between wau [mother's brother] and laua [sister's 
child], is in fact set off by over-weening symmetrical behavior. 
When laua boasts in the presence of wau, the latter has recourse to 
naven behavior. (Bateson 1991, 57) 
It is not only conceivable but likely, then, that more than one of 
the schismogenic interactions implicated in our various explanations is 
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at work in the development of a commitment to achievement. As to how 
they might interact in this case, Bateson obviously doesn't say. He 
does indicate, however, that the self-corrective relationship described 
above between complementary and symmetrical schismogeneses is 
fundamental: "In mixed systems, schismogenesis is necessarily reduced" 
(Bateson 1972, 324). They work against each other, creating the 
negative feedback required for a larger, self-corrective system. 
We can see the negative feedback that obtains between complementary 
and symmetrical schismogeneses in the interaction between competition 
and dominance on a battlefield. If competition alone were at work, two 
warriors might compete in hand to hand combat until they were both 
either dead or exhausted. But the possibility of domination is also 
there: one might be killed, which would end the interaction entirely; 
or one might submit and be taken prisoner. And to take it a step 
further: if the dominance/submission relationship between victors and 
prisoners is pushed too far, as in situations where the vanquished are 
debased and abused, there is always the possibility that the threat of 
death will cease to enforce submission and that a symmetrical 
schismogenesis will reassert itself in the form of revolt. This is one 
example of how competition and dominance/submission keep each other in 
check. 
If we can assume that societies as well as individuals need to be 
"mixed systems" to some degree in order to survive, then we might 
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explore the possibility that the various complementary schismogeneses 
that have been offered to explain the pursuit of achievement all 
require some symmetrical schismogenesic interaction to be coupled with 
it. Since competition is the only symmetrical schismogenesis mentioned 
in connection with achievement, that seems a good candidate to start 
with. 
It is relevant to recall in this connection Nietzsche's analysis of 
the role of the agon -- the contest -- in ancient Greece. While the 
Greeks typically focused on the honor accorded to arete as the motive 
for pursuing it, Nietzsche noted that the Greeks typically pursued 
their arete through competitions and contests. The Greeks invented the 
Olympics as an arena for the demonstration of athletic and martial 
arete; their tragedians and poets vied onstage in competition for 
public acclaim and awards; and even Socrates' dialectic can fairly be 
described as an intellectual contest. The teleological form of 
explanation so favored by the Greeks led them to identify honor as the 
V 
final cause and goal of their pursuit of virtue, but Nietzsche is 
doubtless correct about competition as its vehicle. 
The feedback between these schismogeneses is subtle but powerful. 
There is a reinforcing element to the competition itself that is only 
further aggravated by the interactions between the competitors and 
spectators: the competitors are encouraged to exhibit ever greater 
displays of prowess and virtuosity by the applause of the crowd. 
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This sets up a mixed system in which, contrary to Bateson's claim, 
schismogenesis seems to be reinforced rather than reduced. The 
contradiction can be explained by the fact that the complementary pride- 
and-admiration interaction does not obtain between the contestants. 
That these contests did not, typically, lead to bloodshed suggests a 
third schismogenesis at work, namely the dominance and submission 
interaction involved in the declaration of victory. Contests are rule 
governed interactions in which the end-point for interaction and the 
criteria for declaring winners are pre-arranged and agreed to by the 
contestants. By setting these parameters, the rules differentiate a 
contest from a fight and keep the potential schismo-genesis in such 
interactions under control. The annointing and honoring of the victor 
culminates the pride and admiration interaction between the contestants 
and the crowd; the acceptance of that decision by those not victorious 
in competition marks the shift from competition to a dominance/ 
submission relationship among the contestants themeselves. 
V 
The infusion of these elements of dominance and submission into the 
larger circuit of interactions in a contest may also signal a shift in 
the interaction between contestants and spectators from a display and 
spectating interaction into one of pride and admiration. The latter 
two schismogeneses are clearly connected in the sense that we can 
hardly conceive of pride/admiration without the structure of 
display/spectating at its base. We might say that display/spectating 
is a necessary but insufficient condition for pride/admiration and that 
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the admixture of dominance/submission provides the "sufficing" 
condition. 
If this analysis is correct, then there are three or four basic 
schismogenic interactions already implicated in the production of 
achieving behavior. The approach thus seems to address a wider range 
of relevant phenomena than did the Greek explanation, while preserving 
its essential insight. The next step is to apply the approach to 
Nietzsche's explanation: if the will to power as the source for 
achieving behavior can be mapped onto Bateson's fundamentals in a way 
that validates both its differences and commonalities with the Greek 
explanation, then the approach will have demonstrated enough 
flexibility and scope to be taken seriously. 
Despite his deep affinities for the Greek perspective, a couple 
thousand years of recorded history convinced Nietzsche that the drive 
to achieve had to be uncoupled from the fickle favors of the crowd. He 
\ 
V 
had the example of the many great artists and thinkers before him who 
had labored in obscurity or even against the tides of public opinion. 
He was himself barely read during his lifetime, and said he considered 
it a distinction. For Nietzsche, who serves his teleology spiked with 
irony, the reason for pursuing achievement had to be intrinsic to the 
pursuit, not dependent on extrinsic reward -- especially as bestowed by 
the herd. The will to power, the will that wills itself throughout all 
its interactions, met that requirement. 
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The will to power is not some idealist abstraction, however. It is 
a universal that exists only through individuals. That Nietzsche, like 
the Greeks, chooses to account for behavior in terms of its goal -- its 
final cause -- should not hide the fact that here, too, the goal is 
pursued through competition. That the goal is power rather than honor 
only removes certain constraints: a sense of fair play and respect for 
one's opponent may be less relevant to the interaction whether the 
competition is a rule governed contest or not; the diminished role of 
the crowd may mean that the identities of victor and vanquished must be 
settled directly by the contestants, prolonging the competition. With 
fewer stabilizing factors, the interaction is more likely to accelerate 
in intensity. Eventually, one will comes to dominate while another 
resigns itself to submission. 
The lack of stabilizing factors only increases the likelihood that 
the cycle of domination/submission and competition will continue on. 
Whether because "power wills always -- more power" or because power 
invariably attracts opposition, the will to power inevitably finds new 
competition. Each succeeding interac-tion should display the same 
alternation between symmetrical and complementary schismogenesis that 
gives a semblance of stability to the "mixed system." 
While the will to power thus provides a somewhat less complex 
account of achieving behavior than the Greek approach, it displays more 
than the minimal complexity required for a self-corrective schismogenic 
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system. And because the will to power governs the relationships within 
organisms as well as between them, it is also complex enough for 
Nietzsche to distinguish analytically between the creative spirit's 
pursuit of achievement and the simple, straightforward will to power of 
the battlefield. 
The former is a sublimated, refined will to power developed out of 
one's "bad conscience" -- the guilt that the herd has taught the strong 
to feel over the promptings of their instincts. The spiritualization 
of man wrought by morality has made a battlefield of every strong 
person's soul. It is the will to power turned against itself. This 
contest within the individual self can lead to a crippling or 
extirpation of the instincts; or it can lead to their submission and 
sublimation to a higher ideal -- a victory over self by one's higher 
self. This self-conquest enables one to bend the strength of one's 
passions and instincts to purposes other than their own immediate 
satisfactions. It makes a higher, more spiritual level of achievement 
possible. 
The resourcefulness of Bateson's approach becomes most apparent 
with respect to this aspect of Nietzsche's analysis. By distinguishing 
between contextual levels, Bateson was able to recognize both the 
dangers and the creative potential of "double binds" such as Nietzsche 
is describing here. And he is able to relate such conflicts to their 
social context, whether that be the family or the larger society. 
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Bateson does not have to afford a metaphysical status to the will to 
power to acknowledge dominance/submission as a "pan-human", universally 
available form of social interaction. And he can recognize the 
ubiquity of competitive interactions in just the same way. Given that 
we are socialized to identify and engage in such interactions, the 
moral strictures that incriminate those competing most successfully and 
achieving a dominant position constitute a classic double bind, 
especially since these conflicts are first realized within the family 
system where escape from such binds is most difficult and their effects 
most painful. 
What Bateson loses in theoretical economy by not appealing to a 
single, fundamental principle, he gains in analytical flexibility. 
Nietzsche sees the overcoming of bad conscience as the resolution of a 
potentially debilitating moral conflict in which the passions are 
finally tamed and accepted and harnessed in the service of a more 
powerful organizing ideal. This accounts for the rare strength and 
singlemindedness of Nietzsche's "higher men" -- the great artists, 
philosophers and statesmen. But what of the "inbetween" men and women, 
those athletes, inventors, explorers, landscape gardeners, 
craftspeople, and so on and on, who have managed to train their best 
efforts, over long periods of time, towards the mastery of some lesser 
skill or challenge? Surely they don't all struggle with such deep, 
soul-wrenching conflicts? 
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Bateson accounts for the positive resolution of double binds 
generally in terms of the Level III learning of "trans-contextual" 
skills. If Level II learning involves the contextual learning that 
forms our character, Level III learning is what allows some people to 
recognize this socialization process for what it is and begin to 
consciously shape their characters in the way that Nietzsche suggests. 
Awareness of the contextual level of learning may also reveal itself 
less grandly, in "humor and religion, art and poetry," all of which 
depend more often than not on tensions between contexts of 
understanding (Bateson 1991, 149). This does not mean that humorists 
and artists have necessarily skirted the edges of schizophrenia in the 
development of their craft. While resolution of serious double binds -- 
those involving significant others -- may account for great creativity 
or religiosity (or schizophrenia), there are other, less serious double 
binds as well, which arise in everyday experience and which we may 
learn to inflict upon ourselves to advantage. 
V 
It is in connection with transcontextual learning and the 
overcoming of self-inflicted double binds that Bateson at one point 
nearly addresses our questions concerning the origins of commitment to 
achievement. He touches on the matter in an address titled "The Birth 
of A Matrix, or Double Bind and Epistemology," a retrospective look at 
his life's work given two years before his death from cancer. 
Typically, he approaches the subject of transcontextual learning and 
achievement only towards the end of the address, framing his approach 
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in terms of our general ignorance concerning the causes of cultural 
decay and progress. He suggests that the concept of a "therapeutic 
double bind" might be especially helpful in understanding various forms 
of "cultural advance" (Ibid., 207). Not surprisingly, he finds a 
connection between cultural advance and the efforts of individuals to 
reach beyond their limitations, and he offers the example of the 
mountain climber. 
The mountain climber who learns to navigate between the conflicting 
demands of his body (which demands cessation of painful exertion) and 
his goal (which promises emotional suffering should the body get its 
way), has learned to place himself in "a position of double bind, 
gratuitously" (Bateson 1991, 209). He has learned to push himself into 
painful situations with no reinforcement except that which he "can 
reflexively generate for himself" (Ibid., 212). He has created an 
expectation for himself of a "sequence" of activities which must be 
completed before the body's need can be addressed. Successful 
completion is the reward, the satisfaction, for which this double bind 
was undertaken. The process as a whole involves what a mountain 
climber friend of Bateson's called "the discipline of not listening to 
the body when it screams for relief" (Ibid.). And Bateson asks, "What 
is discipline?" It is one of a series of questions he poses towards 
the end of his address. He asks, "Why do mountain climbers do this to 
themselves?" (Ibid.). And he wonders: 
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Why does the Zen monk sit through hours of agony in the lotus 
position, his legs getting more and more paralyzed and his head 
getting more and more addled? And while he does this, why does he 
contemplate or wrestle with a koan, a traditional paradox, a sort 
of conceptual double bind? [Ibid.) 
His answer to these questions is characteristically elliptical, 
intriguing and frustrating at the same time: 
In this region there are answers which are certainly "beyond the 
double bind," and yet equally certainly the answers will be related 
to double bind theory. We can only speculate about components of 
these answers: 
(1) They will surely include reference to ideas of completion 
of tasks. 
(2) They will include reference to "self" -- that half 
mythological entity whose apparent subjective reality somehow 
increases in situations of reflexive awareness. 
(3) We shall be talking about addictions to the feat of "cold 
turkey" defeat of all addictions of lower logical type. 
(4) We shall face some sort of positive addiction to the pains 
of facing double binds and conquering them. 
(5) We shall need a formal definition of practice. What is 
the musical performer doing between his public appearances? 
He, too, is engaging in behavior which (even if rewarded in 
the concert hall) is fundamentally related to double binds. 
It is a part of the long grind from quick superficial 
adaptation through automatism to the final skillful control of 
automatism. [Ibid., 212-3) 
He reiterates that "all this is speculation," but assures us that 
"the matter is not trivial" [Ibid.). So what are we to make of 
Bateson's speculations? It is interesting that his list of components 
provides no clue as to the underlying social interactions from which 
the pursuit of achievement arises. Bateson focuses instead on the 
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double binds and the transcontextual learnings on which that pursuit 
depends. This reflects his concern with the logical structure of 
behavioral processes; that is to say, with formal as opposed to final 
or efficient causes. A closer examination of the components on his 
list should make this clearer. 
The first component on Bateson's list concerns the "completion of 
tasks." This recalls his description of the mountain climber's 
striving to reach the peak as an effort to complete a sequence "as he 
sees it" (Ibid., 211). A "task" is just such a sequence of activities, 
each being instrumental in some way to its completion. The 
instrumentality inherent in task completion indicates that we are 
dealing with actions rather than behaviors: while behaviors can be 
defined objectively through a physical description of movement, actions 
are defined subjectively, in terms of intentions. Thus, the "blink" of 
an eye denotes behavior while the "wink" of an eye denotes an action. 
Because actions are defined primarily in terms of intentions, they can 
extend over considerable periods of time and cover a number of more 
limited activities along the way: "climbing a mountain," for instance, 
comprises the more limited actions of getting a grip, pulling oneself 
up, scaling the rockface, and so on. 
Defining a task is thus a way of bracketing a sequence of actions 
and situating them within a broader context. The goal sets the end 
term for the sequence. Bateson would say that a task is of a higher 
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logical type than the activities that go into accomplishing it. Like 
any contextual interpretation, it sets parameters for subsequent 
action, narrowing the range of choices and identifying the key 
variables and markers to watch for. While various of the instrumental 
actions that make up the task may bring painful feedback, the 
constraints set by the larger task structure stipulate either that 
substitute action is called for or that, no substitute being available, 
one should press on through the pain. Without the context of a task 
structure that sets goal boundaries for an action sequence, it is hard 
to see how anyone could just press on and on through repeated 
disappointments and frustration. 
What gives the task its staying power, Bateson suggests, may be its 
connection to self. Having noted that the varied activities involved 
in mountain climbing may bring the climber no rewards "except such 
reinforcement as he can reflexively generate for himself," the second 
component on Bateson's list builds on that idea by suggesting that the 
"subjective reality" of self "somehow increases" in situations of 
"reflexive awareness" like this (Ibid., 212-3). Presumably, this 
induces him to continue his efforts; but it must be said that this is 
one of those typically elliptical suggestions of Bateson's which even a 
close reading of the whole essay barely helps to clarify. 
Fortunately, the much needed clarification can be found in another 
essay, which also sheds light on the next two points on Bateson's list, 
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both referring to addiction. In an essay published in 1971 entitled 
"The Cybernetics of 'Self': A Theory of Alcoholism," Bateson set out 
to contrast the principles on which an alcoholic operates as he 
(unsuccessfully) sets out to control his drinking with the principles 
underlying Alcoholics Anonymous which, he notes, "has the only 
outstanding record of success in dealing with alcoholics" (Bateson 
1972, 310). 
The crucial difference he finds between the two approaches lies in 
their differing estimations of the power of "self-control": the 
alcoholic insists he has, or should have, the willpower to control his 
drinking while the first step in the AA program is to admit one is 
powerless over alcohol. That difference, he argues, stems from a 
fundamental divergence in "epistemological" premises. The term is 
placed in quotation marks because Bateson acknowledges that he is not 
employing "epistemology" in its customary philosophical sense. His use 
of the term covers both ontology (the study of what kinds of things 
there are) and traditional epistemology (the study of how we can know 
what we know, being what we are): 
There seems to be no convenient word to cover the combination of 
these two concepts. The nearest approximations are "cognitive 
structure" or "character structure," but these terms fail to 
suggest that what is important is a body of habitual assumptions or 
premises implicit in the relationship between man and environment, 
and that these premises may be true or false. I shall therefore 
use the single term "epistemology". . . to cover both aspects of 
the net of premises which govern adaptation (or maladaption) to the 
human and physical environment. [Ibid., 314) 
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What defeats the alcoholic time and again in his efforts to give up 
drinking is that his epistemology, when he's sober, is in error. When 
in the sober state, he credits his "self" with a power over the rest of 
him that it just doesn't have: 
[He] will not or cannot accept the premise that, drunk or sober, 
the total personality of an alcoholic is an alcoholic personality 
which cannot conceivably fight alcoholism. [Ibid., 312) 
The inconceivability of this premise follows from basic cybernetic 
theory. Bateson reminds us that mind is comprised of innumerable 
interacting circuits which reach across our sensory, neural, and 
muscular systems; and that, within such cybernetic systems, no part 
functions independently of the rest: 
. . . [I]n no system which shows mental characteristics can any 
part have unilateral control over the whole. In other words, the 
mental characteris-tics of the system are immanent, not in some 
part, but in the system as a whole. [Ibid., 316) 
In short, there is no "self" in some commanding position over and above 
the rest of the alcoholic's personality that can counter his 
inclination to drink. The error is not unique to the alcoholic, but 
rather typifies the whole of Occidental culture as it has developed in 
the wake of Descartes: 
. . . [T]he "sobriety" of the alcoholic is characterized by an 
unusually disastrous variant of the Cartesian dualism, the division 
between Mind and Matter, or, in this case, between conscious will, 
or "self," and the remainder of the personality. [Ibid., 313) 
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It is in this sense that Bateson refers to the "self" as a "half 
mythological entity": it is not that the term has no basis in 
experience, but that it lacks the powers that we have imagined it to 
possess. Its limitations become evident in what AA calls alcoholic 
"pride." This is not a pride over past achievement, Bateson notes, but 
"an obsessive acceptance of a challenge, a repudiation of the 
proposition 'I cannot'" [Ibid., 321): 
The alcoholic's "pride" is "mobilized behind the proposition, "I 
can stay sober." But, noticeably, success in this achievement 
destroys the "challenge" ... 
The challenge component of alcoholic "pride" is linked with risk¬ 
taking. ... As success begins to appear probable, the 
alcoholic must challenge the risk of a drink. The element of "bad 
luck" or "probability" of failure places failure beyond the limits 
of the self. "If failure occurs, it is not mine." Alcoholic 
"pride" progressively narrows the concept of "self," placing what 
happens outside its scope. (Ibid., 322) 
His "pride" thus places the alcoholic in a double bind where he is 
in trouble whether he is sober or not. The release from this double 
bind comes, if at all, through the process of "bottoming out" and the 
realization that one is caught between "the obsession of the mind that 
compels us to drink and the allergy of the body that condemns us to go 
mad or die" (Ibid., 331): 
This is a double bind correctly founded upon the alcoholic's 
dichotomous epistemology of mind versus body. He is forced by 
these words back and back to the point at which only an involuntary 
change in deep unconscious epistemology -- a spiritual experience -- 
will make the lethal description irrelevant. [Ibid.) 
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The spiritual experience referred to, of course, is the acceptance 
of one's own powerlessness over alcohol and the giving over of one's 
self to a "Higher Power." In practice, this means subsuming one's self 
in the larger community of AA. The diminished role of "self" is 
thereafter symbolized by the anonymity of giving up one's last name for 
an initial. 
Getting back to our mountain climber: Bateson suggests that, 
instead of diminishing the role of "self" and denying it any special 
leverage over one's person, the reflexive awareness required to 
generate reinforcements in the face of pain may actually increase the 
"apparent subjective reality" of "self." I'm reminded here of "the 
little train that could": he repeats his mantra, "I think I can, I 
think I can ..." all the way up the mountain, unsure of himself right 
to the end; and then he makes it! In a flush of pride he changes his 
chant to "I thought I could, I thought I could ..." and reinforces 
his sense of his own self's power to control his fate. He is still 
laboring under the error of a false epistemological position, according 
to Bateson; but his situation is not pathological. This helps explain 
what Bateson means by a "positive addiction." 
In his discussion of the mountain climber's ability to "go on into 
more pain and more suffering, until he reaches the top of the 
mountain," Bateson asks "why do mountain climbers do this?" (Bateson 
1991, 212). He says it should be impossible; but then he notes that 
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drug addicts "sometimes also unaided break their addiction 'cold 
turkey'," and he asks paradoxically whether an addict could "ever 
become addicted to 'cold turkey?'" {Ibid.). This way out of drug 
addiction is the exception to the general rule of failure attending 
alcoholic "pride." How does it happen? 
Interestingly enough, in Mind and Nature, written a year or two 
after the address in question here, Bateson revisits the case of the 
mountain climber and suggests that mountain climbing is but one 
example of the general category of explorative behavior, and that 
exploration is "not only self-validating; it also seems in human beings 
to be addictive" (Bateson 1979, 139). He recalls once again his 
friend's insight into the harsh discipline of climbing: 
Geoffrey Young used to say that the not listening to the weak and 
self-pitying complaints and pains of the body was among the main 
disciplines of the climber -- even, I think, among the 
satisfactions of climbing. The victory over self. {Ibid., 139- 
MO) 
What was a loosely speculative analogy in the address between 
embracing the pain of mountain climbing and becoming addicted to "cold 
turkey" is here tightened and extended to include the whole context of 
explorative behavior. The addictive potential of discipline is not an 
unfamiliar observation -- I've heard runners ascribe it to the beta- 
endorphins the body manufactures to raise pain thresholds in response 
to stress. But Bateson is connecting the addictive satisfactions of 
discipline not with peptides but with "victory over self," a phrase 
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we've met before in Nietzsche. Bateson's explanation of this notion 
helps distinguish the apparently enhanced awareness of self in positive 
addiction from the diminishment of self in alcoholic "pride": 
Such changing of "self" is commonly described as a "victory," and such 
lineal words as "discipline," and "self-control" are used. Of course 
these are mere supernaturalisms -- and probably a little toxic at 
that. What happens is much more like an incorporation or marriage of 
ideas about the world with ideas about self. (Ibid., 140) 
Bateson clarifies this notion of an enhanced self which 
incorporates ideas about the world with another analogy, this time to 
totemism: 
For many peoples, their thinking about the social system of which they are 
part is shaped (literally in-formed) by an analogy between that system of 
which they are the parts and the larger ecological and biological system in 
which the animals and plants and the people are all parts. . . . 
In its late and partly secular form, totemism is familiar to the occidental 
world as the premise of heraldry. Families or patrilineal lines claim 
ancient dignity by depicting animals on their heraldic shields or totem 
poles. . . . Such representations of family status in a mythological 
hierarchy often aggrandize self or own descent at the expense of other 
family lines. As this more prideful component of totemism increases, the 
larger view of relationship to the natural world is likely to be forgotten 
or reduced to a mere pun. [Ibid.) 
Does the mountain climber or runner -- or the achiever in general -- 
in fact experience this more expansive, more connected view of the 
self? That would be a topic for research, certainly. But there does 
seem to be a prima facie difference between the explorer's competitive 
effort to go "where no one has gone before," which is an inherently 
social interaction even in the absence of others, and the alcoholic's 
lonely, internal struggle for sobriety and re-integration into normal 
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human society. The pride of achievement is surely less endangered by 
its commitment to risk-taking than the alcoholic's "pride." And so, 
perhaps, is its sense of self. 
At this point, the pieces of the puzzle start to fall into place. 
Discipline is a potentially positive addiction to "the pains of facing 
double binds and conquering them" -- the double bind of the mountain 
climber, for instance, being the pain of his body should he continue 
his climb versus the pain of disappointment should he not exercise the 
self-control necessary to complete his task. The double bind of the 
alcoholic follows much the same pattern. The sense of participation in 
a larger, social self which helps the climber attain victory over his 
lesser, complaining self likewise mirrors the pattern of the alcoholic 
who, in bottoming out, accepts defeat for his private self in favor of 
participation in the larger, social self of AA. It is interesting that 
the alcoholic's longterm dependence on AA is sometimes viewed cynically 
as trading in one addiction for another. The notion of positive 
i 
addiction helps clarify that assessment. 
Giving up an addiction "cold turkey" seems to represent for Bateson 
the possibility of overcoming a pathological addiction with the 
positive addiction to "victory over self" instead of with the 12 step 
group. If the positive addiction to discipline can thus defeat the 
addiction of alcoholism, then perhaps that same addiction to a larger 
sense of self can addict one to defeat of all addictions of "lower 
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logical type" bound up with an epistemologically unsound, dualistic 
sense of self. 
It is hard to assess Bateson's approach here since he so barely 
sketched it out. The idea that the discipline necessary to achievement 
might work to overcome more pathological addictions is certainly open 
to question. I think it's probably true that those committed to 
achievement are more likely to give up habitual distractions like 
television, gambling, and light reading. Nietzsche was surely correct 
about the unusually high number of celibate philosophers. I'm less 
convinced, however, that their discipline enables high achievers to 
give up chemical addictions. Stories about substance abusing athletes 
are hardly a recent phenomenon; the number of writers, poets, artists 
and musicians who have drunk or drugged themselves to an early grave is 
truly staggering; and while scientists tend to be longer lived, there 
are stories enough but them as well -- Johnny Von Neumann was a 
notoriously prodigious drinker, to name but one, and Bateson's own 
interest in the problem of addiction may have gone beyond the merely 
clinical. On the other hand, Bateson quotes the adage "in vino 
veritas," and argues that the intoxicated state helps restore the more 
expansive sense of self that our dualistic culture routinely inhibits. 
Perhaps that gives it exceptional status. There is just not enough 
here to go on. 
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Such details aside, the broader outline of Bateson's linkage of 
victory over self with discipline and the overcoming of double binds 
certainly captures much of what Nietzsche had to say on the sources of 
achieving behavior. There does seem to be a major difference between 
Nietzsche's emphasis on the higher man who individuates himself away 
from the herd and Bateson's emphasis on overcoming the individuated 
self in favor of a more participatory, social self. But the fact that 
Bateson's approach ties into so many other concerns like addiction, 
self-validating behaviors, learning theory, and so on says more about 
its overall adequacy as an explanatory approach than does any details 
of its agreement or disagreement with Nietzsche's theory. 
The last of the components on Bateson's list, like the first, goes 
beyond matters of concern to either Nietzsche or the Greeks to address 
a question of formal rather than teleological or efficient causality. 
It typifies Bateson's cybernetic approach. In asking for a formal 
definition of practice, he is seeking to understand its logical 
•1 
typology in relation to the dynamics of two relevant processes: double 
binds and habituation. 
That practice is "fundamentally related to double binds" is hardly 
surprising after our examination of discipline. Practice needn't 
involve pain, but it is by definition not something pursued for its own 
sake. It may be hard or simply boring; and the satisfaction one feels 
at the refinement of one's abilities is always limited and contingent 
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upon duplication in a public performance. It is the work one has to 
do, over and over again, in order not to disappoint one's own 
expectations. It is the mild double bind implicit in all deferred 
gratification. Learning to place oneself -- and keep oneself -- in 
double binds like these and learning the value of repetition is an 
essential part of learning how to learn. It is a character builder. 
Repetition is the aspect of practice that ties it into the larger 
process of habituation. But what Bateson calls "the long grind from 
quick superficial adaptation through automatism to the final skillful 
control of automatism" is a special case of habituation, not like 
unconsciously turning out the lights on leaving a room (Bateson 1991, 
213). Bateson was interested in habituation as the cognitive parallel 
of the general tendency of living things to maintain flexibility at the 
adaptive level by "hard-wiring" into the genome those adaptations which 
have proven most successful. It is one of nature's most effective 
strategies: 
When we encounter a new problem for the first time, we deal with it 
either by trial and error or possibly by insight. Later, and more 
or less gradually, we form the "habit" of acting in the way which 
earlier experience rewarded. To continue to use insight or trial 
and error upon this class of problem would be wasteful. These 
mechanisms can now be saved for other problems. (Bateson 1972, 351- 
2) 
Bateson believed that the unconscious provided a similar function. 
What distinguishes practice from the usual habituation process, 
however, is that it is, in fact, pursued consciously. Learning to play 
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an instrument (or wield a sword or tennis racket or whatever) involves 
a vast number of "superficial adaptations" -- learning to match notes 
with fingerings, learning to move from one fingering to another, 
learning to match those movements with rhythms, and on an on. Done 
often enough, these sink to the level of "automatisms" like tying 
shoes; but the would-be musician continually reviews key variables like 
speed, accuracy, and "flow" for possible improvements. Practice, in 
effect, sets up a process of self-correction on one's habituations. 
Bateson refers to the self-correction at work here not as "feedback" 
but as "calibration." 
Calibration is to feedback as form is to process; it is of a 
different logical type. To illustrate the difference, Bateson offers 
the contrasting situations of shooting a rifle versus a shotgun: 
The marksman will look along the sights of his rifle and will note 
an error in its aim. He will correct the error, perhaps creating a 
new error which again he will correct, until he is satisfied. He 
will then press the trigger and shoot. 
What is significant is that the act of self-correction occurs 
within the single act of shooting. . . . [T]he term feedback . . . 
characterize^] this whole genus of methods of perfecting an 
adaptive act. 
In contrast, consider the case of the man who is shooting a flying 
bird with a shotgun ... In such cases, what must happen is that 
an aggregate of information is taken in through sense organs; that 
upon this information, computation is completed; and that upon the 
(approximate) result of that computation the gun is fired. There 
is no possibility of error correction in the single act. To 
achieve any improvement, correction must be performed upon a large 
class of actions. ... By long practice, he must adjust the 
setting of his nerves and muscles so that in the critical event, he 
will "automatically" give an optimum performance. This genus of 
methods ... [is called] calibration. (Bateson 1979, 195-6) 
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Another example would be the thermostat: whether it switches on or 
off is determined by feedback within the mechanism of the thermostat; 
whether its setting needs to be adjusted for a higher or lower 
temperature, however, is a calibration that requires the conscious 
involvement of the home owner following sufficient experiences at the 
original setting. The practice that a musician --or any other 
practitioner of a skill requiring physical coordination -- undergoes 
is, similarly, an attempt to consciously adjust one's neuromuscular 
"settings." 
While calibration is thus of a different logical type than 
feedback, it would be inaccurate to say that it is necessarily of a 
higher type. In practice, calibration and feedback tend to alternate 
back and forth in an hierarchic sequence of more and more inclusive 
levels. A good example can be drawn from the field of law enforcement 
A driver of an automobile travels at 70 miles per hour and thereby 
alerts the sense organ (radar, perhaps) of a traffic policeman. 
The bias or threshold of the policeman dictates that he shall 
respond to any difference greater than 10 miles per hour above or 
below the speed limit. 
The policeman's bias was set by the local chief of police, who 
acted self-correctively with his eye on orders (i.e., calibration) 
received from the state capital. 
The state capital acted self-correctively with the legislator's 
eyes on the voters. The voters, in turn, set a calibration within 
the legislature in favor of the Democratic or Republican party. 
Again, we note an alternating ladder of calibration and feeback up 
to larger and larger spheres of relevance and more and more 
abstract information and wider decision. (Ibid., 198-9) 
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Bateson details a similar hierarchy with respect to thermostats and 
the home owner, whose own biases can be reset in various ways. And the 
marksman, too, can recalibrate and improve his aim with practice as he 
learns to control his breathing, timing, heartbeat, etc.. In the case 
of the musician, the alternation from calibration to a higher level of 
self-corrective feedback occurs once practice has produced a level of 
mastery such that the performer in the concert hall can respond 
appropriately to the affect of that audience in that hall on that 
particular evening. And that is what Bateson means by "the long grind 
from quick superficial adaptation through automatism to the final 
skillful control of automatism." 
By distinguishing these formal stages in the long process of 
mastering a musical instrument, Bateson goes beyond simply categorizing 
practice as a special type of habituation marked by steeper learning 
curves. He identifies a deeper, general pattern of alternating self¬ 
corrections that is applicable to a wide variety of phenomena and 
analyzable in logical and mathematical terms. In his distinction 
between feedback and calibration and in his outlining of how the two 
interact in practice on the way from novice to mastery, I think Bateson 
has provided an insight into the complexity of skill development that 
is usually overlooked. 
By relating practice to discipline and discipline to addiction 
through their common reliance on double binds, Bateson has, in 
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addition, helped to take those terms which have been only loosely or 
metaphorically connected in everyday speech and re-establish them on a 
more precise scientific footing that allows us to examine those 
connections. By removing the notion of "will" and denying any active 
agency to "self" in his explanation of these phenomena, he has also 
managed to avoid the mental ism that modern behavioral science so 
strongly resists. In other words, while Bateson's speculations on the 
components of an answer to the question of achieving behavior do not, 
in fact, provide that answer, they do provide usable and useful 
directions for further research. Together with the capacity of 
Bateson's approach to incorporate insights from other thinkers as to 
the motivations and causal factors underlying commitment to 
achievement, I think it's fair to say that Bateson has provided a 
better theoretical framework for pursuing the question than anyone 
before or since. 
His approach, like Plato's, roots the human pursuit of excellence 
in behaviors that are not limited to human beings, while preserving its 
dependence on the uniquely human ability to learn about learning. The 
historically identified factors of competition, public recognition and 
honor, dominance/submission, and the nurturing of independence are not 
only accorded a place within Bateson's framework, they are recast as 
behavioral interactions capable of mutual reinforcement and self¬ 
correction. This renders them suitable for formal restatement in terms 
amenable to mathematical and logical analysis. That means they can be 
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mapped onto the tautologies -- "the eternal verities" -- which are the 
fundamental truths to which all explanation aspires. 
The social level of analysis represented by these schismogeneses is 
then connected directly to a theory of learning in which character 
development is of central rather than peripheral concern. I doubt that 
could be said of any system of philosophy or psychology since the time 
of Aristotle. And by recasting the final causality on which 
Aristotle's philosophy depends in terms of mutual causality and formal 
explanation, Bateson's cybernetic approach makes talk of goals and 
purpose -- and achievement -- at last intelligible to modern scientific 
discourse. The fact that Bateson's idea of achievement and cultural 
advance depends as much on individuals learning of transcontextual 
skills as on the social interactions and their contradictions which 
make such learning necessary, relates the individual to society and 
nature to nurture in a refreshingly evenhanded way. If, once again, 
this seems to recall the philosophies of ancient Greece, that is to be 
hoped for in an approach that rejects the dualism that has dominated 
Western thought since their eclipse. 
The promise of Bateson's approach to the question of achievement 
is, of course, not fully realized either in his own work or here. 
Where I think his list of components falls short, ironically enough, is 
in addressing the dedication of scientific researchers like himself. 
His list seems geared towards factors involved in perfecting physically 
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based skills like art and sport rather than towards the factors 
involved in intellectual attainments. Though we talk of science and 
math as "disciplines" and of researchers in those fields as 
"disciplined," we are not talking "of the discipline of not listening 
to the body when it screams for relief." And it is not clear to me in 
what sense a scientist or mathematician "practices" his craft. 
That is not to say that there is no connection between the 
development of physical and intellectual skills. The discipline of the 
scientist or mathematician involves learning to hold oneself to a 
standard of rigor in one's experiments and proofs that is as high in 
its own way as any mountain. Trying to prove a hunch or hypothesis can 
bring frustration and pain analogous to beating one's head against a 
wall. There is a sequence of activities which the dedicated researcher 
always feels must be completed, regardless of competing inclinations. 
The rewards along the way to achievement are, indeed, only such as can 
be reflexively generated -- an insight here, a task completed there, a 
sense of getting closer all the time. There are double binds at work 
here, too. There is what we might call "obsession," if not addiction, 
though the differences at this point are obscure. And there is also 
the long, slow progress towards mastery of one's subject. Bateson has 
certainly given us the starting points for consideration of lifelong 
intellectual pursuits. 
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It is not that the components of intellectual achievement might be 
different than the one's Bateson provides us here; but there may be 
additional ones, like the role of collective and collaborative 
enterprise; and the ones he has listed may need some considerable 
refinement. What can't be disputed, I think, is that Bateson has given 
us a set of tools and a way of thinking about the question that goes 
beyond what was available to us before. And lying in the background of 
this inquiry is a broader theory of character development and learning - 
- of a theory of mind -- whose depth we have only scratched. It has 
all the makings of a remarkable achievement. What it lacks most is 
recognition. 
Understanding Bateson's Achievement within the Ecology of Ideas 
I declared my intention back in the introductory chapter of this 
work to pursue an examination of Bateson's ideas on two levels: first, 
by applying the methods and insights of his ecology of ideas to the 
question of why human beings pursue achievement; and then, per the 
success of that effort, by assessing those methods and insights in 
terms of their overall contribution to the advance of the behavioral 
sciences. So now it is time to ask, what is the measure of Bateson's 
achievement? 
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We begin with the understanding that Bateson himself so clearly 
shared, that his contributions depended, perhaps more than most, on 
those of others. Bateson did not invent cybernetics, or information or 
organization theory and his debts to Russell and Whitehead's theory of 
logical types were profound. His network of friends and relations, 
collaborators and correspondents, stretching from his father, William 
Bateson, to C.H. Waddington and Warren McCulloch; from A.R. Radcliffe- 
Brown to Ruth Benedict, Alfred Kroeber, and his wife, Margaret Mead; 
from Norbert Wiener and Johnny Von Neumann to Claude Shannon and Heinz 
von Foerster; from Kurt Lewin to Erik Erikson, R.D. Laing, and Adelbert 
Ames; from Konrad Lorenz to John Lilly; and including too many other 
luminaries to even list, reads like a who's who of the leading thinkers 
of the first two thirds of this century. 
What Bateson shared with all of them was a predilection for the 
most fundamental questions. What set him apart was the peculiarly 
reflexive nature of his fundamental questions: what is mind? how does 
it learn and evolve? what kind of explanation do such questions 
require? what other questions require this same sort of explanation, 
and why? Questions like these, that reflect upon their own 
foundations, are the province of philosophy and it is fitting that 
Bateson eventually came to understand his field as natural epistemology 
-- and fitting that the field he so described didn't really fit with 
any field of study he knew. His new science, the ecology of ideas, 
would be included today within the emerging, still not fully shaped 
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field of cognitive science. Bateson's task was to sketch its 
epistemological foundations. 
To understand the magnitude of Bateson's task, consider the 
challenge it presented to the main thrust of the behavioral sciences as 
this century began. Bateson was well aware of the historical 
development whereby the older, more theoretically developed physical 
sciences became the touchstone for the emerging biological and 
behavioral sciences of the 19th century. The problem these latter 
sciences faced was how to ascend from the fundamental levels of organic 
chemistry to the macroscopic levels of observed behavior in organisms; 
or, going in the other direction, how to descend from the highest 
levels of analysis back to their biochemical foundations -- in other 
words, how to ground truths at the higher level in the truths of the 
lower. 
Bateson's contention was that the choice of energy as the bridge 
between "behavioral data and the fundamentals of physical and chemical 
science" was understandable but wrong, that the bridge had thus been 
built "to the wrong half of the ancient dichotomy of form and 
substance". The result, Bateson said, was the proliferation of 
heuristic concepts in place of fundamental principles, an over-emphasis 
on induction at the expense of deductive theory, and a lot of misplaced 
effort: "a very large part of the fundamental structure of nineteenth- 
century science," Bateson argued, was simply "inappropriate or 
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irrelevant to the problems and phenomena which confronted the biologist 
and behavioral scientist" (Bateson 1972, xxi). His remedy, and his 
task, was to "revisit the ancient dichotomy" and build a new bridge 
"between the facts of life and behavior and what we know today of the 
nature of pattern and order" (Ibid., xxvi). 
In our account of the history of speculation on how humankind comes 
to pursue achievement, we have returned time and again to that ancient 
dichotomy and to the various attempts to bridge it. Aristotle built 
his bridge between form and substance on the foundation of final 
causality, its keystone being the Unmoved Mover who was not only the 
ultimate end but also the ultimate source of all motion and, hence, of 
efficient causality. The concepts of purpose and hierarchy, which were 
teleology's essential intellectual contributions, both pointed, 
unfortunately, toward a theological terminus in a history of ideas in 
which science gradually gained sway over faith. 
Modern science, if not the modern age itself, can fairly be said to 
begin with Galileo's rejection of teleology in favor of the 
mathematical analysis of motion within the explanatory framework 
provided by efficient causality. The understanding of organic life and 
behavior without the concepts of purpose and hierarchy, however, proved 
more difficult than some of the early physicalists, at least, 
anticipated. While teleology clearly lost that longest of wars, it 
must be said that efficient causality managed but a rather Pyrrhic 
316 
victory. Hume's radical skepticism, born of the same empirical spirit 
that animated modern science, stripped away most of what was once 
understood as causality though it took several hundred years for the 
full implications to sink in. 
What was once the universal and all-encompassing rational necessity 
of efficient causation has been reduced in the 20th century to 
mathematical correlations indicating functional dependence. These more 
than adequately serve the purpose of the physical sciences, which is to 
predict (and thus, control) the phenomena of experience within an 
elegant theoretical structure of deductively arranged and empirically 
grounded propositions. They do not fulfill the purposes of the 
behavioral sciences, however. 
It is not that correlations can not be made, or that behavior can 
not be predicted and controlled -- they certainly can in most of the 
biological/ behavioral world, including the realms of human behavior. 
But there is too little usable theory, too much that is not explained 
by antecedent conditions, and too much that passes for science that, 
Bateson warns, is simply wrong. 
It might be helpful to lay the ancient dichotomy out visually to 
see where Bateson's new bridgehead takes us: 
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FORMAL CAUSE FINAL CAUSE 
MATERIAL CAUSE -- EFFICIENT CAUSE 
It is easy to map the connections among these. Bateson's dichotomy 
of form and substance splits the top from the bottom half of the 
table. Plato and Aristotle and the whole of German idealism stands 
above, the scientific sensibility, from atomists to Skinnerists, sits 
below. Historically, emphasis seems to circle clockwise, as in the 
ancient world: from the Ionians' underlying substance to Plato's 
formative ideas, on to Aristotle's ends. In the modern era, 
Aristotle's finality is surpassed by Newtonian mechanics, which is 
upstaged in turn by modern physics' return to ultimates. If Bateson is 
correct, and there are many signs he is, the time is come again for 
sciences of form and pattern. 
There is another dichotomy cutting vertically, with the causes for 
things being what they are on the left, and the causes for why things 
happened as they did on the right. Dividing the terms this way 
emphasizes the split between Plato's mathematicism and Aristotle's 
empiricism, and between Newton's and Neils Bohr's physics. It also 
questions any ultimate distinction between causes coming before and 
after the fact, and between ultimate particles and ultimate ideas. 
Bateson looks at these pairs together and sees linear and circular 
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causality, entropy and organization. He sees an emergence of top from 
bottom. Logically, the progression runs counter-clockwise, from 
physical substances subject to linear causality, which occasionally 
feed back into circular causal systems, which are then subject to the 
patterns and hierarchies that the cognitive sciences have uncovered. 
These systems eventually die or disorganize, leaving only their 
physical elements. 
What Bateson and the other cyberneticists realized back in the Macy 
Conferences of the 1940's was that the tenacity of teleological 
explanations both in every-day speech and in the applied behavioral 
sciences could be accounted for in terms of the formal properties of 
systems of reciprocal causality. They realized that organization and 
information were subject to rules beyond the regularities of linear 
cause and effect. They realized that these rules were inherent in the 
phenomena and not imposed by us. They realized that truth in this 
domain was established deductively rather than inductively, and that a 
new array of logical and mathematical tools would be needed to capture 
it. 
What Bateson and his colleagues offerred was a type of explanation 
that relies neither on antecedent conditions nor on purposes to be 
realized after the event. It relies instead on identifying the 
patterns or forms, the fundamental logical structures, that govern 
interactive systems subject to feedback and responsive to difference. 
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While it can't tell us which social interactions underlie the 
commitment to achievement, it can tell us that neither competition nor 
dominance/submission alone can provide a full explanation. While it 
can't tell us who might be honored for their achievements, it can tell 
us that whoever who has undertaken the pursuit of achievement will not 
be dissuaded from it by a failure to win honors. This pattern of not 
predicting what will happen but, rather, what won't is characteristic 
of what Bateson called "cybernetic explanation": 
Causal explanation is usually positive. We say that billaird ball 
B moved in such and such a direction because billiard ball A hit it 
at such and such an angle. In contrast to this, cybernetic 
explanation is always negative. We consider what alternative 
possibilities could conceivably have occurred and then ask why many 
of the alternatives were not followed, so that the particular event 
was one of those few which could, in fact, occur. . . . 
The negative form of these explanations is precisely comparable to 
the form of logical proof by reduction ad absurdum. In this 
species of proof, a sufficient set of mutually exclusive 
alternative propositions is enumerated, e.g., "P" and "not P," and 
the process of proof procedes by demonstrating that all but one of 
this set are untenable or "absurd." It follows that the surviving 
member of the set must be tenable within the terms of the logical 
system. (Bateson 1972, 399-400) 
The events that are deemed "untenable" through cybernetic 
explanation become so by virtue of the restraints operating on the 
system. Sometimes they are purely logical, like the impossibility of 
stochastic process without a source of random variation; more often, 
the restraints operate through feedback or redundancy. Feedback 
restrains the possibities of variance in a system in ways we've already 
examined. Redundancy introduces pattern and predictability into 
aggregates, thereby restraining the possibility of items that don't fit 
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the pattern. Communication is so rife with redundancies that w_ h_v 
n_ tr_bl_ r_d_ng th_s m_ss_g_, _v_n w_th th_ v_w_ls m_ss_ng. It is 
impossible for there to be consonants in most of those spaces, and 
indeed only certain vowels will do. 
Another tactic of mathematical proof that helps give cybernetic 
explanation its power is the use of mapping or "rigorous metaphor": 
An algebraic proposition may, for example, be mapped onto a system 
of geometric coordinates and there proven by geometric methods. In 
cybernetics, mapping appears as a technique of explanation whenever 
a conceptual "model" is invoked or, more concretely, when a 
computer is used to simulate a complex communicational process. 
But this is not the only appearance of mapping in this science. 
Formal processes of mapping, translation, or transformation are, in 
principle, imputed to every step of any sequence of phenomena which 
the cyberneticist is attempting to explain . . . 
The relations which remain constant under such transformation may 
be of any conceivable kind. (Bateson 1972, 401) 
The simulation of mathematical proof in these emerging formal 
sciences, Bateson tells us, was new and "of more than trivial interest" 
{Ibid.). In effect, they provided another explanatory model to 
complement, and in some fields even replace, the reigning scientific 
paradigm. The conferees of the numerous Macy Conferences, continuously 
entitled "Feedback Mechanisms and Circular Causal Systems in Biological 
and Social Systems," were obviously well aware of the applicability of 
cybernetic tools to other sciences. Bateson did not invent these 
methodologies, but he was the first to seriously apply them across 
disciplinary lines, and he was the first to address their deeper 
philosophical implications. 
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In this study, we used Bateson's ideas and methods to understand 
why some people (and some societies) dedicate themselves to virtuosity 
and notable achievement. The question was first asked and answered by 
philosophers. In the 20th century, it has been asked by behavioral 
scientists. That it is still being asked by parents and teachers and 
those proposing educational reforms shows that the question is far from 
exhausted, and that what's been learned has been difficult to apply. 
Translating earlier answers into cybernetic terms and principles, and 
developing Bateson's own thoughts on the question gave us a way to 
assess the effectiveness of Bateson's challenge to the reigning methodo¬ 
logical paradigm in those fields. The approach seems effective. 
Because the question is significant for our understanding of what it 
means to be human, the challenge is also significant. 
What is most striking about the results of Bateson's approach to 
the question of achievement is the prominence of contextual elements 
among the various explanatory components. To be sure, the commitment 
to achievement was placed in a social context by all who considered the 
matter, whether they attributed it to the pursuit of honor or 
dominance, or to the reinforcement of competitive and independent 
behavior in parent-child relationships. In Bateson's hands, however, 
what was originally considered a matter of individual character is 
recast as the internalized by-product of bi-polar, schismogenic 
interactions operating at the social level. What is internalized is a 
contextual learning that helps frame the events and determine the 
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choices that the individual feels are relevant and available to him. 
Bateson's own focus on the double binds involved in discipline and 
practice emphasizes potential conflicts at the contextual level and 
suggests transcontextual skills as the way to overcome them and use 
them in pursuit of achievement. 
Bateson's insistence on the primacy of context is, of course, part 
and parcel of his cybernetic approach: 
This hierarchy of contexts within contexts is universal for the 
communicational . . . aspect of phenomena and drives the scientist 
always to seek for explanation in the ever larger units. It may 
(perhaps) be true in physics that the explanation of the 
macroscopic is to be sought in the microscopic. The opposite is 
usually true in cybernetics: without context, there is no 
communication. (Bateson 1972, 402) 
Where I believe Bateson made his own most important contribution to 
the behavioral sciences is precisely in this area of contextual 
learning and in his general theory of an hierarchy of levels in 
learning. The definition of character as the aggregate of our 
contextual learnings as determined by our social interactions, and of 
transcontextual skills as the ways in which we become aware of our 
ability to learn at this level has potentially major ramifications 
throughout the behavioral sciences. 
It certainly carries major implications for the whole program of 
behaviorist psychology. What makes Bateson's challenge so critical for 
behaviorists is that he uses their language. He comes out of the 
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empiricist tradition. That Bateson seems readier than they are to 
distinguish a contextual level of learning stems, in part, from the 
behaviorists' historical embrace of reductionism and linear causation. 
But Bateson's insistence on the importance of social interaction in the 
learning process also plays a role. The associational learning theory 
of which behaviorism is the fruit had its seeds in the social atomism 
of Hobbes and the other social contract theorists. The behaviorists' 
preoccupation with laboratory animals only reinforces their tendency to 
see learning as something the individual accomplishes in response to 
its external environment. Bateson's background in social anthropology 
led him to place far greater emphasis on the structures of interaction - 
- on kinship systems, value systems, and so on -- in determining an 
individual's patterns of learning and behavior. 
The circular causality of the social interactions which shape 
individual behavior is not assimilable to the model of efficient 
causality. Nor is it congruent with the sort of explanation provided 
by behaviorism: although reinforcement supplies behaviorists with a 
basic feedback mechanism for learning, the possibility of two or more 
individuals mutually reinforcing a complementary or symmetrical 
response in each other in an ongoing relationship subject to runaway 
goes quite beyond the model. It also goes well beyond the social 
anthropology which Bateson started with. Social anthropology arose in 
opposition to Herbert Spencer and others caught up in the Darwinian 
revolution, "who attempted to fabricate the evolutionary development of 
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all cultures" (Upset 1980, 123). It tended to downplay the role of 
temporal development. In anthropological terms, it preferred 
"synchronic" over "diachronic" analysis. 
Skinner refers to this sort of approach as "structuralism," and 
rejects it as an "attempt to abandon the search for causes and simply 
describe what people do" (Skinner 1974, 12). This is a fair charge 
against all the classification systems of which social anthropologists 
are so fond. It is a fair description of Bateson's early work on eidos 
and ethos. But Bateson took an important step beyond a merely 
descriptive approach with his analysis of schismogenesis, which implied 
a dynamic, temporal development and required constraints. Skinner 
acknowledges the availability of various explanatory approaches within 
the structuralist position, but he is not impressed with any of them. 
He is as cognizant as Bateson that there is a mode of explanation at 
work here which is incompatible with efficient causality: 
Structuralism often goes beyond mere description, and one of its 
strategies has had a very long history. When the notion of a 
functional relation was not yet fully understood, explanations of 
phenomena were sought in their structures. ... It has been said 
that from Plato to Kepler mathematics was not regarded as 
describing celestial motion but as explaining it. The search for 
explanation in form or structure goes on. Gestalt psychology tried 
to supplement the structural notion of habit formation with 
organizational principles. Mathematical properties hold their old 
explanatory force; it has been said, for example, that for one 
anthropologist "the relations of kinship do not evolve as much as 
they tend to express algebraic relations" [author's note: Skinner 
typically doesn't bother to cite references, and I can only guess 
that the last reference is to Claude Levi-Strauss; who's being 
quoted is anybody's guess.] [Ibid., 74) 
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Skinner identifies the issue without resolving it. Can mathematics 
explain as well as describe? Is there a formal causality? It can, if 
pattern and number somehow inform our world. Communication is that 
information system. Skinner lived to witness the rise of cognitive 
science on foundations laid by cybernetics, information theory, and the 
other mathematical approaches that Bateson employed, and he was 
certainly aware of their tendency to dismiss behaviorism like an 
outgrown garment; but he never seemed to muster a general counter¬ 
attack on the order of the one he managed against mental ism. 
His main complaint was that construction of what he called a 
"conceptual nervous system" continued to "turn attention inward, away 
from a genetic and personal history" (Ibid., 240). This is fair with 
respect to those researchers in artificial intelligence, for instance, 
who presume to study the software of learning independently of the 
hardware, electronic or neural, that it runs on. A psychology of human 
behavior that does not take genetics or personal history into account 
is incomplete. But this charge is not fairly levelled against Bateson, 
whose Mind and Nature is a full length study of the interaction between 
evolution and learning; whose emphasis on the interactional contexts in 
which learning occurs is inherently developmental; and who rejects 
"factitious inner tendencies" no less resolutely than Skinner himself. 
Bateson's challenge to behaviorism lies not in the construction of 
a conceptual nervous system, but in his proposal for a more adequate, 
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complex, and complete learning theory. The continuing reliance of 
empirical behavioral research in the English speaking world on the 
learning principles of an associational psychology more than 300 years 
old is no longer tenable. That it still commands such devotion as it 
does can only be attributed to the inertia of tradition and to the 
faith that, eventually, all knowledge of behavior will be reducible to 
the linear causality of biochemical processes. That we already know 
neurons to be connected in a bewildering array of interconnected 
circuits, and that such mutually causal systems form hierarchies whose 
effects are not predictable with the limited mathematical tools of the 
old models will only slowly change the way psychology is taught and 
pursued. In the meantime, cognitive scientists from other fields will 
be grabbing more and more of what was once psychology's turf. 
A similar set of issues is likely to arise between the new 
cognitive sciences advocated by Bateson and the still growing field of 
sociobiology, but there is likely to be more room for accomodation 
between them. Sociobiologists are already focused on populations and 
on socially defined behaviors. Their mathematical tools are extensive 
and already include information theory and cybernetics (cf., Wilson 
1975, 100; 299). Bateson shares more conceptual ground with the 
sociobiology than perhaps any other field. There are still 
differences, however. 
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The famous entomologist and sociobiologist Edward Wilson has argued 
that sociobiology represents the possibility of a "new synthesis," in 
terms rather like those that Bateson proposes for his ecology of 
ideas. He complains, as Skinner does, that sociology "still stands 
apart from sociobiology because of its largely structuralist and 
nongenetic approach" (Ibid., 4), but he believes that will change: 
It may not be too much to say that sociology and the other social 
sciences, as well as the humanities, are the last branches of 
biology waiting to be included in the Modern Synthesis. One of the 
functions of sociobiology, then, is to reformulate the foundations 
of the social sciences in a way that draws these subjects into the 
Modern Synthesis. Whether the social sciences can be truly 
biologicized in this fashion remains to be seen. (Ibid.) 
The caution that Bateson would urge on the sociobiologists concerns 
their sometimes dormitive appeal to genetic factors. A good example 
can be found in Wilson's discussion of warfare in genetic selection, 
where he reviews some of the previous research and makes some state¬ 
ments of his own that Bateson would likely take issue with. The 
research he reviews concerns the oft noted "benefits" conferred by war: 
These authors envision some of the "noblest" traits of mankind, 
including team play, altruism, patriotism, bravery on the field of 
battle, and so forth, as the genetic product of warfare. (Ibid., 
298) 
It would be a caricature to suggest that Wilson is proposing a gene 
for team play and another for altruism, patriotism, and the rest; but 
the gap between the genetic and the behavioral levels shouldn't be 
passed over too lightly. The connections between the two levels is 
devious and difficult to uncover, and the assumption of a specific 
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genetic mechanism leading to specific behaviors in humans is almost 
invariably wrong. Wilson recognizes this, but his emphasis on the 
genetic factors underlying educational and cultural advances can 
sometimes focus attention in the wrong places. Consider his thoughts 
on what might save a population at risk of victimization at the hands 
of a genocidal aggressor: 
The only combinations of genes able to confer superior fitness in 
contention with genocidal aggressors would be those that produce 
either a more effective technique of aggression or else the 
capacity to preempt genocide by some form of pacific maneuvering. 
Either probably entails mental and cultural advance. [Ibid.) 
Probably? Our search for the origins of achieving behavior 
suggests that the potential for "pacific maneuvering" would be 
available to any human society engaging in dominance/submission 
interactions -- which means virtually all of them. The key to whether 
they survived or not would depend on other feedbacks affecting the 
availability of the submissive response and on the abilities of 
individuals to generate and apply particularly effective submissive 
tactics. The emphasis of research here should be on social interaction 
and learning processes rather than genetic mechanisms, and it is not 
clear that the sociobiologists have anything new to offer on that 
score. 
Wilson recognizes that reduction from the behavioral to the 
neurophysical levels is problemmatic: 
329 
Whole patterns of animal behavior will inevitably be explained 
within the framework, first, of integrative neurophysiology, which 
classifies neurons and reconstructs their circuitry and, second, of 
sensory physiology, which seeks to characterize the cellular 
transducers at the molecular level ... To pass from this level 
and reach the next really distinct discipline, we must travel all 
the way up to the society and the population. Not only the the 
phenomena best described by families of models different from those 
of cellular and molecular biology, but the explanations become 
largelyevolutionary. (Ib/d., 6) 
As Skinner points out, however, evolutionary theory only tells us 
the contingencies of survival, which in human society at least is only 
a small part of the story; to uncover the contingencies of 
reinforcement that underlie learning and cultural advance will take a 
science of behavior. And we can be sure, if Bateson's approach has any 
validity at all, that biology can not hope to do for human societies 
what Wilson hopes it will one day do for insect societies: 
. . . [T]here exists among experimentalists a shared faith that 
characterizes the reductionist spirit in biology generally, that in 
time all the piecemeal analyses will permit the reconstruction of 
the full system in vitro. In this case an in vitro reconstruction 
would mean the full explanation of social behavior by means of 
integrative mechanisms experimentally demonstrated and the proof of 
that explanation by the artificial induction of the complete 
repertory of social responses on the part of isolated members of 
insect colonies. (Wilson 1978, 319) 
To what extent is sociobiology, like the associational psychology 
of behaviorism, inherently reductionist despite all disclaimers? That 
so many of Bateson's ideas and approaches could be taken for 
sociobiology suggests that it needn't be. But to the extent that the 
reductionist spirit still informs sociobiology, Bateson will remain 
just outside it. He is certainly clear on this: The interacting, 
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hierarchal circuits of mutual cause and effect that make up human 
social behavior can never be reconstructed out of that part which is an 
isolated human subsystem -- any more than the workings of a brain can 
be reconstructed from the firings of a single neuron, or the workings 
of language from examining a single word. 
Perhaps the homeostatic worlds of ants will one day be reduced to a 
catalog of their integrative biochemical mechanisms. Ours is not that 
kind of a world: there is less "hard wiring", Bateson would say, hence 
more flexibility and more divergence in our social process. 
Cybernetics presents a top-down world, where what a thing is and does 
is defined by context, and contexts are not stable: social process is 
marked by schismogenic divergences and painful double binds, and by the 
learning of transcontextual skills that can help us use these to our 
own ends. Individualities are submerged here, nested like boxes in a 
Chinese puzzle. We need to understand this world we've built no less 
than the one that built us. Evolutionary history can only tell us so 
much. It needs need a better theory of learning than behaviorism. 
It is not that the laws of cause and effect don't operate in this 
world of communicated information, but that this world has its own 
rules as well. And there's no going back: Bateson took the 
sociobiological idea that "the higher properties of life are emergent" 
a step farther out, into an emergent world of form and communication 
from which there was no return but death or disintegration. If Bateson 
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is right and there are two worlds of explanation, ontologically 
intertwined but epistemologically separate, then there is no reduction 
of one to the other. 
So where does all this finally leave us in evaluating Bateson's 
achievement? 
I suspect biographer Upset's assessment that Bateson wasn't a 
truly original thinker will prove less insightful than Donaldson's 
suggestion that he might prove a "harbinger." Bateson's early work on 
schismogenesis, his theory of the double bind, and his later 
ruminations on the boundaries of self and mind all mark him as an 
original, if not a seminal thinker. He may not have had a major 
influence, but that is not what a harbinger does. Like the wave that 
sweeps unexpectedly over the beach, it tells of the tide to come and 
then recedes, not advancing the next wave in any obvious way. Bateson 
is a transitional figure, but because he was ahead of his time instead 
of behind it, he will remain a difficult thinker to assess for some 
time to come. Cognitive science is too new for retrospective 
reassessments. 
In the great age of analysis that was the 20th century, he may be 
remembered as one of the few great synthesists, able to cross the 
boundaries from discipline to discipline, sharing insights, finding 
common ground, seeking always for the pattern that connects. The 
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remarkable thing is that he found it. In his later years, Bateson 
became increasingly bleak about the prospects for humanity. Caught as 
we are in self-reinforcing epistemological errors, he feared we had 
little hope of collective self-correction. And yet Bateson's last 
years were also marked by a spiritual quest that brought him to the 
study of Zen Buddhism, Taoism, and the possibilities of an emergent 
Mind within the evolutionary process. He began to envision an 
epistemology of the sacred. In the 20th century, he was one of the 
very few whose science reached so far. 
I think Bateson will finally be remembered as a behavioral 
philosopher, much as we used to speak of natural philosophers, and that 
his reputation will rest on his work in epistemology and the philosophy 
of science. It is not a field likely to secure great fame, but it is 
the infrastructure on which others may one day build great 
achievements. Perhaps none of his accomplishments will long outlive 
him. Perhaps Bateson did not so much break new ground as, in Eliot's 
words, "to arrive where we started and know the place for the first 
time." But that in itself is quite an achievement. 
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